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Introduction 
The relevance of the topic of this thesis. The Central Asian region (CAR) is a new 
geopolitical structure that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From being a 
peripheral region, as part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for more than 120 
years, the region has become the knot of intersection of competing multidirectional 
interests of external actors in the 21st century.  
The transformation of the Soviet Central Asian republics into independent subjects 
of international relations has increased significantly the attention of the political and 
business circles, the military and diplomatic agencies of the world’s leading countries, 
and the international scientific community. The CAR is under constant global monitoring 
in numerous monographs, research reports and articles, the media, and conferences.  
On the one hand, the current geopolitical importance of the region is determined by 
its natural resources; it reserves control over these and it regulates the transit of energy 
resources (including Caspian hydrocarbons) and other strategic raw materials towards the 
world’s largest economies. On the other, the escalation of instability in the Middle East 
and North Africa, as well as the attempts of international terrorism and religious 
extremism to penetrate into Central Asia has turned the region into one of the most 
important frontiers in the world community in countering the threats to international 
security. Overall, in recent years, the relocation of many international processes from 
Europe to Asia means that the CAR will become a geopolitical pivot in subsequent 
possible geostrategic scenarios. 
Nonetheless, Central Asian developments are not limited to its geopolitical aspects; 
the countries of the region have carried out and are continuing to encounter a huge number 
of political and economic transformations. The choice of political and economic 
orientations will predetermine the future developmental trajectory of the Central Asian 
region and its countries.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the institutional and socio-economic 
evolution of the (CAR) and its states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan) after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gaining of independence 
within the framework of the influence of Soviet heritage and the movement of the world 
community toward globalization.  
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Organization of the study. The thesis consists of an introduction, two chapters, a 
conclusion, and a bibliography.  
Chapter 1 defines geographically the different possible boundaries of the CAR, 
which over the centuries were part of different empires, kingdoms, and states, and the 
population of which historically de jure and de facto never had their independent national 
statehood until 1991. The study also focuses on the consequences of the policy of the 
ethnic and territorial division adopted in the Soviet era in Central Asia on the current 
political instability in the region. 
The chapter analyzes the features and results of the transformation of the Soviet 
political system into a Western democratic system in the states of Central Asia. In the 
early stages of independence, the ruling elites of the Central Asian republics declared that 
they would build democratic states, but in practice, in all of them there was an 
authoritarian throwback and movement toward the strengthening of the regime for 
personal presidential power. Why did Central Asian countries abandon communism for 
democracy, but then turn to authoritarian rule? This paper proposes a theoretical 
framework to explain the phenomenon of durability and sustainability of the super-
presidential Central Asian regimes, and the key factors that have largely determined the 
failure of a democratic transition in all five post-Soviet republics. Special attention is 
given to the issues of political legitimacy of the current authoritarian regimes and the 
prospects of further democratic modernization.  
Chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of the main features and results of the socio-
economic transformation of the Soviet planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
in Central Asian states. The research area covers several periods: the period of deep 
recession against the background of the disintegration of the USSR (1991-1999); the post-
transitional period defined in this paper from 2000 up to today given the fact that the 
world community has already recognized Kazakhstan (the largest economy in the region) 
and Kyrgyzstan as the countries with market economies.  
The chapter investigates the structural change in the five Central Asian economies 
that have allowed them to be ranked in terms of socio-economic development levels and 
models. State capitalism and critical dependence on external factors have become today 
the main common features of all these economies.    
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The second chapter describes the restrictions imposed on the Central Asian 
commodity and labor exported economies and the protectionist policies adopted by the 
national governments. The restrictive trade policies are aimed at reducing the economies’ 
vulnerability to external shocks, which are due to the high sectorial and geographical 
concentration of exports, significant migrants’ remittances and consistent foreign direct 
investment inflows. The chapter discusses the issues of regional cooperation and 
integration and the perspectives of sustainable economic development in the states of 
Central Asia.  
Finally, this study highlights the emerging challenges associated with the 
intersection of the competitive multidirectional interests of the major world powers, 
which consistently expand and strengthen their control over the natural resources of the 
CAR. Through different economic instruments, such as providing loans and investments, 
or the formation of alternative macro-regional integration projects in Eurasia, they seek 
to achieve their ambitious strategic objectives in Central Asia.  
The methodological foundations of the thesis include systematic, institutional, 
historical, comparative, and other scientific approaches, as well as a wide range of modern 
methods of political, economic, and other interdisciplinary sciences (such as analysis and 
synthesis, analogy, hypothesis, classification, descriptive statistics, economic-
mathematical methods and models).  
The theoretical and empirical foundations of the study. Empirical information 
was provided by the constitutional laws and official documents regulating the activity of 
the supreme government bodies of the Central Asian states, and by the speeches of 
political leaders and diplomats of the Central Asian countries, Russia, the United States, 
European Union, China and others. The study has reviewed the analytical and statistical 
materials of scientific conferences, different research institutes and international 
organizations (UN, CIS, CSTO, SCO, EU, World Bank, Eurostat, IMF, IFAD and others). 
It has also analyzed publications in electronic and print media and scientific 
communication. Moreover, this study includes statistical data of the Soviet period not 
previously used in research papers.  
The originality of the study. Previous studies in this field of research focus on 
limited periods of political and economic development of Central Asian states, or they 
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have not taken into consideration the impact of Soviet heritage on the outcomes of the 
transformational process unfolding in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR. This 
thesis represents an attempt to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
institutional and socio-economic evolution of Central Asian countries over the almost 25-
year period of independent existence.  
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Chapter I. The history of the formation of the Central Asian region and features of 
the political transformation of its states after gaining independence 
 
1.1 The historical background of the Central Asian region  
The history of the Central Asian region located at the heart of Eurasia is very rich. 
Since ancient times, this huge arid landlocked area has served as the generator of 
population movements within the Eurasian continent. 
In this extensive continental landmass of the planet, its one natural resource-grass, 
served as fodder for horses and ensured the existence of one of the most formidable forms 
of state of its time: the nomadic empires. Horses and nomadic people of the steppe that 
moved on them were the engine of the military machine that prevailed for thousands of 
years in this area. The constant interaction between sedentary civilizations with 
successive waves of steppe nomads on horseback became the leitmotif that passes through 
the history of Central Asia. Migration and recurrent shocks of military invasion, in 
combination with the mixing and replacement of peoples and cultures maintained 
this spacious region extending from the Caspian Sea to the high plateau of Mongolia in 
constant change and flux (Dani et al, 1992; Kuzishchin, 2003; Bradley, 2011).   
Over the centuries, commercial communication and cultural exchange passed 
through this region with the help of the Great Silk Road defined by Boulnois (2005; cited 
in Bradley, 2011, p.29)  as “an island of peace in a sea of wars”, which combined into 
one two Great Roads. One, coming from the West, from the Mediterranean to Central 
Asia, explored and traversed by the Greeks and the Macedonians in the military 
campaigns of Alexander the Great to the East in the 4th century BC. Another, coming 
from the East, from the Han Empire in Central Asia, explored by the Chinese in the 2nd 
century BC during the first diplomatic mission headed by Zhang Qian and later renewed 
for owning the “heavenly horses” from Fergana Valley.  
These caravan routes named silken by a Venetian merchant traveler Marco Polo 
were the crossroads of civilizations between East and West. For some 1,500 years to the 
beginning of the 15th century until the European powers started gaining ground and  
alternative maritime trade routes replaced the traditional land pathway, the Great Silk 
Road was crucial as the route along which people, merchandise and ideas flowed between 
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China, India, Iran and Europe.  Nevertheless, Central Asia was more than a territory of 
transit, and its history and culture are much more than the sum of the influences brought 
from the East and West1. For century after century, the region experienced the impact of 
foreign influence, colliding and merging with the indigenous features of Central Asia.  
Throughout its history, the different parts of the region administratively and 
territorially were part of unstable empires, kingdoms, and states2. The population of this 
region, historically de jure and de facto never had their own independent national 
statehood until late 1991. 
The documented history of Central Asia began in the 6th century BC when the Great 
Achaemenid Empire of Persia (now Iran) created in Central Asia different satellite 
kingdoms, the satrapies (provinces). Sanai (2002, p.15) argues that “most of the current 
territory of Central Asia was part of the Persian civilization even before the advent of 
Islam, and even before the advent of Christianity.” According to Dani et al (1992, p.6), 
“the influence of Iran - although the core of its civilization lies in South-West Asia - was 
particularly strong, to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to establish a clear boundary 
between the civilization of the Iranian motherland and that of the outlying lands of Central 
Asia.” 
After the Arab conquest at the dawn of the 8th century, in the territory between the 
Caspian Sea and the Amu Darya, the population of the region was converted to Islam and 
entered into trade and cultural relations with the rest of the Muslim world. The impact of 
Islam was pervasive and fundamental. Nowadays, Islam is considered in Central Asia as 
the most important component of the cultural and civilizational traditions. 
                                                          
1 The region gave the world famous scientists, philosophers, and poets such as Al-Farabi, Al-Biruni, Al-
Samarkandi, Avicenna, Firdawsi (the author of the Shahnameh), Omar Khayyam and the list continues. 
2 In ancient times this territory was under the rule of the Achaemenid Empire (Ancient Persia, now Iran), 
Empire of Alexander the Great, the Seleucid Empire (a Hellenistic state), the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom (a 
Hellenistic state), and the Kushan Empire. In the Middle Ages, different parts of the region were under 
control of the Hephthalite Empire (408–670), the Turkic Khaganate (552–744), the Samanid Empire (819-
999), the Kara-Khanid Khanate (840–1212), the Seljuk Empire (1037–1194), the Khwarezmian Empire 
(1077-1231), the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan (1206–1368), the Timurid Empire (1370–1507). In the 
feudal period, the territory was part of Uzbek Khanate that included three states: Bukhara Emirate (1785-
1920), Khanate of Khiva (1511-1920) and Kokand Khanate (1709-1876). From 1860, most of modern 
Central Asia came under control of the Russian Empire (Russian Turkestan), and later, after the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, became part of the Soviet Union (Kuzishchin, 2003). 
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The historical and cultural ties with Turkey were and currently remain very strong. 
The ethnic group native of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
descends from nomadic Turks. Tajikistan is the only non-Turkic state in Central Asia. 
The population of Tajikistan is mostly Persian - speaking.                 
The main migration of Turkic peoples occurred between the 5th and 10th centuries, 
when they spread across most of Central Asia. Since the 11th century, when the region 
was invaded by the Oghuz Turks and fell under control of the Seljuk Empire, the peoples 
in the region have considered themselves descendants of this Seljuk Oghuz tribe 
(Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1993).  
Until the Mongol conquest in the 13th century (from which the sedentary 
populations of Central Asia would be recovered only 600 years later during the Russian 
colonization) Central Asia was one of the most economically and culturally developed 
regions of its time. In the late Middle Ages, the worldwide known blue-domed cities of 
Central Asia such as Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva established themselves as 
outstanding centers of intellectual learning and artistic creation. 
In this “Turco-Persian” cultural world (Cummimgs, 2012) the Russian influence, in 
historical terms, was a recent phenomenon and will be discussed in detail in this paper.  
In 1844, the geographer Alexander von Humboldt introduced the first definition of 
Central Asia as a distinct world region. With the term Central Asia, he outlined all internal 
parts of the Asian continent, extending from the Caspian Sea to the west and to the rather 
uncertain border to the east (Humboldt, 1844; cited in Laumulin, 2009).  
The modern definitions of this region vary, due to the lack of clear physical 
geographical borders in the northern part of the region. As shown in figure 1.1, there are 
different views on the possible boundaries and definitions of the Central Asian region. 
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Figure 1.1. Map of Central Asia in conformity with different definitions of 
the Central Asia region 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Central_Asia    
 
According to the UNESCO definition (Dani et al, 1992), Central Asia occupies a 
vast space in the Eurasian heartland from the Caspian Sea in the west to central China in 
the east, and from southern Russia in the north to northern India in the south. This 
definition includes five former Central Asian Soviet republics as well as Mongolia, 
western China, northern Afghanistan, northern India, northern Pakistan, northeastern 
Iran, southern Siberia. As follows from this definition, the Asian part of Russia outside 
the taiga zone (the northern part of the region) is considered part of Central Asia. 
Laumulin (2009) asserts that this point of view deserves the right to exist because the 
modern regions of the Russian Federation such as Altai, southern Siberia, Yakutia, 
Buryatia, as well as the rudiments of the Golden Horde in the Volga and the Urals regions 
are referred to by oriental studies as fragments of historical Central Asia.  
According to historical definitions of the region (Kurecic, 2010), this vast space 
representing Central Asia was called Turkestan. In the second half of the 19th century 
Turkestan was conditionally subdivided into Western (Russian), Eastern (China), 
Southern (northern part of Afghanistan and Iran). Modern Central Asia is a historical and 
geographical region that in terms of area is almost synonymous with Russia or Western 
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Turkestan (the obsolete name of the region during the rule of Russian Empire from 1867 
to 1917). 
The official Soviet definitions of Central Asia refer to the part of Central Asia 
formerly controlled by the USSR during the period of Soviet administration (1918-1991). 
Soviet Central Asia went through many territorial divisions before the current borders 
were created between the 1920s and 1930s (Luong, 2002). With the definitive borders, a 
“Central Asian economic region” included Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republics (Kazakh SSR was referred to as another economic region). In 1992, 
soon after achieving independence, the leaders of the four former Soviet Central Asian 
Republics met in Uzbekistan and declared that the definition of Central Asia should 
include Kazakhstan as well as the four original States. Since then, this has become the 
most common definition of Central Asia, which took a firm place in modern political and 
scientific use. 
In this context, the map charted by Laura Canali gives the three different definitions 
of Central Asia (figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2. Three definitions of Central Asia charted by Laura Canali 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-primavera-araba-non-arrivera-in-asia-centrale. Il marchio 
giallo, Limes 3/2008.  
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According to the first definition, the Central Asian region located between 30° and 
55° latitude north and 55° and 120° longitude east. As is evident, this definition does not 
include the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea rich in natural energy resources. The second 
definition of Central Asia includes in itself the area of former historical Turkestan 
(Western Turkestan, Eastern Turkestan and the Hindu Kush or South Turkestan). Lastly, 
the third definition of Central Asia refers to the territory of five post-Soviet states: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
Another method for determining the boundaries of modern Central Asia takes into 
consideration the ethnic composition of the population (De Blij et al, 2004). According 
to this method, Central Asia is considered a region inhabited by Eastern Turkic peoples, 
the Mongols and Tibetans, and includes the former Soviet Central Asian republics, 
China’s Xinjiang, northern Afghanistan, southern Siberia, Mongolia, and Tibet (figure 
1.3). These ethnical and cultural criteria do not completely define the borders of Central 
Asia to the north, since a mixture of Slavic (Russian) populations with Kazakhs live in 
Kazakhstan. Russian minorities are also present in other Central Asian countries, because 
of the Russian dominance of these areas that ended only in recent history. 
In political science works, reports on Central Asia analyze the energy aspects of the 
situation around the Caspian Sea (which can be classified also as a salt lake). Onshore 
and offshore oil and gas fields make Central Asia a prime object for many relevant 
geopolitical and geoeconomic studies, including Russia’s territories bordering with 
Kazakhstan - the Astrakhan region in the west and the Altai Territory in the east 
(Bogaturov, 2010).  
For the purpose of this research, in determining Central Asia we will refer to the 
modern political borders of the following five post-Soviet Central Asian republics: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (figure 1.4).   
Moreover, in this paper, with reference to the five Central Asian states, we will also 
use a well-established concept of political science: “the Central Asian region” (hereinafter 
– CAR).  
1
1
 
 
 
Source: Perry Castenada Map Library at the University of Texas (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/casia_ethnic_93.jpg). 
Figure 1.3. Major ethnic groups and population density in Central Asia 
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          Figure 1.4. The modern political borders of the Central Asia states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kurecic, 2010, p.25. 
 
The five countries that are referred to here as the CAR occupy a territory of 
approximately 4 million square kilometers with about 69 million inhabitants3. About 70 
percent of the territory of the CAR is occupied by Kazakhstan that is also the second 
largest country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the ninth largest 
country in the world. Central Asia is one of the most sparsely populated regions in the 
world, despite the observable steady growth of the population in recent years. The 
population density of the region is only 16.6 people per sq.km. (by comparison, the 
population density in the European Union is about 116.4 people per sq.km.4) However, 
despite its generally low human density, the region is heavily overpopulated in its agrarian 
zones. The situation is particularly acute in the Fergana Valley, with more than 14 million 
inhabitants (20 percent of the Central Asian population) and levels of human density 
reaching 559 persons per sq.km around Andijan (Laruelle et al, 2013), (figure 1.3). 
The Central Asian population is a mixture of more than 100 different ethnic groups. 
The largest ethnic group are Uzbeks. Uzbekistan is also the most densely populated 
region; 30.5 million people live there, or about 44 percent of the total population of 
                                                          
3 http://www.cisstat.com/eng/ (Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, 2014). 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00003&plugin=1  
European Commission, Eurostat (the last date available is in 2013). 
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Central Asia. Within the region, the level of urbanization (number of people living in 
urban areas) varies from 26.7 to 53.3 percent of the total population by countries (table 
1.1, table 1.2 and figure 1.5). 
 
Table 1.1. Territory and some Central Asian region data 
  Sources: World Bank, CIA (The World Factbook, 2014).                                                                                                                 
 
Table 1.2. The dynamics of the population of Central Asia from the years 1960 - 
1990 to 01.01.20155, mil. persons.    
Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan In total 
1960 9.8 2.1 2.1 1.6 8.4 23.9 
1990 16.3 4.4 5.2 3.6 20.2 49.8 
01.01.2015 17.4 5.9 8.4 6.7 30.5 68.9 
1990/1960,% 167 205 256 232 241 208 
2015/1990,% 107 135 160 185 151 139 
2015/1960,% 179 277 410 429 363 288 
  Sources: http://www.cisstat.com/public/cis-ec.pdf The European Union and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Statistical comparison (Содружество Независимых Государств и Европейский 
союз. Статистические сравнения), (2008, p.23); http://www.cisstat.com/eng/ Interstate Statistical 
Committee of the CIS (2015). 
 
 
                                                          
5 Turkmenistan's population on 01.01.2015 is given de facto at the beginning of 2006 because between 
2006 and the present time (2015) official publications of the country’s population were not present. 
Obtaining updates is not possible because Turkmenistan has the status of a neutral state and is closed to 
international experts and observers. 
 
 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan In total 
Country Area 
in sq.km  
2.724.900 199.951 143.100 488.100 447.400 4.003.451 
Population 
density sq.km 
5.94 27.4 59.2 10.5 75.8 16.6 
Urbanization, 
% of total 
population 
53.3 35.3 26.7 49.7 36.3  
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Figure 1.5. The dynamics of the population of Central Asia from the years 
1960 - 1990 to 01.01.2015 
Sources: Graph based on data of Table 1.2 
 
The data in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.5 demonstrate population growth in the states of 
the Central Asia region on 01.01.2015 by almost three times since the 1960s, and by 39 
percent since the 1990s. At the same time, the data represent a 26.3 percent reduction of 
population in the period from 1990 to 2015 in comparison with the period from 1960 to 
1990, which is primarily explained by the migration of the population for political and 
economic reasons in the first periods indicated.  
After gaining independence in the 1990s, new political elites in heterogeneous 
Central Asian societies aimed to promote and impose the culture of the dominant ethnics 
upon the rest of the society (Peyrouse, 2008). Adopting a police force favorable towards 
the titular population and unfavorable to the Russian population and other smaller 
minorities led to a strong external migration of the last ethnic groups. The outflow of the 
Russian population from Central Asian states that had started in the 1990s was one of the 
most significant in all the post-Soviet space. 
The number of Russians in Central Asia today is approximately about 4.7 to 5.3 
mil. people, or about 7-8 percent of the total population, that is, less than twice the number 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the 1990s, apart from the migration of non-
titular population for political reasons, another factor that influenced a reduction of 
population in Central Asian countries became the migration for economic reasons; 
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millions of unskilled workers were forced to look for permanent jobs in other countries, 
primarily, in Russia (Hoperskaya, 2013).  
In regard to “the political - psychological background” of the region, Bogaturov 
(2010, p.110) asserts that “the population of Central Asia, before it became part of the 
Soviet Union and was subjected to ethnic and territorial division, was unaware of «nation 
states» in the European sense of the term. The prevailing form of organization was a 
territorial-political formation based on the supra-ethnicity principle. The Emirates of 
Bukhara, the Kingdoms of Khiva and Kokand were motley oasis empires, united by the 
common possession of land and water resources and the ideology of religious solidarity.” 
In opinion the author, the modern political boundaries of the CAR have developed 
contrary to the logic of traditional «oasis thinking» of local residents based on 
identification with the territory of residence rather than one’s ethnic group. As a result, 
the political, military-strategic, economic and ethnic contours of the CAR do not always 
coincide with the existing division of Central Asia to the conventional geographic 
regions. Combined with the natural features of the relief (deserts, mountains, trails) vague 
representation about the boundaries is a prerequisite for the uncontrollable movement of 
people, smuggling goods (drug trafficking and weapons) and diffusion of conflicts.  
Bradley (2011, p.60) says that “before the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Central 
Asian peoples «ethnically» called themselves nomads or sart (sedentary), such as Turkish 
or Persian, or simply Muslim or according to membership to a particular tribe. Later, as 
ordered by Stalin, Soviet researchers «identified» different nationalities”. 
In fact, in the process of the national territorial delimitation or administrative-
territorial border changes the Soviet Central Asian space was divided into five national 
republics. This policy had the fundamental repercussions on the issue stateness6 and 
aggravated problems of access to local systems of land and water use that were not taken 
into account by this policy. The Soviet policy of the national territorial delimitation was 
primarily aimed at avoiding the complexities of the interaction with the different 
ethnicities groups existing in the region, and at reducing the spread and influence of pan-
Turkism in the region (de Blij et al, 2011).  
                                                          
6 In this context, “stateness” refers to the issues of the coincidence between the territory of a state and the 
national identity of those who live in the geographical territory (Dagiev, 2013). 
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According to Dagiev (2013, p.26-27)  “Stalin’s greatest victory was to have brought 
the intellectuals of Central Asia to a position defending their language and their «nation» 
against their neighbors, and not against Moscow, whom they called upon to assist in the 
mediation of conflict.” Roy (2000, p.55) adds that the “invention of ethnicity represented 
the culmination of Russian policy toward organising the indigenous peoples into more 
«manageable» and controllable units.”  
Thus, the policy of ethnic and territorial division carried out in the Soviet era led to 
the break of integrated territorial and supra-ethnicity of the Central Asian space; after 
gaining independence in 1991 this was exacerbated by the policy of ethno-national self-
determination conducted by authoritarian leaders of the new Central Asian republics (see 
part 1.2 of this paper).  
The Central Asian independents states are just beginning to develop inter-state 
cooperation, but the basis for internal unity that would make the CAR a definitively 
formed region has not yet been created. However, integration is a necessary precondition 
for the further political and economic development of this region (this concept will be 
examined in detail in Chapter II). 
 
1.2 The features of institutional transformation of Central Asian countries in 
the post-Soviet period  
The collapse of the USSR and “catapulting to independence” (Olcott, 1992, p.108) 
put before the peoples of Central Asia and their elites the challenges of building a strong 
national state with a stable political system and a dynamic economy in the context of 
increasing globalization. Prolonged coexistence of Central Asian states within the 
framework of one state (Russian Empire before and Soviet Union after), the proximity of 
culture of their peoples, a similar structure of the economy and traditions of the elite 
formation, contributed as a consequence to the emergence of very similar starting 
conditions for the construction of the independent states.  
However, the task of building stable political and economic systems has been 
resolved with varying success and with distinct features by the new independent 
republics.   
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The first years of independent development of the Central Asia states were at the 
same time a period of formation and evolution of transformation strategies of their 
economic and political systems designed and put forward by both external actors and 
local elites. 
Theoretically, the states of the region had different models of political and 
economic transformation from which they could choose: a) Western - political pluralism, 
developed civil society, open economy; b) Turkish - quite a liberal model, but focused on 
the separation of the secular and Muslim state functions; c) Iranian - Muslim-theocratic 
and anti-Western; d) Chinese - tight political regime, focused on implementation of 
reforms under state control (Isakov, 2011). 
Based on indicated above transformation models it can be concluded that the 
hypothetical possibility of filling the ideological void created in the post-Soviet Central 
Asia space with religion was not excluded. Nevertheless, the idea of unity of the 
professing Islam Turkic peoples of the CAR did not take root among the masses and 
Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia failed to gain a foothold in Central Asia. Therefore, the 
Islamic paradigm did not give here the basis for a political transformation (Abazov, 1995; 
Isakov, 2011). 
As for the Russian-Soviet cultural and civilizational tradition, it began to back down 
its position in the first half of the 1990s, and its place was taken by political and cultural 
trends that have come from the West. In this regard, the main political goal that faced the 
post-Communist Central Asian republics after gaining independence followed by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union became the transformation of the Soviet political system into 
a Western democratic system based on universally accepted democratic principles.  
The transitologic paradigm differently interprets the impact of international factors 
on the choice of democratic models of transformation by the states in the post-Soviet 
space. Some researchers (O’Donnel et al, 1986; Linz et al, 1996 and 2000; Whitehead, 
1996; Torkunov, 2004) consider that the impact of international factors on the process of 
democratic transformation in the East should not be overestimated because the impulse 
to democratization came here from inside.  
For example, O’Donnel et al (1986, p.6) assert that “the typical sign that the 
transition has begun comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, 
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begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for 
the rights of individuals and groups.” As noted by Whitehead (1996, p.16) “domestic 
processes were viewed as primary, with international factors generally playing no more 
than a secondary role.”  
According to Linz et al (1996, p.10), “the emergence and evolution of post-
totalitarianism can be the result of three distinct but often interconnected processes: 1) 
deliberate policies of the rulers to soften or reform the totalitarian system 
(detotalitarianism by choice); 2) the internal «hollowing out» of the totalitarian regimes’ 
structures and an internal erosion of the cadres’ ideological belief in the system 
(detotalitarianism by decay); and 3) the creation of social, cultural, and even economic 
spaces that resist or escape totalitarian control (detotalitarianism by societal conquest).”  
Torkunov (2004, p.107) says that “the most important factor of occurring processes 
of democratic transition in the countries has been the inability of traditional societies and 
their associated political regimes to manage the load of internal problems.” 
Political changes are perceived by some of these political scientists as “borrowed” 
and caused by a “diffusion effect”, i.e. the penetration of political, economic, social, and 
cultural forms, models and procedures from the outside. The international environment is 
only a transmission mechanism from one domestic policy to another. In this connection, 
the choice of democratic model of development by the states of the post-Soviet space can 
be explained by the effect of a “Zeitgeist”, the expression adopted in the 18th century to 
indicate the dominant cultural trend in a certain period of history that refers to the “spirit 
of the times.” 
For example, Linz et al (2000, p.118) assert that “when a country belongs to an 
international community in which the democratic ideology is simply one of the many 
competing ideologies, the chances of achieving democracy and seeing its consolidation 
are considerably lower compared to a situation in which the spirit of the times is such as 
to leave the democratic ideologies without significant competitors.” 
Other authors (Huntington, 1991; Bunce, 1995; Nikitchenko, 1996; Schmitter, 
1991; Vainshtein, 2001), conversely, emphasize the particular or even decisive role of 
external factors in the post-communist transformation.   
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According to Nikitchenko (1996; cited in Linetsky, 2008) the external factor 
determines the essential characteristics of the “third wave” of democratization, the 
generally accepted definition introduced by Huntington (1991). Nikitchenko proposed to 
consider a “third wave” of democratization as an “international regime” by which he 
means the social and political institutions that affect in a certain way the behavior of states 
and other political actors. In the opinion of the author, the interpretation of the processes 
of the “third wave” of democratization as an “international regime” is connected with the 
following factors for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the hegemonic role of the United States in promoting democracy in other 
countries is evident. Secondly, all aspects of international relations (trade, monetary and 
financial, environmental, human rights) exist in the framework of the economic liberalism 
that are not simply related to democratization, but also reciprocally strengthen it. Thirdly, 
the “international regime” is created on the basis of the other international regimes 
impacting on the transformation within the region of democratization.  
Bunce (1995; cited in Snkel, 2014a) points to the difference in the degree of 
influence of the international factor in the transformation process in the South and the 
East. Democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America took place in a stable 
international environment in which international institutions, regional and world powers 
were willing to mitigate the difficulties of the transition. The post-Soviet transformation 
began in conditions of a high degree of international instability, which had a negative 
impact on the process of democratization in the countries of the former Soviet bloc.  
According to Schmitter’s (1991; cited in Linetsky, 2008, p.199) classification of 
methods regarding the influence of external actors on the processes of democratization, 
in most post-Soviet states a mixed strategy of “taming” (the conscious use of compulsion 
by “establishing special conditions for the distribution of benefits from international 
institutions”)  and “diffusion” (the impact of one state to another “by means of neutral 
channels excluding compulsion”) were implemented, at least until the “color revolutions” 
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.  
Basing on the strategy of “taming” it can be suggested that the choice of leaders of 
the independent Central Asian states on the path towards liberal democracy was largely 
determined by considerable financial aid from international organizations and the 
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developed countries of the West7. Engagement in democratic reforms in these states was 
the main condition for issuing Western soft loans and grants. Some researchers 
(Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1992) link the beginning of the democratization process 
in the post-Soviet space with the cessation of foreign (Soviet) support of the ruling elites 
and regime after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Vainshtein (2001) notes that the implementation of democratic transition in the 
post-Soviet space was carried out under conditions of strong external pressure from 
“standard” Western democracies. This, presumably, has manifested one of the common 
globalization process aspects that narrows the independence of states, not only in the 
economic sphere, but also in their political development, and in the opinion of Bogaturov 
(2006, p.273) “leads to «softening» of their sovereignty.”  
There are two approaches characterizing the phenomenon of “global 
democratization.” The first approach interprets the “third wave” of democratization as a 
sort of alignment of the world political landscape to the standards of developed liberal 
democracies of Western classical type.  According to the second approach, the process of 
democratization is interpreted not as a unification of the political map of the world in 
accordance with Western democratic standards, but rather as a diversification of 
democracy, as an extension of the diversity of democratic variants of development.  
In fact, post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian transformations of the “third wave” 
of democratization lead to the appearance of a plurality of different forms of social 
organization that can be combined only with formal procedural attributes of democracy.  
Despite the fact that the content of the “third wave” of democratization consists “in the 
transition from an expansion phase to a consolidation phase, i.e., enhancing democratic 
institutions, as well as the strengthening of inter-state relations in the community of 
democratic nations”, the majority of new democracies have not been consolidated.  
                                                          
7 At the same time, according to some observers in the 1990s post-Soviet countries did not receive adequate 
economic assistance and political support from the West. Thus, Cohen (2001; cited in Linetskiy, 2008, 
p.200) writes that for the success of the processes of democratization in the post-Soviet space the US and 
other Western countries had to implement a new “Marshall Plan”.  
21 
 
O’Donnell et al (1986) and Diamond (2002) assert that the inability of states to 
complete whole cycles of democratic transformation has led to the appearance of “hybrid 
regimes” that combine features of autocracy and democracy.  
Dimond (2002, p.23) says that “some of the countries (…) fall into the «political 
gray zone» (…) between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship.”  
O’Donnell et al (1986, p.3) assert that transition from authoritarian regimes leads 
towards an uncertain “something else”. The authors introduce two terms to define the 
forms of governance for determining the outcome of democratic transition, such as 
“liberalized authoritarianism” (dictablandas) and “limited democracy” (democraduras) 
(ibid, p.9).  
Bunce et al (2010, p.43) argue that “one of the most striking outcomes of the third 
wave of democratization has been the proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes.” 
Thus, the fundamental theoretical and methodological theories of political 
development, which interpret political transformation as a vector extending from the 
collapse of authoritarianism to democratic transition and then to the consolidation of 
democracy, requires serious rethinking.  
McFaul (2002, p.213) offers “an alternative set of causal paths from «ancient 
régime» to new regime that can account for both outcomes - democracy and dictatorship.” 
The author asserts that “decommunization triggered a fourth wave of regime change - to 
democracy and dictatorship.” The facts show that these processes can often also complete 
the consolidation of the “new autocracies”.  
In conclusion, it can be assumed that the process of political transformation, which 
unfolded in the post-Soviet Central Asian states, occurred under the strong impact of the 
following external factors: the Soviet Union’s disintegration, strong pressure from 
Western democracies, and the world community’s move toward globalization.  
Despite the significant impact of external factors on the process of democratic 
transformation, internal factors remain the key variable that has largely determined the 
outcome of the transitions. The mechanisms of the diffusion of democracy do not explain 
why in the neighboring countries the impact of international actors has led to very 
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different results. Thus, in order to analyze the dynamics of the post-communist political 
transformation it is necessary to take into account the impact of two types of factors.   
The features of the process of political transformation will be considered below in 
the context of the five following post-Soviet Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
 
1.2.1. Kazakhstan 
After gaining independence, Kazakhstan went through different stages of political 
transformation and experimented with various models of political development, which 
are significantly distinguished from the classical scheme proposed in the framework of 
the Western transitologic  paradigm.  
Most political scientists subdivide the period of political and socioeconomic 
transformation in Kazakhstan into four stages: 1991–1995, 1995–2000, 2001–2006 and 
from 2007 till the present time (Zvyagelskaya, 2009; Shkel, 2009). 
The first stage of the political transformation of Kazakhstan (1991-1995) was 
characterized by the controversial distribution of powers between the legislative and 
executive authorities (the Soviet (Supreme Council) and post-Soviet (President) 
institutions) that led to a long-term conflict between political elites, whose resolution in 
Kazakhstan was delayed until 1995. The strategies of political actors in this stage were 
aimed to maximize the authority within the framework of respective institutions.  
According to McFaul (2002, p.226-228), the classical elite pact represents the 
reciprocal concessions between the ruling elite and counter elite, or between supporters 
and opponents of the authoritarian regime, in one of the phases to democratic transition. 
In Kazakhstan, in contrast, the elite pact represented a kind of “cartel agreement” between 
“the various segments of the elite divided by institutional boundaries of powers (the 
President and his entourage, on the one side, and the representatives of the Supreme 
Council, on the other), in order to maintain status quo in circumstances where none of the 
actors reached absolute advantages” (Igbaev, 2009). The result of this formal compromise 
was the adoption in 1993 of the first Constitution of independent Kazakhstan based on 
the model of a parliamentary republic.  
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The procedural factors (mechanisms and strategies applied by dominating actors to 
maintain their rule) on the whole contributed to the victory of the executive branch, 
represented by Nursultan Nazarbaev, who was First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan in 1989, and in 1991 after the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan was 
elected President of the new Republic. 
The soft constitutional coup of 1995 was expressed in the dissolution of a 
unicameral Parliament created in 1994, and the adoption of a new Constitution in the 
national referendum on August 30, 1995, which formalized the model of a presidential 
republic and established a new bicameral Parliament. 
In this stage, the process of so-called “minor privatization” was launched. The state 
appropriated the main asset of socialism-socialist property, but at the same time, refused 
responsibility for the social sector. All this contributed to the appearance of negative 
tendencies in the political and social fields (Zvyagelskaya, 2009). 
The second stage has been defined from 1995 until 2000 and the focus within that 
time span was aimed on establishing and consolidating modern democratic institutions 
and on forming the presidential form of government based on the new Constitution, 
granting to the incumbent president unprecedented powers with respect to all the 
remaining branches of government. The subsequent constitutional amendments strongly 
strengthened the monocratic character of the presidential authority, and in fact fixed 
presidential powers for life (Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art.42 par.5 and 
Art.42 par. 4). 
The second stage was also characterized by intensification of the tendency in terms 
of the process of the so-called “major privatization.” According to a number of expert 
estimates, the multinational corporations controlled up to 40 percent of Kazakhstan’s 
industrial production and about 50 percent of its foreign trade (Lubman, 2005).  
Zviagelskaya (2009, p.45) asserts that in Kazakhstan, there emerged in this stage 
the “premises for the formation of polycentrism, a simultaneous existence of multiple 
independent power-cum-property ownership centers and geared towards asserting their 
independence and repudiating (…) the sovereignty of the overarching polity.”  
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Thus, due to the occurrence of insuperable contradictions between presidential 
authority and the interests of the newly emerged bourgeoisie, Nazarbaev staked on a 
limitation of democratization that led to an authoritarian throwback. 
During the following five years, from 2001 to 2006, the country witnessed socio-
economic progress, and consolidation of an authoritarian regime. The electoral cycles of 
2004-2005 and 2007 confirmed the absolute domination of presidential power, over all 
branches of government (Shkel, 2009). 
From 2007, Kazakhstan found itself at a new stage of political development 
attempting to build up a system of “guided democracy”, most often referred to as the 
“Nazarbaev model” that can be characterized by a combination of limited pluralism and 
possibilities for political participation with successful market reforms.  
The presidential party, Nur Otan, which actually holds 81 percent of the seats in 
Parliament, is dominating in political system of the states. Nazarbaev adopted legislative 
measures limiting the possibilities of other parties to become political competitors to Nur 
Otan8.  
According to the results of the latest parliamentary elections, held in January 2012 
and coinciding with the unusual rebellion that broke out in the oil city of Zhanaozen9, out 
of seven political parties participating in the elections only three, Nur Otan, Ak Jol (the 
party close to business) and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan managed to 
clear the 7 percent threshold10.  
Today, in Kazakhstan’s political arena not only are independent political figures 
absent, but also factions at the central and regional level, so typically prevalent in the 
2000s, which were capable of creating political competition to Nazarbaev and offering 
any real alternatives to the pursued presidential policy.  
                                                          
8 More specifically, this was expressed in the seven -percent barrier for entry into the Mazhilis (the lower 
house of Parliament), in the prohibition for parties to form electoral blocs, in effecting a transition to a 
purely proportional election system, and in calling early elections for the Mazhilis (see: The Constitutional 
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan from October 16th, 1995 № 2529; Art.4 par.6). 
9 http://www.eilmensile.it/2012/01/16/kazakistan-elezioni-via-a-multipartitismo-di-facciata Kazakistan, 
elezioni: via a multipartitismo di facciata (Kazakistan, elections: towards a multi-party façade). 
PeaceReporter, January 16, 2012.  
10 http://www.parlam.kz/en/mazhilis/faction The official website of the Mazhilis of Parliament of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
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At the same time, the modern political system of Kazakhstan is characterized by 
the existence of a sub-ethnic division of the Kazakh elite. Therefore, despite the great 
formal powers of the President, the regime retains elements of polycentrism, which, 
however, are often latent (Shkel, 2009). The containment of inter-elite contradictions is 
carried out by the regime not with violence and repression, but by methods of imitation 
democracy.  
The clannish nature of the bureaucracy is another feature of the current political 
system of Kazakhstan. Clans provide a mechanism for internal support of the incumbent 
president in exchange for large privileges for them. Clan-based authoritarianism bolstered 
by oil wealth has helped Nazarbaev to consolidate a super-presidential regime in which 
his network controls power and resources (Collins, 2006). 
According to Snkel (2009, p.104), the main result of political transformation in the 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan is “the formation of a mono-centric political regime with a 
prevalence of the dominant actor and informal institutions.” The author asserts that the 
essence of the political-regime transformation in Kazakhstan “can be described as the 
consolidation of a non-democratic regime with clan-bureaucratic characteristics and 
elements of imitation democracy”.  
Currently, the main challenges for the ruling regime are searching for ways to 
legitimize power, to protect private property concentrated in the hands of members of the 
“Family” and its closest entourage from redistribution, and to resolve the question of 
power succession. Future liberalization and democratization of the Kazakhstan society 
depends on resolving these issues.  
Nazarbaev, who on 26 April 2015 was re-elected for a fifth term as President of 
Kazakhstan in early presidential elections, is trying to resolve the power continuity 
problem. Reforms and changes in legislation of the last years demonstrate the 
redistribution of power in favor of parliament and the strengthening of the role of political 
parties in order to prevent possible inter-clan conflicts after the departure of the incumbent 
president. At the same time, any attempt to accelerate the process of political 
modernization will inevitably open up a prospect for redistribution of property. It is 
necessary to eliminate doubts that with a change in the nature of the political regime and 
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the country’s transition from a presidential system to a presidential-parliamentary 
form of governance, a redistribution of property is possible (Malashenko, 2015). 
 
1.2.2. Kyrgyzstan 
The political development of Kyrgyzstan after achieving independence is unique in 
Central Asia: the country is constantly experimenting with the constitutional system and 
is challenging political immobility and authoritarianism in the region.  
The birth of independent Kyrgyzstan looked like a triumph of liberal-democratic 
ideals. Meanwhile, democratic transition in Kyrgyzstan proved harder than expected. In 
the almost twenty five years of its independence, the republic has changed its Constitution 
nine times, altered form of governance four times, disbanded its parliament three times, 
banished its presidents twice (Akayev in 2005 and Bakiyev11 in 2010), and lived through 
two “color” revolutions (the so-called “tulip” revolution of March 2005 and 
“contrevolution”12 of March 2010) (Duysheeva, 2014).  
Two revolutions and the following large-scale inter-ethnic clashes in the southern 
regions of the country in June of 2010 led from the “island of democracy” in Central Asia 
have made Kyrgyzstan one of the most unstable states of the region. 
Kyrgyzstan, the first among the Central Asian states, created an important political 
prerequisite for a transfer to a parliamentary republic. In the referendum of 27 June 2010, 
the country adopted Constitutional amendments that limited the power of the president 
and widened the rights of the unicameral Parliament (Jogorku Kengesh).  
According to Constitution of Kyrgyzstan (Art.70 par. 2), Parliament has 120 seats 
with members elected for a five-year term by party-list proportional voting. Five political 
parties represent acting Parliament. De jure, the parliament and the prime minister have 
                                                          
11 Bakiyev in the course of the revolution 7-15 April 2010 was overthrown by the opposition and fled the 
country, currently he is in political exile in Belarus. 
12 The last uprising could be referred as to as the “peacock revolution”, as the poor population of Kyrgyzstan 
was agitated by the ex-president Bakiyev’s excessive personal wealth and the perceived level of corruption 
in the country. Frustration was directed, for example, at the fact that the ex-president owned a private zoo, 
including peacocks. http://vsesmi.ru/news/4062884 (In the house of Kyrgyzstan’s ex-President a zoo of the 
Red Book animals have been found), Editorial, 2010.  
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much more power and authority than the president does, but the de facto governance is 
parliamentary-presidential.  
Changing the form of government from a presidential to a parliamentary republic 
after the revolution of 2010 did not contribute to the withdrawal of the republic from 
instability in political life but, on the contrary, led to the division of the region and the 
loss of state control in it.  
The current political situation in Kyrgyzstan can be described as an acute political 
crisis. A high probability of revolutionary processes in Kyrgyzstan, together with the 
impact of external factors threatening independence and the territorial integrity of the 
republic, may entail the state’s collapse and its political and economic merger by stronger 
neighbors. 
 Atambayev, the incumbent president of Kyrgyzstan experiences the “lame-duck 
syndrome” (a term introduced by Hale (2005)) because he has dramatically less power 
than at the beginning of his term, and elites believe that he may leave office. 
The feature of the political system of the state is the weakness of its political parties 
caused by their constant transformation, reorganization or disintegration. The first 
political parties were set up by separating certain groups from the “Democratic Movement 
o Kyrgyzstan” established in 1990. By 1995, there were 12 registered political parties, 
and in 2008 already more than 100, in 2015 on the eve of the autumn parliamentary 
elections there were 20313.   
Imanalieva (2014) argues that it is typical to all Kyrgyzstan’s parties to have the 
features of an authoritarian leadership style, small membership, lack of interest in local 
elections and very often in parliamentary elections, lack of clearly expressed political 
interests and programs and a vividly expressed regional and tribal character.  
The weakness of the party system in Kyrgyzstan means that nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs)14 and independent media, rather than the political parties, are 
                                                          
13 http://minjust.gov.kg/?page_id=6551 The Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic. List of political 
parties. Last access: November 20, 2015.  
14 http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kyrgyz.html Kyrgyzstan has become a country with the highest 
NGO density in Central Asia. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), over 
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acting as the mobilization and consolidation channels for the opposition forces and the 
advancement of democratic values. Nonetheless, the degree of liberty and the activity 
scale of the NGOs cannot be seen as a major indicator of liberalization in the socio-
political life. “Although there was a certain degree of progress in political modernization, 
Kyrgyzstan has preserved quite an archaic political structure of society dominated by the 
regional groups and tribal clans, instead of political parties” (Mamutova, 2000; cited in 
Zvyagelskaya, 2009, p.97).  
In Kyrgyzstan, the informal mechanisms of governance are manifest also in the 
activities of the patronage networks that cover different parts of society, regardless of 
their regional, ethnic and religious affiliation and thus, go beyond clans and 
administrative-territorial division15. The patronage networks are based on business 
interests and access to material resources by using personal contacts. In public 
administration, actors of such networks ensure the safety of each other in the 
implementation of illegitimate political and financial action (Temirkulov et al, 2013).  
The corrupt patronage groups have built a model based on large-scale re-export of 
smuggling Chinese goods and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. The change of 
government in April 2010 provoked a new round of struggle for control of economic 
assets and pushed rival clans to the redistribution of property. Deregulation of the clan-
political structure became the main factor for the renewal of old contradictions between 
the northern and more Islamic southern elites, and for destabilization in the country.  
In these conditions, it has become evident that the government is unable to control 
the situation in the state and cannot offer a viable or united national idea. Today, 
according to a number of experts, a quite aggressive nationalism remains the dominant 
ideological “trend”. 
The collapse of the ideology of official Soviet atheism in Kyrgyzstan, has led to the 
rapid growth of the politicization of Islam. One of the main conductors of Islam in 
Kyrgyzstan, the international organization Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI), is officially not 
                                                          
10,000 NGOs registered in the country, and around 3,500 of them are operational (the last date available is 
in 2012).  
15 For example, the scheme of patronage network of Maxim Bakiyev the son of former president of 
Kyrgyzstan Bakiyev, included not only people from one clan, province or region, but even foreign citizens, 
having nothing to do with the Kyrgyz traditional division (Domashev, 2010, p.59). 
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prohibited. Islamist opposition that participated in both anti-presidential coups (in 2005 
and 2010) has a distinct ethnic character, because it is prevalent mainly in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan among the ethnic Uzbeks (Laumulin, 2009). A particular threat is represented 
by the emerging tendency of cooperating Islamists with regional and clan groups, political 
parties, and the infiltration of Islamists in government bodies. It is not excluded that 
Kyrgyzstan could become the second Central Asian state after Tajikistan where an 
Islamist political party would be legally functioning.16 
 
1.2.3. Turkmenistan  
Turkmenistan is known as one of the most repressive countries in the world, 
containing strong elements of personal leadership, despotic paternalism, totalitarianism, 
and constitutional subversion. In many respects, the Turkmen totalitarianism resembles 
the modern regime in Northern Korea (Medushevsky, 2008). 
 The development of the situation in Turkmenistan after independence on October 
27, 1991 has always been one of the most closed subjects for any outside observer. The 
almost total isolation of the country from the world has become possible because of both 
the existence of significant reserves of natural resources in oil and natural gas, and the 
choice of a neutrality status17.  
International isolation gave the country a certain stabilization, but at the same time 
contributed to retraditionalization of the regime, which began to acquire the expressed 
despotic features. The combination of totalitarian and paternalistic methods of 
governance meant absence even from a formal legal point of view of the separation of 
powers and the institution of constitutional control. In this regard, Turkmenistan presents 
“an extreme case of the personalization and deinstitutionalization of the regime” in the 
Central Asian region (International Crisis Group, 2003).  
                                                          
16 http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8029  Кыргызстан: “Исламизация» необратима?” (Kyrgyzstan: 
Is “Islamization” irreversible?) M. Kalishevsky. January 27, 2014. International news agency “Ferghana”, 
Moscow.  
17 On December 12, 1995, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution №50/80A 
“Permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan”. The UN, CIS, and several other international organizations 
officially recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality. 
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After the declaration of independence, the first Secretary of the Turkmen 
Communist Party, Saparmurat Niyazov, remained in office as the first president of 
Turkmenistan. During the 15 years of Niyazov’s rule, the presidential elections were held 
only in 1992, while the subsequent presidential elections were canceled by Parliament 
that in 1999 gave Niyazov the exclusive right to execute presidential powers for his 
lifetime.  Niyazov possessed an absolute power over the nation; he was at the same time 
Prime Minister, Head of the Armed Forces and leader of the Democratic Party (the only 
legally recognized political formation). Presidential powers extended to all aspects of the 
country’s economic and political life, even including the right to emit edicts that have the 
force of law. He called himself “Serdar Turkmenbashi” (the Father or Great Leader of all 
Turkmen).  
A nationalist ideology and mythologized history legalized the ruling regime. The 
ideological dogmas, designed to become the ultimate truths for every citizen of the 
country were written down in his book “Rukhnama” that according to (Peyrouse, 2007, 
p.86), was “second book after the Holy Koran”, in which Turkmenbashi presented 
himself as a descendant of Alexander the Great. Denison (2007) stresses that an active 
participant in the formation of national consciousness was also the Seljuk Sultan (Sanjar).  
According to Peyrouse (2007; cited in Indeo, 2010, p.22), “Niyazov transformed 
Turkmenistan into a kind of absolute monarchy of medieval-style type founded on the 
exaltation of the image of his person and hermetically isolated from the rest of the world.” 
Turkmenistan under Niyazov absorbed many elements of the archaic despotic 
regimes peculiar to Oriental countries. This state was completely dominated by the Akhal 
Tekke clan, which constituted the main population of the metropolitan area. For them 
Niyazov was a tribal leader, who had power and influence in the country and provided 
income at a higher level than the rest of the Turkmen.  With only Akhal Tekke clans 
placed in key positions, Niyazov refused to maintain a balance of clan representation in 
the government thus creating the threat of conflict between the main tribal Turkmen 
groups.  
In Turkmenistan, all political activity opposition was banned and most non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were closed. Under Niyazov’s rule, the policy of 
total control over an individual on the part of the state had been established.  Internet 
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access was extremely limited and independent providers were not in the country. 
Censorship in the media was introduced. Only the President himself could establish 
newspapers. Opera, ballet and circus were banned by governmental decrees. 
(International Crisis Group, 2003 and 2004).  
Nonetheless, even extreme centralization of power did not consolidate Niyazov’s 
regime. Collins (2006, p.303) asserts that “his [Niazov’s] method of continually 
reshuffling or sacking his ministers, advisers, and even his security service and military 
testified to a near paranoia in his attempt to keep power.”  
On December 21, 2006, Niyazov suddenly died of a heart attack. After his death, 
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov assumed power and “won” the two presidential elections 
in 2007 and 2012.18  
The death of President Niyazov has allowed the new leadership to take cautious 
steps to modernize the regime and to restrict the personality cult of the former president. 
Turkmenistan got a chance to reform and get out of international semi-isolation in which 
the country had been put by the old regime. In 2007, the course of the new president 
towards gradual liberalization and the transition from a monocratic to an oligarchic 
regime was evident (Laumulin, 2009).  
Nevertheless, the transition to “Renaissance” (as the new course of president 
Berdymukhammedov was called) has not changed anything within the bearing structures 
of the Turkmen totalitarian construction. The character of the rule retains clannish nature 
and the internal logic of the current change is the transition of power from one clan to 
another (the so-called “clan Revolution”). Most reforms seem to be cosmetic, and/or in 
order to please the West, with whom Berdimuhamedov hopes to do business 
(Zviagelskaya, 2009; Medushevsky, 2014). 
The Constitutional development of Turkmenistan (Constitution of 1992 was 
amended 5 times) represents the retreat from democratic standards of modern 
constitutionalism toward the strengthening of the personal power of the President of 
Turkmenistan. As in most post-Soviet Central Asian states, the important issues of the 
                                                          
18 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/turkmenistan European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. 
Turkmenistan. 
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correlation between the prerogatives of Parliament and the President decided in favor of 
the latter (Medushevsky, 2008). 
The last version of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan adopted on 
September 26, 2008, preserves the old power paradigm, changing small details. For 
example, it abandons the institution of Halk Maslahaty (Council of Elders consisting of 
2507 members), the main role of which was to maintain the political system established 
by Niyazov. According to constitutional amendments, the President is elected for a five-
year term. In fact, the President may be endowed with powers of life with full control of 
the Mejlis (Parliament, 125 members). There is no vice president or prime minister. The 
President is the Head of state and the Head of government (Constitution of Turkmenistan, 
art. 50); he leads the military forces (art. 53) and may issue presidential decrees that have 
the power of law in Turkmenistan (art. 54). Berdymukhamedov is accused of presiding 
over one of the most pervasive personality cults in the world and is widely known as 
“Arkadag”, or the Patron Saint19. 
The Constitution of 2008 introduced also the legal possibility of forming multiple 
political parties. In 2013, Turkmenistan held its first multi-party parliamentary elections. 
In the national Parliament, representatives from the first opposition Party of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (PIE) were elected. Before this time, in Mejlis only the Democratic 
Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) was legal. In 2014, the country established a third party - 
the Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan (APT). In fact, creating the political parties only 
imitates the democratic multi-party system in the country.  
Turkmenistan is a country with one of the toughest totalitarian regimes in the world, 
which has violated all possible freedom and does not respect human rights. According to 
an estimate of Freedom House (2015), Turkmenistan is one of the world’s most repressive 
societies, “worst of the worst” for political rights and civil liberties20. The government 
                                                          
19 On May 15, 2015 in Ashgabat the grand opening was held of the first statue of Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov the “Arkadag Binas” (monument of the Patron Saint or “White Khan”). This is a 21-
meter bronze statue of the president riding a horse, established on its 15-meter marble pedestal and covered 
in 24-carat gold leaf. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/turkmenistan-unveils-huge-marble-
and-gold-statue-of-its-autocratic-president-10274725.html Turkmenistan unveils huge marble and gold 
statue of its autocratic president, former dentist Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. C. Milmo, Independent, 
May 15, 2015. 
20 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.Vk8oEHYvfIU Freedom in the 
World 2015. Interactive Map. 
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completely denies freedom of association, expression, and religion, and the country is 
closed to independent scrutiny. Relatives of dozens of people imprisoned during the 
massive waves of arrests in the late 1990s and early 2000s have had no official 
information about their fate. The government continues to use imprisonment as a tool for 
political retaliation (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 559).   
It is important to note that in February 2015 President Berdimuhamedov signed a 
law authorizing the holding of country meetings, demonstrations and other peaceful 
public events from July 1, 2015.  
According to the experts, the reason for such a sensational innovation was 
connected with the main goal of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy - to achieve independence 
from Russia in energy exports and withdraw its gas resources in the new European 
markets. For this, Turkmen elites are ready to demonstrate to Europe the process of 
political liberalization in the country by allowing meetings and demonstrations that in 
reality are rarely feasible (Dubnov, 2015).  
Turkmenistan was the only country in the CAR where, after gaining independence, 
the authoritarian regime significantly weakened the position not only of Islamists, but 
also of official Islam. Niyazov’s policy towards Islam was aimed at preventing the 
transformation of religious institutions into the opposition force of the regime. However, 
during the rule of Berdymukhamedov political Islam gradually recovered lost positions. 
 
1.2.4. Tajikistan 
Tajikistan was the only Central Asian state where the transformation of its political 
regime and the construction of a new statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union took 
place under conditions of acute struggle for power between four major ethno-regional 
clans, which became a five-year Civil War (1992-97). 
Due to the process of national territorial delimitation held by the Bolsheviks in 
1924, the Tajiks got only a small part of the vast territory of historic Tajikistan. Ancient 
cultural centers of the Tajiks – Samarkand, Bukhara, Fergana Valley - with nearly two 
million Tajiks (who would become the nucleus of Tajik society integration) remained in 
Uzbekistan. This disintegration was the main cause of regional and clan division in 
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Tajikistan on the basis of four major ethnic and regional groups of the Tajik people: 
Leninabad (Khojent), Garmis, Kuliabis and Pamirs that determined the nature of the 
contemporary state-building process in the country (Boboxonov, 2012). 
The conflict that began in 1992 as a political confrontation between the Popular 
Front - the supporters of  a secular state and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) - a 
coalition of Islamists and Democrats, developed into an ethnic war between 
representatives of various clans and, in fact, was a war between regions. According to 
McFaul (2002, p. 228), such a case is classified as one with equal balances of power “in 
which neither communist nor anticommunist forces won a clear majority” (table 1.3).  
The consequences of this fratricidal war were between 40,000 and 100,000 people 
killed, and about a million refugees (Kuzmin, 1998; cited in Boboxonov, 2011). Great 
numbers of victims and refugees were not the only consequences of the war; it threatened 
the very existence of the secular state, which had proclaimed its independence in 1991. 
Islam in Tajikistan during this period turned into a real political force that claimed 
authority and established an Islamic state on the territory of the republic.  
The Popular Front headed by Rakhmon (formerly known as Rahmonov) received 
the support from Russia and Uzbekistan, as a possible islamization of Tajikistan could 
have threatened the geopolitical balance in the region and could have led to the activation 
of Islamic militancy within these countries. Against the background of the strengthening 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, on June 27, 1997 in Moscow an armistice was concluded 
between the government of Rakhmon and the UTO. Islamists and Democrats got their 
quota in the government and parliament (about 30 percent of places in governmental 
structures) and in the armed forces (4.5 thousand fighters of the opposition) in exchange 
for cessation of military confrontation with the new authorities (Malashenko, 2003).  
This armistice was unique in the Central Asia scenario because of the incorporation 
of religious Islamic opposition into the political power of the secular state. This agreement 
was also a consequence of acute necessity to overcome the ideological and political 
division of society that coincided with the split of the regional elites (Boboxonov, 2012; 
Malashenko, 2003). 
Currently, the Kuliab regional clan, which in the civil war came to power in the 
country, constitutes about 35 percent of the country’s population. Its representatives are 
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in all spheres of power and occupy the predominant majority of the ministerial positions, 
including control of force structures. The interests of the clan are presented as ones of the 
state and of the nation. The society remains deeply divided without a unifying national 
idea.   
In Tajikistan, the key issue in the post-Soviet constitutional debate was the problem 
of preservation a secular state. The adoption of the first post-Soviet Constitution of 
Tajikistan in 1994 was carried out in the midst of civil war. In fact, the Constitution 
expressed the interests only one military-political coalitions because in the referendum 
were not able to participate much of the population being in exile, so it may not have 
sufficient legitimacy.  
The evolution of Tajik constitutionalism (the Constitution was amended twice, in 
1999 and 2003) went in the direction of the strengthening of the authoritarianism and 
presidential power of Emomali Rahmon, who has been the President of Tajikistan since 
1994. He was re-elected to office three times in 1999, 2006 and 2013, and in accordance 
with Constitution of Tajikistan (art. 65) Rakhmon may remain in office for a seven-year 
term until 2020.  
In 1999, the unicameral Parliament (Majlisi Oli) was transformed into a two-
chamber structure, consisting of the Upper chamber (Majlisi Milli) and the Lower 
chamber (Majlisi namoyandagon). According to the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (art. 49), indirect election was established for the Upper chamber, thereby the 
President appoints the speaker of this chamber and 25 percent of its members are allowed 
to create a pro-Presidential majority in the Parliament, upsetting the balance between the 
branches of power. Moreover, Rahmon from 1994 represents and leads the People’s 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, which has a majority in the Parliament. At the last 
parliamentary elections that took place on March 1, 2015 Rahmon’s ruling Party won 65 
percent of the vote21.  
Formally, the ban on activities of political parties in Tajikistan was lifted in 1999. 
Currently, in the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan eight political parties 
                                                          
21 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/tajikistan  European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. 
Tajikistan. 
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are officially registered22. In fact, legal opposition parties play by the rules established by 
the regime, and primarily, by the President. 
The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) is the only legal religious 
opposition in the post-Soviet space that has a stable structure and branched network of 
cells throughout the country. On the results of the parliamentary elections of 2000, 2005 
and 2010 IRP received two seats of the 63 available parliamentary seats. At the elections 
held on March 1, 2015, the IRP failed to surpass the 5 percent vote barrier, and lost its 
two seats in Parliament.  
Some political experts suggest that the defeat of the Islamic party contributed to the 
external situation. Common anti-Islamic moods in society and wide coverage in the media 
of the massacres committed by the group “Islamic State” have a negative impact on the 
opinion in Tajik society on Islamic parties. 
At the same time, most experts are more inclined to assert that the political influence 
of the IRP is increasing. The attempts of the ruling regime to limit activities and to curb 
the influence of legal Islamic opposition by putting pressure on the party became the real 
reasons that led to its defeat in the last parliamentary elections23.  
In this context, it should be noted that Tajikistan is the most impoverished nation in 
Central Asia. Local natural resources are being depleted, and the regime will soon be 
unable to provide its people with even a minimal level of sustenance. According to 
varying estimates, from 700,000 to 1.2 million Tajik migrants currently work in Russia 
(see table 2.10 of these paper). The social tension in the country where about 50 percent 
of the population lives in poverty is very high and popular demand for a strong opposition 
force to the regime is growing.  
Moreover, the ruling Kulyab clan thanks to a tough authoritarian regime retains 
power in most parts of the country, but their presence in such regions as Garm and 
                                                          
22http://www.minjust.tj/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=94&lang=en 
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan. 
23 http://www.profi-forex.org/novosti-mira/novosti sng/tajikistan/entry1008247900.html Деятельность 
партии Исламского возрождения Таджикистана парализована. (The activity of the Islamic Renaissance 
Party of Tajikistan is paralyzed). R. Ghani. March 8, 2015. 
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Badakhshan is minimal and limited to regional centers. Government forces do not control 
some mountain areas (mountains cover 93 percent of Tajikistan).  
Collins (2006, p. 295) asserts that although the regime is authoritarian, it is not 
consolidated. “On the surface, Rahmon and his clan have established hegemonic control. 
Yet at a deeper level, the Tajik regime has exhibited little success in implementing its 
policies - such as the campaign against corruption, centralization of the economy, 
disarmament, and rebuilding state control outside of the capital.” In this situation, the 
repressive measures and persecuting by government the legal opposition may strengthen 
the radical forces. The Islamists may attempt to monopolize public protest and cause a 
military conflict, as already happened in the recent past (Malashenko et al, 2014). 
 
1.2.5 Uzbekistan 
The formation of a modern political system of Uzbekistan took place in common 
with the former Soviet republic conditions. However, the highest population density and 
the largest armed forces in the region, the possession of resource potential24, and the 
location in the country of the oldest cultural and intellectual centers of Central Asia such 
as Bukhara and Samarkand, allowed Uzbekistan to claim regional leadership and consider 
itself one of the key countries in Central Asia.  
A characteristic feature of the political development of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
after gaining independence was the refusal to implement constitutional reforms or imitate 
a strategy for the conservation of a traditionalist authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the 
consistent reproduction of power succession legitimated the term in office of the leader, 
the duration of whose rule amounted to a quarter of a century in 2015 (Medushevsky, 
2012).  
Islam Karimov, former First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic, whose political longevity has been achieved largely thanks to the 
control over the numerous (more than 1 million people) security forces, has headed the 
Republic since 1989. In March 29, 2015, Karimov was re-elected President of Uzbekistan 
                                                          
24 The country is one of the world’s biggest producers of cotton and is rich in natural resources, including 
oil, gas and gold. 
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for five years for the fourth time. His appointment once again postpones the elaboration 
of an institutional mechanism for leadership succession. From the first days of 
independence, Karimov acted as Head of state and Chief executive at the same time. The 
President’s authority dealt also with issues within the competence of legislative and 
judicial branches (Zvyagelskaya, 2009). 
The second decade of independence saw some initiatives, aimed at limiting 
presidential powers. The political and legal act of huge importance was the executive 
branch reform of 2001, which aimed to redistribute part of the President’s authority to the 
Cabinet of Ministers, which since then is formed by the legislative branch.  
This reform contributed also to the enhancement of the role, authority and oversight 
functions of the Parliament. In this connection, in 2002 after a national referendum a 
bicameral Parliament (the Oliy Majlis) consisting of the Senate (upper Chamber) and 
Legislative Chamber (lower chamber) was introduced (before 2002 Uzbekistan had a 
unicameral Parliament of 250 seats) and some of the President’s authority was transferred 
to the Senate (Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, art. 78, 80). 
In 2008, the Government has continued with parliamentary reforms by adopting 
constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening the role of political parties. In 
accordance with these amendments (Law on elections in the Oliy Majlis of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan. Tashkent, December 25, 2008 № ZRU-194) only political parties may 
nominate candidates of the Legislative Chamber.  
Constitutional amendments of 2011 (art. 98) introduced a new procedure for the 
nomination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan by a political party that 
has the most seats in the lower Chamber of Parliament or by several political parties, 
securing  the equal highest number of seats.  
In 2014, Karimov proposed ulterior constitutional changes that would transfer some 
presidential powers to the legislative and executive branches (Malashenko, 2014). These 
reforms would later lead to fundamental changes in the existent political system and to a 
transformation in the hierarchy of governance structures. Currently, the multi-party 
system emerged in Uzbekistan remains largely formal, as in other republics in the region. 
The position of political parties in their relations with the executive branch is pro-
government or even pro-presidential. In practice, the Uzbek Parliament only meets a few 
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times a year, which makes a real political debate and a critical attitude towards the 
Government impossible. The President makes all decisions.  
During the last parliamentary elections held in Uzbekistan on December 21, 2014, 
with a second round on 4 January 2015 the party’s politicians were hard to distinguish 
between themselves and did not address the most interesting topics for the voters25. 
Practically, Karimov has manipulated electoral and party legislation in order to 
strengthen political parties and thereby decrease clan and regional group representations 
in government. The aspiration to neutralize the clans in politics was also due to a large 
extent to the threat of the spread of their influence on the army.  Currently, compared to 
the first two decades of independence, ethnic composition of the political elite in 
Uzbekistan is less homogeneous and its clannish nature has been retained only in part.  
 Zviagelskaya (2009, p.210) asserts that “the political weight of functional political 
groups in Uzbekistan is not equal and their influence varies from sphere to sphere and is 
never absolute, because the supra-clannish nature of presidential power allows to manage 
personnel while restricting the militancy of the opposition and the presidential advocates.” 
Islam Karimov also completely cleaned the political space from secular opposition. 
According to Kurtov (2007), the defeat of secular opposition in the early 1990s in 
Uzbekistan caused lack of support by the Russian population due to nationalist appeals 
contained in their programs and activities.  
A sharp increase of the religious factor did not contribute to the success of secular 
opposition either. Gaining independence coincided with the rise to power of the religious 
“Taliban” movement in Afghanistan, which supported the Muslim movements 
throughout the region.  
A stable Islamist opposition that includes a multitude of factions appeared in 
Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. The main goal of Islamists is the creation of a supranational 
caliphate in Central Asia with a nucleus in the Fergana Valley. The leading places for 
such organizations were occupied by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and 
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI). Their ranks were joined not only by international 
                                                          
25 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/uzbekistan European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. 
Uzbekistan. 
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terrorists, but also by militants from secular opposition parties, the Birilik and Erk, which 
had been banned in Uzbekistan.   
The culmination of social tensions and the growing influence of Islamic 
underground was the massacre in one of the Fergana Valley towns - Andijan - in May 
2005. The security forces opened fire on protesters demonstrating against the 
imprisonment of people charged with Islamic extremism.  According to various estimates 
about 200 -1,500 people died in clashes between demonstrators and the police (Laumulin, 
2009). Assessments of these events by Uzbek authorities, governments of various 
countries and human rights organizations differed significantly and interpreted them as 
the legitimate quelling of a prison break, the inter-clan struggle for state power, the 
attempt to a color revolution, the anti-government protest organized by Islamist 
underground with Western support26.  
The tensions in the Fergana Valley, connected to the Andijan massacre, and its 
suppression have led to a tightening regime and allowed authorities to justify civil rights 
breaches and repressions. Karimov’s government has been accused of human rights 
violations, torture and killing of civilians, including thousands of innocent Muslims. 
According to Human Rights Watch (2015, p.599), President Islam Karimov “continued 
to employ a widespread security apparatus to monitor and crack down on activities of real 
and perceived opponents”. 
The consequences of the revolution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan in 2010, 
accompanied by the Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic clashes, which caused a significant flow of 
refugees to Uzbekistan, were the closure of the borders of Uzbekistan and the introduction 
of the police regime of presidential dictatorship. In the opinion of experts, the possibility 
of “the Uzbek spring” without external interference is unlikely27. 
 
                                                          
26 http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8535 Годовщина кровавых событий в Андижане. 
Комментарии экспертов, политиков, журналистов (The anniversary of the bloody events in Andijan. 
Comments of experts, politicians, journalists). May 12, 2015. “Fergana” News agency, Moscow.   
27 http://www.limesonline.com/la-primavera-araba-non-arrivera-in-asia-centrale/36896 La primavera 
araba non arriverà in Asia Centrale (The Arab Spring will not arrive in Central Asia). F. Indeo. 11.07.2012.  
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1.3. The failure of democratic transition and the factors of sustainability of the 
authoritarian regimes in the Central Asian countries 
Currently, it can be stated that the transition period, or according to O’Donnell et al 
(1986, p.8) “the interval between one political regime and another” by which many 
researchers imply, above all, a definitive breakaway from the Soviet regime, has finished. 
However, it does not follow that transformation as a transition to democracy and a market 
economy is nearing its completion too.  
The Western model of democracy imposed on the local political and social features 
of Central Asian states have changed their political image and laid the foundations for 
their development along the path of imitation democracy that is characterized by a 
combination of elements of formal procedural democracy and authoritarianism28.           
After almost 25 years of gaining independence, none of the post-communist Central 
Asian states has produced democracy. Carothers (2002, p.9) asserts, “the initial political 
openings have clearly failed and authoritarian regimes have resolidified”. There was a 
brief period of democratization only in Kyrgyzstan in the early stages of its independence. 
Why did Central Asian states abandon communism for democracy, but then turn to 
authoritarian rule? This paper proposes to explain the causes of the failure of democratic 
transition in the Central Asian states.  
To examine the reasons for the failure of regime transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy in the Central Asian states we will use the conceptual framework for 
determining the democratic governance proposed by Cheema (2005, p.11). This model is 
based on three interconnected factors: what makes up democratic governance 
(institutions, processes and practices), how governance is democratic (key principles of 
democracy as a form of governance), and why governance becomes democratic (internal 
and external factors - previously discussed in this paper - that influence the development 
and consolidation of democracy) (figure 1.6). 
                                                          
28 Different authors have chosen specific labels to describe such “democracies with adjectives” (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997, cited by Schedler, 2006) with the help of which they are meant to refer to specific structural 
deficits and weaknesses. For example, “delegative” democracies lack checks and balances (O’Donnell 
1994), “illiberal” democracies fail to uphold the rule of law (Zakaria, 2003 and 2004), and “clientelist” 
democracies are weak on programmatic party politics (Kitschelt 2000, cited by Schedler, 2006). 
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Figure 1.6.  The What, the How and the Why of Democratic Governance 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
    Source: Cheema, 2005 p.10-11. 
 
Figure 1.6 reflects the dynamics of interconnection between three factors that 
determine the nature and specifics of democratic governance and can help to explain the 
success or failure of the transition of the authoritarian states toward democracy.  
Obviously, these invisible structures do not make democracies or dictatorships. 
McFaul (2002, p. 214) asserts that “structural factors such as economic development, 
cultural influences, and historical institutional arrangements influence the formation of 
actors’ preferences and power, but ultimately these forces have causal significance only 
if translated into human action. Individuals and the decisions they make are especially 
important for explaining how divergent outcomes result from similar structural contexts”. 
In the process of transformation of the Soviet political system into a democratic 
model of governance proposed by the West already in the middle of the 1990s, it seems 
that the Central Asian states responded to the first requirement of the conceptual 
framework by creating democratic governance. All Central Asian states established free 
elections, political parties, and parliaments. The principles of democracy, including 
respect for human rights, institution of presidency, legislative elections, multiparty 
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systems, and the supremacy of international law, were written into the new national 
constitutions (with the exception in part of Niyazov’s autocratic regime characterized by 
totalitarianism and constitutional subversion). 
Nonetheless, the Central Asian states failed to execute the second requirement of 
the conceptual framework: to accept democracy as a dominant form of governance. In the 
first process, therefore, the Central Asian countries dealt with the issues of “regime 
change”, or transition, in the second process with the “functioning of the regime”, or 
consolidation.  
McFaul (2002, p. 227) hypothesizes that “if the election produced a clear 
communist victory for the old ruling communist party or its direct successor - with victory 
defined as winning more than 60 percent of the vote - then the case is classified as a 
balance of power in favor of the «ancien régime».” According to author, the distribution 
of power in Central Asian states except for Tajikistan (a case with equal balances of power 
in which neither communist nor anticommunist forces won a clear majority) was favored 
to the “anciens régimes” (table 1.3). 
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Sources:  McFaul (2002, p. 227); Collins (2004, p.227); Bobokhonov (2012); Rotberg (2004, p.48); 
Democracy index 2011 (countries with index less than 2 are clearly authoritarian); Freedom House 2015; 
Fragile States Index 2015 (The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels 
of stability and the pressures they face. The index’s ranks are based on twelve indicators of state 
vulnerability - four social, two economic and six political. The Fragile States Index scores should be 
interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better).   
 
The rejection of democracy as a form of governance in the post-Soviet Central 
Asian states is largely related to the features of the process of privatization of state 
property that unfolded in these countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
struggle for the right to be the legal proprietors of state property meant that all rudiments 
of the former Soviet system of nomenklatura29, as well as the system itself (but in a new 
quality), remained intact. It should be noted that today, in some of the Central Asian 
republics the former members of the republican Communist parties still remain in power 
as presidents of these states.  
From here, on the one hand, the aspiration of the “new” elite to retain control of 
obtained state property has led to the formation of a closed political system. On the other, 
the privatization of state property has resulted in the emergence of the preconditions for 
the formation of polycentrism, i.e. the simultaneous existence of multiple independent 
centers of power and property, whose interests did not always coincide with the interests 
of the state. Under these conditions, presidential power alone might be a stabilizing 
system factor (Syroezhkin, 2011). 
Despite establishing a complete set of democratic institutions, in all Central Asian 
states there was an authoritarian throwback and movement toward strengthening the 
regime of personal presidential power, in the first place, by way the concentrating all 
political power within the executive branches of their respective governments.  
Hale (2005, p.137) uses the term “patronal presidentialism” to define the super-
presidential regimes established in the Post-Soviet space. The implementation of political 
authority by these regimes carried out “primarily through selective transfers of resources 
                                                          
29 The nomenklatura were a category of people (members of the Communist Party) within the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern Bloc countries who held various key administrative positions in all spheres of 
those countries’ activity and whose positions were granted only with approval by the Communist party of 
each country or region.  
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rather than through formalized institutional practices, idea-based politics or the 
established rule of law”. In the author’s opinion, the transplant of democracy to the post-
Soviet regimes is not successful “as the president holds too much power within and 
outside the political institution.”  
In fact, it has often been noted that the presidential form of government has less 
functionality for the purposes of democratic consolidation, than parliamentary or semi-
presidential forms of governance, and according to De Vergottini (2008, p.6), it has “a 
greater ability to favor phenomena of involution in the operation of the form of 
government”.   
All states of the region (except in part politically unstable Kyrgyzstan) are 
characterized by models of personalizing authoritarian regimes, which are often called in 
literature “authoritarian – pluralistic” (Scalapino, 1989), “sultanistic” (Chehabi et al, 
1998), “neopatrimonial” (Eisenstadt, 1973, cited in Dagiev, 2013), or are defined by the 
term “patrimonial nationalism” (Dagiev, 2013).  
The “authoritarian-pluralistic” model of Scalapino combines undemocratic (even 
very repressive) management of political power with “acceptable or even encouraged 
economic and social pluralism” (Scalapino, 1989, p.71).  
“Neopatrimonalism” is a term used to describe a political regime in which 
relationships of loyalty and dependence prevail over a formal political and administrative 
system. The personalistic nature of “neopatrimonialism” is similar to “sultanism”, where 
individuals who occupy office can use state power for their own enrichment, they are 
often presidents for life, dominating the state apparatus and standing above its laws 
(Dagiev, 2013). According to Chehabi et al (1998, p.7), “the contemporary sultanistic 
regime is based on personal rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by 
embodying or articulating an ideology, nor by a unique personal mission, nor by 
charismatic qualities, but a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators”. 
“Neopatrimonialism” like “sultanism” lacks a state ideology, whereas ideology is a key 
component of the term “patrimonial nationalism”, “as the form of the authoritarian rule 
where the elites have unofficially imposed an ideology of nationalism centered around 
the person of the president” (Dagiev, 2013, p.9). 
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According to Bobokhonov (2009, p.256), “in the Central Asia republics for a 
variety of reasons (historical, geographical, legal, ethno-cultural and ethno-
psychological), the choice of a new form of government was predetermined in favor of 
authoritarian rule in the spirit of the classical model of the «eastern monarchy»”. 
However, the Central Asian regimes demonstrate various degrees in the 
personalized nature of their authoritarianism. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan established 
types of presidential regime that can be described as “soft authoritarianism” with 
Nazarbayev and Atambaev; in Uzbekistan the “hard authoritarianism and police control” 
of Karimov; in Turkmenistan the autocracy of Berdymukhammedov; in Tajikistan, a war-
achieved authoritarian regime by Raxmon.  
On the one hand, authoritarian regimes hinder the establishment of independent 
civil society and the functioning of democratic institutions. On the other, in the early 
stages of independence the authoritarian regimes of the Central Asian states were capable 
of solving the important transformation goal, such as the maintenance of stability and 
order in the situation of transition from the disintegrating Soviet system to the creating of 
a new national statehood. Local authoritarianism in a certain sense somewhat 
compensated the authority and force of the former Soviet federal center which was the 
guarantor of stability.  
The only Tajik government after gaining independence was unable to resolve the 
political crisis in the country and caused the acute struggle for supremacy between ethno-
regional clans that led to a protracted and bloody civil war. The so-called “Tajik 
syndrome” became the external factor for other Central Asian states that has discredited 
the idea of simultaneous political transformation based on the Western democratic model 
and has promoted the peaceful development of the other states of the Central Asian 
region. In this sense, a positive factor for post-transitional democratic development of 
Central Asia states has been a minimal involvement of the state’s security forces in 
political life. Only in Uzbekistan the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and the National 
Security Service (SNB) have a significant impact on the political elites due to their large 
numbers and particular role for the stability of the regime (Zvyagelskaya, 2009). 
Thus, the ruling Central Asian elites accepted authoritarianism as a governing 
principle by means of which the statehood of the new independent states could be 
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preserved during the transition from the Soviet regime toward democracy. At the same 
time, in the post-transitional period these “unconsolidated democracies” with an 
authoritarian form of government framed in such a way as to make it appear legitimate 
contributed to the ruling elites protecting their own power and personal benefits rather 
than promoting democratic development of their states. 
In this context, the thesis proposed by Gerschewski (2013) may be used as a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the sustainability of the authoritarian Central 
Asian regimes. The author argues that the political leaders are providing the sustainability 
of their regime in a non-democratic environment with the help of three key strategies such 
as cooptation, repressions and legitimation.  
According to this concept, the main procedural factor producing continuity in 
authoritarian rule is an ability of a political leader to form an empowered coalition. In this 
sense, cooptation can be defined as the strategic measures of the authoritarian ruler, aimed 
at establishing strong regime relations with the elites in order to maintain their loyalty 
(see below: internal regime of clan politics).  Cooptation also carries out the function of 
weakening and marginalizing the opposition. Bunce et al (2010, p.60) assert, in the 
conditions of «electoral authoritarianism»30 “the formation of a united opposition on the 
eve of the election or during the election undermining the ability of oppositions to mount 
effective electoral challenges” became the key issue for the incumbent leader.  
Repression, as the second strategy of an analytic framework providing the 
sustainability of the authoritarian regime in the interpretation of  Wintrobe (1998; cited 
in Shkel 2014b), is not only an act or threat of physical violence, but also other measures 
restricting political freedom of citizens. With reference to  authoritarian Central Asian 
regimes, it may be mentioned that in all states of the region authorities repress all forms 
of free expression and do not allow any organized political opposition, independent 
media, or religious freedom. 
                                                          
30 According to Schedler (2006, p.3), electoral authoritarianism characterizes regimes that present an 
illusion of multi-party democracy and render parliament and the chief executive elections “instruments of 
authoritarian rule, rather than instruments of democracy”. Incumbents use a variety of techniques to ensure 
their reelection; these range from harassment of the opposition and civil society organizations to control 
over the media to manipulation of vote tabulations.  
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 In Central Asian states thousands of human rights and opposition activists, 
journalists, religious believers, artists and others are imprisoned on politically motivated 
charges. Across the region, impunity for torture remains the norm (Human Rights Watch, 
2015). 
The Freedom House (2015)31 considers Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan among the 
eight most authoritarian and repressive state of the world “worst of the worst” in terms of 
respect for political rights and civil liberties.  
According to a number of new theories, legitimation (the third strategy providing 
the sustainability of the authoritarian regime) is on the periphery of research interest since 
authoritarian power is not based on the opinion of the majority of the population. 
Nevertheless, the first two strategies (cooptation and repression) require significant 
economic costs for their implementation, which makes the functioning of the 
authoritarian regimes based only on these mechanisms too expensive.  
Gerschewski (2013) considers legitimation as an important pillar of modern forms 
of authoritarianism, defining it as the actions of the incumbent leader aimed at building 
relations between state and society in order to form active support, observance of 
established rules, or simply tolerance on the part of the elites and wider social groups. A 
variety of these instruments include nationalist or religious ideologies; populism; 
“developmentalism” or propaganda of the regime’s economic success; personality cult of 
the incumbent leader; artificial creation of the threat of social destabilization in order to 
convince the population of the necessity to tighten the regime to preserve society’s safety. 
Moreover, authoritarian leaders often effectively use democratic instruments to legitimize 
their regimes. In particular, presidential elections and referendums can be held to 
demonstrate support of the authoritarian leader on the part of the population.  
O’Donell et al (1986, p. 15) say that authoritarian regimes “practice dictatorship 
and repression in the present while promising democracy and freedom in the future. Thus, 
they can justify themselves in political terms only as a transitional power, while 
                                                          
31 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.Vk8oEHYvfIU. Freedom in the 
World 2015. Interactive Map. 
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attempting to shift attention to their immediate substantive accomplishment - typically, 
the achievement of «social peace» or economic development.” 
In the post-Soviet Central Asian states, the incumbent presidents implement all 
these strategies (cooptation, repressions and legitimation) in order to provide the 
continuity of their authoritarian regime and thereby undermining the possibility of 
democratic development in these countries. We will examine below the four most vividly 
expressed instruments for implementing these strategies by Central Asian incumbent 
presidents.  
 
1.3.1 Informal regime of clan politics (as an instrument for implementing the 
strategy of cooptation) 
Clan and tribal structures32 of Central Asian republics are a strong and resilient form 
of social organization that have shown their viability during the 70 years of Soviet rule. 
Despite the attempt to modernize Central Asia states by eliminating clans (for example, 
Andropov-Gorbachev’s “Cotton campaign”33in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), they were 
able to survive the Soviet onslaught because of their informality, strong kin-based 
network, and ability to use Soviet institutions to achieve their aims.  
Clan structures reemerged in the post-Soviet period and clan networks increasingly 
pervaded all Central Asian societies. The most vivid clan division of the regional 
(territorial) criteria among all the Central Asian states characterizes Uzbekistan. The tribal 
structure of Kazakhstan is divided into three main regional Juz (tribal unions) in 
correspondence to the historical Great Horde division. The political clan’s polarization of 
the Kyrgyzstan comes along the north - south line. In Tajikistan, the clan system is based 
on four major ethnic and regional groups under the leadership of the Kuliab clan, which 
came to power in the country in the civil war. In Turkmenistan, leadership in political and 
                                                          
32 A clan is not (but is sometimes confused with): clientelism, patronage, corruption, blat, mafias, regions, 
ethnic groups, nations, or tribes. The term “clan” refers to the smaller subgroups of tribes. But in Central 
Asian these terms are used interchangeably, in part because there are numerous, distinct ethno-linguistic 
groups that are often smaller in size (Collins, 2006, p.35-38).  
33 From 1984 to 1988, Moscow staged massive purges of the dominant clans in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Gorbachev installed a large ethnically Russian cadre from Moscow in most positions of economic and 
political power. All told, his efforts to shake up the traditional system of power resulted in the imprisonment 
of an estimated 30,000 Central Asian leaders (Collins, 2002, p.144).  
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economic life belongs to the tribe Ahalteke, concentrated around Ashgabat (the capital of 
the country).  
Collins (2004, p.231) describes the political relations in Central Asian as «politics 
of clans» that are characterized “by the informal competition and deal making between 
clans in pursuit of their own interests” (ibid, p.224). Collins (2006, p.233) argues that “the 
clans serve as an organization for passive resistance against a state repression that allows 
them access to institutional channels of survival”.  
Clans are the powerful political actors that have had profound influence on the 
nature of transitional and post-transitional authoritarian regimes in the Central Asian 
region and on the durability of these regimes. In the early stage of independence, inter-
clan informal pacts34 promoted peaceful political transition in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, in Tajikistan where there was no pact among 
elites, inter-clan contradictions led to regime breakdown and to one of the longest 
bloodiest post-Soviet conflicts. 
Collins (2004, p.228) says that the Central Asian cases offer a critique of the central 
hypothesis of the transitology paradigm, “that a «pact» is the mode of transition most 
likely to cause democratization.”  
According to McFaul (2002, p.213), clan pacts, or “power-sharing arrangements 
negotiated during transition” have generally been followed by authoritarian throwbacks 
in Central Asia; only in Kyrgyzstan did the clan pact contribute to a brief period of 
democratization in the early stages of its independence. Thus, it can be assumed that clan 
pacts are not a mode of transition to democracy but an informal agreement that fosters 
the durability of the political system, independently of the regime type (table 1.3). 
On the one hand, inter-clan pacts contributed to the strengthening and legitimization 
of authoritarian regimes in Central Asia in the short term because the impact of the 
leader’s ideological orientations, elites, and formal new political institutions was very 
limited.  On the other, clan networks breach the constitutional separation of powers and 
                                                          
34 According O’Donnell et al (1986, p.37), “a pact can be defined as an explicit, but not always publicly 
explicated or justified agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) 
rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the «vital interests» of those 
entering into it. 
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break down parliamentary and court independence that suppress the consolidation of both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes and in the long term may undermine regime 
viability. Moreover, an informal regime of clan politics has sharply polarized society in 
the Central Asian states in terms of property ownership and led to stagnant poverty in 
these countries, creating a permanent threat of social explosion. 
In the post-transitional period, the leaders of the Central Asian states have raised 
the issues of  maintaining states apart from clan domains or even their elimination from 
the political scene because clans significantly increased in power during the transitional 
regime. The attempt to neutralize clan networks in politics was above all, triggered by a 
threat that clan rivalry would infiltrate the army.  
In this connection, Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan for some last years has 
managed to eliminate the dependence of the central government on the traditional rivalry 
of clans and regional groups, considering that clan struggle threatens the republic’s 
stability. Nevertheless, he does not deny the existence of clans and maintains a balance 
between them, but actually, clans no longer play a central role in the distribution of power 
in Uzbekistan.  
At the same time, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s energy wealth and increasing 
GDP have not made them immune to clan politics. Instead, Nazarbaev and 
Berdimuhamedov use their greater revenues to neutralize clan rivals and increase their 
personal power. The change of power in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 led to the deregulation 
of the clan-political structure of the country and pushed rival clans towards a 
redistribution of power and property that became the main factor of further destabilization 
in the country. In Tajikistan, the Kuliab clan continues to play a central role in the political 
life of the country after its rise to power during the civil war. 
 
1.3.2 The ideology of nationalism (as an instrument for implementing the 
strategy of legitimation)  
During the process of regime change, leaders of the Central Asian republic applied 
the ideology of nationalism, which allowed them to legitimize authoritarian regimes and 
strengthen their power in the new independent states. The only exception was 
Turkmenistan, where there was no potential threat to its stateness due to the high degree 
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of ethnic homogeneity of the population in comparison with other Central Asian states 
(Dagiev, 2013). To implement this policy, ruling Central Asian elites have altered 
Communist parties into nationalist parties and represented the image of current presidents 
as national leaders and state builders.    
Dagiev (2013, p.2) asserts that “by employing patrimonial nationalism, the ruling 
elites are aiming to achieve also several other objectives, such as: a) filling the post-
Communist’ ideological void; b) giving a stronger sense of national belonging to their 
titular nation; c) maintaining the stateness of their respective countries and the national 
unity of their nations; d) preventing the re-emergence of Islam and other competing 
ideologies.” 
According to Cummings (2012, p.6), the “deployment of «nationalism» by Central 
Asian elites is one of the principal contributing factors undermining the process of 
transition from Soviet authoritarianism to democratization.”  
In all Central Asian countries, the 1990s were marked by experiments in the 
selection of ideological constructs. Different national ideas were taken in consideration.  
Kazakhs identified themselves with Abylaja’s legacy and other khans of the Golden 
Horde; Kyrgyz – with the legendary ancestor Manas, which left the “seven 
commandments”; Uzbeks – with Emir Temur, and later adopted a concept of 
“Uzbekchilik” developed under the rule of President Karimov; Tajiks - with Ismail 
Samani, the founder of the Tajik nation; Turkmens - with Seljuk Sultan. The 
personification of the greatness of the past and the present of Turkmenistan was also the 
book “Rukhnama”.  
Ideologists of Central Asia states could not avoid the temptation to argue the 
national identity of the population in the new independent republics by intentionally 
“ancientizing” the history of the dominant ethnic groups in them. Nevertheless, the 
majority of the population does not perceive historical personages too remote in history 
as very appealing.  
The reclamation of national identity through declaring the titular language as the 
state language along with efforts to limit the role of the Russian language in public life 
was common throughout the region. Currently, Russian has been declared the language 
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of “interethnic communication” in three Central Asian states except Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan (Landau et al, 2012).  
Thus, issues of national identity and the construction of a national ideology 
acceptable for the majority of the population remain very acute for all the Central Asian 
republics that have emerged as a product of Soviet nationality policy and whose 
population for thousands of years did not have an independent national statehood.  
 
1.3.3 Phenomenon of retraditionalization of the regimes (as an instrument for 
implementing the strategy of legitimation) 
 The transformation of Post-Soviet regimes has led to a revival of a number of 
traditional institutions that allow control not only of the mass consciousness of the 
population with the help of traditions, but it is simultaneously a mechanism for state 
control over the lives of the citizens.  
Among these “new” institutions are “men’s clubs” in Tajikistan; mahalla and 
kishlak (social institutions built around familial ties and Islamic rituals in urban districts 
and in rural villages respectively) in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; avlod 
(territorial- family clans united by a common place of birth and a common tribal ancestor) 
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The old wisemen aksakal (literally “white beard”) are 
recognized as an undisputed authority in all Central Asian states.   
In view of the ruling elite, the enclave-conglomerate structure of the society (in 
which enclaves of modern and traditional co-exist) represent the best way to keep peace 
and social stability (Bogaturov et al, 2002). That is why some leaders of the Central Asian 
states have appropriated attributes not only as the constitutionally legitimate presidents, 
but have also associated their names with historical and national heroes, and even pseudo-
monarchs. This allowed them to appear in the eyes of their fellow citizens as the Fathers 
and protectors of the nation (for example, Nazarbaev from 2010 was legally assigned the 
title of leader of the nation “Elbasi”; Berdimuhamedov in 2010 was given the title 
“Arkadag,” or “Saint Protector”; Turkmenbashi, meaning Father of all Turkmen, was 
President Niyazov).  
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With regard to political behavior, retraditionalization was revealed in the habit of 
participating and voting in elections in accordance with the advice of “elders” in the 
traditional sense of terms: chiefs of clans and groups, mullahs, elder male relatives or in 
their absence, just men.  
Thus, the phenomenon of retraditionalization of the regimes has emerged in Central 
Asian states as a component of the policy of national resurrection aimed to fill the post-
Soviet ideological void and to give legitimacy to authoritarian regimes in the region.  
 
1.3.4. The Islamic factor (as an instrument for implementing the strategies of 
legitimation and repression) 
Central Asia is the only completely Muslim region in the post-Soviet space. After 
a relatively short period of limiting influence of Islam in the Soviet period (which led to 
differentiate the CAR from other areas of the Muslim World35), it strengthened its 
position in the post-Soviet era.  
Historical and geographical factors exerted a significant impact on the rebirth of 
Islam in the region. During the national-state demarcation in the Soviet period, which 
aimed to reduce the spread and influence of pan-Turkism in the region, the CAR were 
divided into various republics. As a result, the Fergana Valley was divided among 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Shash oasis became part of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, and Transoxiana became part of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
The most intensive rebirth of Islamic political activity occurred in accordance with these 
geographical and administrative-territorial fractures (Abazov, 1995).  
In comparison with Soviet regionalism, Islamic ideology has not divided people by 
ethnicity and nationality criteria, but has offered a much broader basis for national identity 
acting as a consolidating force in the Muslim republics of Central Asia. 
Moreover, the phenomenon of turning to religion was well-known for centuries as 
a reaction to poverty, misery and a lack of social prospects. The Soviet system of social 
                                                          
35 The faith is based on the Sufi doctrines, with personal non-rigid observance of the Koran, to which are 
added shamanic practices and the worship of saints. The cradle of spirituality in Central Asia is situated in 
the Fergana Valley. 
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security, which supported the principle of equality was destroyed, but Central Asian 
society was too weak to create something to replace it right away. As a result, the problem 
of poverty became acute. Today, almost the entire region is confronted with a profound 
deterioration of the social living conditions.  
According to the UNDP report (2011, p.18), in 2005, the percentage of children in 
households with an income of less than 2.5 USD a day per capita was 90 percent in 
Kyrgyzstan, 80 percent in Uzbekistan and 75 percent in Tajikistan. The problem of 
poverty and lack of social support of the population led to a rejection of democracy and 
the enhancement of the positions of the political forces, supporting alternative models of 
development, the Islamic one in particular.  
A significant factor of the growing influence of Islam in Central Asia was also the 
crisis in public consciousness. After the disappearance of the Soviet ideology, which had 
coordinated the interests of polytechnic groups in Central Asia, the new political power 
was unable to provide any national identity-giving ideology; as a result, this ideological 
void began to be filled by Islam.  
Islam cannot be viewed as a factor responsible for the failure of democratic 
transition in Central Asia, but it contributed to the development of nationalism in the 
region, for the ruling elites saw Islam as a competing ideology, which could threaten their 
secular form of state (Dagiev, 2013). At the same time, Islam has been actively used by 
the authoritarian regimes as a tool for creating a new national identity and legitimation of 
their political power.  
A complex of objective and subjective reasons (including repression and 
persecution by the dominating regimes of Islamic activists) created conditions for the 
emergence and expansion of radical Islam in the region. Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI)36 
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)37 are the two main Islamic organizations 
that have both challenged the stability of the authoritarian regimes across the region. 
                                                          
36 HTI is the most powerful and branched international organization covering the entire region that aims to 
unite Muslims through creating a theocratic supranational Caliphate based on Sharia. Democracy 
represented for them a system of infidels.  
37 IMU is a national Uzbek organization set up in 1966 by Islamic militants, which in the early 1990s began 
their political activities in the Fergana Valley. “The IMU’s focus on overthrowing Karimov’s regime and 
seizing power in Tashkent” (Naumkin, 2005, p. 264). 
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Extremist organizations were involved in the civil war of 1992-97 in Tajikistan; in 
the Batken incidents of 1999 -2000 in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; in the coups d’état of 
2005 and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan; in the Andijan massacre of 2005 in Uzbekistan, and in 
subsequent terrorist attacks throughout the region. Moreover, in Central Asia recently 
identified cases of recruitment of militants for the extremist group “Islamic State” (IS)38.     
The fight against extremist organizations remains one of the most important tasks 
for ruling elites in ensuring regional security in Central Asia. The activity of Islamic 
organizations in Uzbekistan was cruelly suppressed by the Karimov police regime, many 
Islamists were forced to leave the republic, or go underground. In Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan the activities of Islamic organizations either were banned or 
were taken under the strictest control by the authoritarian regimes.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the widespread use by authorities of the 
Central Asian states of the Islamist radical label as a pretext to fight with the political 
opposition, is often greatly exaggerated in order to legitimate repressive regimes in the 
states, as well as to gain additional funds from Western countries.  
Khalid (2007, p.191) asserts, “Central Asian regimes justify their policies toward 
Islam as a defense of secularism, which allows governments to legitimate their own 
authoritarian policies by casting all opposition as extremist. Even though Islamic 
militancy may pose some danger to the regimes, the danger the regimes pose to ordinary 
pious Muslims is far greater.”  
Although Islam was not able to overthrow the local secular regimes, it has become 
the Achilles’ heel for secular Central Asian states.   
According to Seifert (2012, p.17), “the government must make an effort to create a 
political modus vivendi within the framework of a secular-Islamic negotiation process. 
This is the key question for the political survival and consolidation of the state. For this, 
there needs to be a joint elaboration of a democratic mechanism, which makes nonviolent 
                                                          
38 http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/congress-isis/2816806.html Центральная Азия и Россия как 
платформы для вербовки боевиков «Исламского государства» (Central Asia and Russia as a platform 
for recruiting militants for “Islamic state”). F. Tlisova, June 11, 2015. 
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cooperation of both sides possible.” In this sense, the Tajik model presents a version of 
possible synchronization between secularism and Islam.  
Thus, instruments applied by incumbent Central Asian leaders to produce 
continuity of their authoritarian rule have become one of the main obstacles for 
democratic development in these states, namely:  inter-clan pacts in the short term (in the 
long term, clan networks may undermine regime viability); ideology of nationalism as 
the consequences of Soviet regionalism; retraditionalization of the regimes as a 
component of the policy of national resurrection; the Islamist radical label as a pretext to 
fight with the political opposition.  
Based on the conceptual framework for determining the democratic governance 
proposed above (see p. 42 of this paper), these features of Central Asian states can be 
referred to internal factors (as specifics of social, cultural, religious, economic and historic 
development of the state) that have determined the trend of keeping a distance from the 
Western democratic model. 
 
1.4. The issues of the legitimacy of the regimes and the prospects of democratic 
modernization in the Central Asian countries 
According to Bogaturov (2010, p.113), in contrast to open-type Western society, 
“Central Asian society represents a closed-type structure that has not yet freed itself from 
being tied down to particular paternalistic structures, clans, regional groups, and, very 
often, forms of pre-nation social awareness.” The liberalization of the political systems 
of Central Asia “cannot happen ahead of changes in regional cultures; i.e. shifts in the 
basic concepts of sufficiency or excess, the attractiveness of «freedom» or «non-
freedom», individual competition or communal-corporate solidarity, personal 
responsibility (and equality) or patronage (and subordination)” (ibid). 
All these features of Central Asian society are directly linked to the issue of where 
the output from political transformation deadlock is and, consequently, what objective 
should be pursued by the political system, if bearing in mind the prospect of democratic 
modernization. So far, neither Western schemes nor the ruling Central Asian elites have 
given answers to these questions. The Western concepts proposed can only suggest some 
general approaches. The Central Asian states need to determine by themselves the 
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specifics for the application of these schemes and to search their own paths for further 
political development. Thus, the key issue of Central Asia states is the advancement of 
their “own” democracies in line with their social structure, cultural and political norms.  
On the one hand, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, Central Asian states do 
not have all the required social and political prerequisites that can be assessed in 
accordance with the criteria used in the Western political system. On the other, 
repudiation of democracy and the maintaining of an authoritarian form of government no 
longer correspond to the current challenges and threats standing in front of Central Asian 
states, nor to the development prospects of the entire region.  
The stabilizing and regulatory capacities of Central Asian authoritarian regimes 
have recently begun to manifest an alarming tendency towards stagnation and even to 
degradation. The common risks of instability of authoritarian regimes presented currently 
across the region are connected with some contradictions. 
Firstly, the artificially formed Soviet era borders and national identities (which 
Central Asian countries have been able to maintain after gaining independence) have 
provoked ethnic tensions and controversies related to water and land distribution and have 
caused reciprocal complaints between the states across the region.  
Linz et al (2000, p.25) define this problem as “statehood”, “when there are profound 
differences regarding the definition of the territorial boundaries of the state, 
corresponding to a certain political community, and who has the right to citizenship in 
that State” (figure 1.3).  This can play a decisive role in the deepening of the crisis of non-
democratic Central Asian regimes. In connection to this, the issues of territorial integrity 
and the possible scenarios of the breakdown in such countries as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan have been repeatedly discussed. The incumbent leaders of these Central 
Asian states have managed to contain these contradictions by using authoritarian methods 
in the early stage of independence but in spite of this, currently, the threat of an outburst 
of conflicts within countries remains very high (above all in Kyrgyzstan). The opposition 
and criminal forces might use these reciprocal contradictions against authoritarian 
regimes to achieve their own objectives.  
Secondly, it is a crisis of national identity and conflict between democracy and 
nationalism as the two basic values of post-communist transformation. In contrast to 
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democracy that suggests unlimited possibilities for civil and legal self-determination, 
nationalism is focused on the principles of national self-determination and sovereignty. 
In conditions of high ethnic heterogeneity of the population in the region, nationalism 
emphasizes the superiority of some nations over the others, thereby splitting the society 
based on ethno-national criteria and preventing the emergence of an authentic civil 
society. The inability of authoritarian regimes to provide any unifying national identity-
giving ideology aggravates the problem of poverty, while the lack of necessary economic 
reforms and interethnic contradictions within countries enhance the positions of the 
political forces supporting alternative models of development, the Islamic one, in 
particular, thus threatening a secular form of state. 
Thirdly, there is a permanent crisis of legitimacy of post-Soviet authoritarian   
regimes, connected with the conflict between the legality of decisions and actions of the 
government and their legitimacy in the eyes of society. The “Andijan Massacre” in 
Uzbekistan in 2005, the “tulip” revolution in 2005 and subsequent “counterrevolution” in 
2010 in Kyrgyzstan have become the most visible expressions of the crisis of legitimacy 
of an authoritarian regime.  
In the opinion of Medushevsky (2014, p.501), “the features of the phenomenon of  
«color revolutions» in the post-Soviet space as an anti-regime reaction look not to destroy 
the political system nor to renounce the old Constitution in the name of the new one, but 
to protect the current Constitution against the political regime, which has been violating 
the provisions of its own basic law.”  
The challenges of the crisis of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes proposed in the 
countries of the region were different, but in most cases were reduced to the choice of the 
form of government: a parliamentary form of government (Kyrgyzstan), a parliamentary-
presidential form (Kazakhstan), or legitimation of traditional authoritarianism in the 
presidential regimes (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). Despite the diversity of 
chosen governance models by Central Asia states, none of them has solved the problem 
of political stability and led to the functioning of the political institutions.  
Currently, the presidential branch of power (even though with some reservations) 
is the only capable political institution in the Central Asian region, which itself rests on 
the authority of the incumbent leaders of the state (Zvyagelskaya, 2009).  
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The attempts to further maintain these forms of government based on an 
independent super-presidential power39 while lacking the institutional mechanism for 
leadership succession only increase systemic contradictions. These contradictions under 
certain circumstances (for example, the aggravation of the Islamic factor, or inter-ethnic 
and inter-clan conflicts) can lead to large-scale political collisions and to a real war among 
elites for the redistribution of power and property (Bogaturov, 2010).  
Moreover, the impact of external factors might also destabilize the situation in the 
weak links of the Central Asian space and trigger the “domino effect” across region. 
Among them are the recent events in the Middle East (the so-called “Arab Spring”) that 
some political scientists refer to as a “fourth wave” of democratization even if this may 
be premature since the fate of these transitions is currently extremely uncertain40; 
unpredictable consequences for the security and the capacity of Central Asian states to 
deter militant groups of Islamic extremists connected with the withdrawal of most NATO 
troops from Afghanistan in December 2014; the continuing conflict in Ukraine and in 
Syria.  
These global challenges and threats have raised concerns for Central Asian 
incumbent leaders about the possibilities of contagion and the loss of power in their 
countries and have pushed them to strengthen the measures of social control in order to 
prevent emulation. In this regard, the last presidential elections held in the Republics of 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (in April of 2015 and in March of 2015 respectively) were 
directed in the first place towards reducing the scale of intra-elite contradictions and the 
possibilities of social unrest in these countries (Malashenko, 2015).  
The upcoming wave of natural replacements of incumbent leaders, many of whom 
have been in power for nearly a quarter century, induce the need to continue democratic 
modernization started by them towards free and transparent elections, real multi-party 
                                                          
39 The institutional transition from a presidential to a parliamentary republic in Kyrgyzstan cannot be 
regarded here as successful because a constitutionally formed parliamentary system does not have a strong 
social and economic base and is evidently premature.  
40 http://www.limesonline.com/rubrica/in-kazakistan-chi-protesta-non-vota La rivolta esplosa nella città 
petrolifera di Zhanaozen nel dicembre 2011 prima delle elezioni fu interpretata come l’inizio di una 
primavera araba in Kazakistan (The revolt that exploded in the oil city of Zhanaozen in December 2011 on 
the eve of the parliamentary election was interpreted as the beginning of an Arab Spring in Kazakhstan). 
C.Tosi. January 9, 2012. 
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competition and independent media. However, forced democratization can be dangerous 
for the political and social viability of Central Asian states as the further attempts to 
remain within “the paradigm of surface reformation” which stabilizing and regulative 
capacity has been already largely exhausted.                
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Chapter 2. Economic development of the Central Asian region and its states after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gaining of independence  
 
2.1 Connecting Central Asian republics with a common economic space of the 
Soviet Union before its disintegration 
Within the former Soviet Union, the fifteen41 Soviet republics were considered a 
single economic space, or “a unified currency area” (Kaufman et al, 1993, p.416). The 
administrative borders, which became state borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the gaining of independence of its successor states, were not taken into account in 
economic inter-republican relations.  
Soviet Central Asian republics had a special place in the inter-regional and inter-
sectoral division of labor, with a particular focus on the supply of products of the oil and 
gas industries, non-ferrous metallurgy, agriculture and light industry to the domestic 
market of the Soviet Union, although the specific resource endowment varied from 
country to country (table 2.1).  
Central Asia was the most heavily rural part of the USSR, the share of manual labor 
in agriculture according to Soviet statistics varied from 85 up to 93 percent (Kazanzev, 
2010). Kazakhstan was the only one of the five Central Asian republics with over half of 
its population living in urban areas. The Kazakh republic has had a more diversified 
economy specialized in grain exports and a variety of mineral and energy resources. The 
Uzbek economy was dominated by cotton, as were the other neighboring Central Asian 
republics. Turkmenistan had experienced a boom in natural-gas production during the last 
decade of the USSR, while the mainly mountainous Kyrgyz and Tajik republics had fewer 
exploitable resources (Pomfret, 2006). 
According to Omarov (2008), the contribution of Central Asian economies 
accounted for 20 percent of coal, 18 percent of gas, 33 percent of gold, and 92 percent of 
cotton extracted and produced in the former USSR. 
                                                          
41 Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.  
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          Table 2.1 Inter-republican trade of Russia and the Central Asian republics according to sectors of the economy in 1988 (million rubles). 
Sectors of the economy 
Russia   Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan 
Input  
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-input 
Input 
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-input 
Input 
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-input 
Total of material 
production sectors 
68 963.9 69 224.2 260.3 13 686.4 8 337.1 -5 349.3 2 971.8 2 536.8 -435.0 
Industry, including:  64 665.9 68 498.6 3 832.7 13 464.1 6 772.7 -6 691.4 2 900.1 2 423.9 -476.2 
electric power industry 527.1 490.7 -36.4 343.5 190.0 -144.5 29.9 78.1 48.2 
oil and gas industry 1 606.4 7 474.8 5 668.4 1 334.0 878.7 -455.3 314.3 11.4 -302.9 
coal industry 183.1 461.7 278.6 166.6 326.1 159.5 31.4 21.6 -9.8 
ferrous metallurgy 6 367.9 5 371.5 -996.4 1 010.9 862.9 -148.0 187.3 8.2 -179.1 
nonferrous metallurgy 1 588.1 3047.1 1 459.0 241.8 482.4 240.6 87.4 128.6 41.3 
chemical and petrochemical 
industry 
6 189.2 8 252.7 2 063.5 1 462.3 966.3 -496.0 338.6 24.7 -313.9 
machine building and metal 
working 
20 848.9 27 114.5 6 265.6 4 646.2 776.0 -3 870.2 974.8 938.8 -10.0 
wood, wood-processing, 
pulp and paper industries 
795.9 4 177.2 3 381.3 772.9 25.5 -747.4 107.1 4.5 -102.6 
construction materials 
industry 
751.8 1 152.3 400.5 285.8 143.9 -141.9 64.6 12.7 -51.9 
light industries 11 560.5 6 392.2 -5 168.3 1 539.5 1 402.0 -137.5 470.9 650.8 179.9 
food-processing industries 13 135.0 2 598.3 -10 536.7 1 376.8 631.6 -745.2 263.5 521.1 257.6 
other industry sectors 1 086.6 1 963.8 877.0 282.9 78.3 -204.6 56.3 23.4 -32.9 
Agriculture  3 950.1 333.0 -3 617.1 160.1 1 516.4 1 356.3 64.5 107.7 43.2 
Other types of material 
production 
347.9 396.2 44.7 62.2 48.0 -14.2 7.2 5.2 -2.0 
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Sources: The State Committee for Statistics (1991), Statistical compilation, pp.238-265 (Госкомстат, Cборник статистических материалов). 
 
Sectors of the economy 
(continued) 
 
Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Input  
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-
input 
Input  
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-
input 
Input  
(import) 
Output 
(export) 
Balance, ∆  
output-input 
Total of material 
production sectors 
3 022.6 2 052.2 -997.4 2 486.0 2 389.2 -96.8 10 623.8 8 957.2 -1 666.5 
Industry, including:  2 917.8 1 935.2 -982.6 2 457.0 2 245.9 211.1 10 217.3 7 700.5      -2 516.8 
electric power industry 60.5 67.0 6.5 8.9 58.9 50.0 191.6 180.3 -11.3 
oil and gas industry 295.9 16.8 -279.1 100.2 750.6 650.4 968.3 619.2 -349.1 
coal industry 10.8 4.3 -6.5 6.6 0.0 -6.6 37.6 14.5 -23.1 
ferrous metallurgy 127.7 3.4 -124.3 107.0 3.3 -103.7 652.8 111.4 -541.4 
nonferrous metallurgy 189.8 300.1 110.3 9.4 5.2 -4.2 364.3 468.1 103.8 
chemical and 
petrochemical industry 
321.1 94.8 -226.3 200.1 150.4 -49.4 976.4 813.5 -162.9 
machine building and 
metal working 
783.0 207.0 -576.0 925.6 44.2 -881.4 3 152.2 1 203.2 -1 949.0 
wood, wood-processing, 
pulp and paper industries 
106.9 7.1 -99.8 103.1 0.3 -102.8 514.3 31.5 -482.8 
construction materials 
industry 
56.4 32.9 -23.5 53.5 20.9 -32.6 188.0 82.6 -105.4 
light industries 494.2 973.2 478.9 395.1 1 116.1 721.0 1 492.8 3 278.6 1 785.8 
food-processing 
industries 
403.4 225.2 -178.2 433.9 95.3 -338.6 1 481.5 832.9 -648.6 
other industry sectors 68.1 3.5 -64.6 113.6 0.7 -112.9 197.3 64.7 -132.6 
Agriculture 101.5 79.9 -21.6 28.2 137.2 109.0 348.6 818.0 469.4 
Other types of material 
production 
3.3 10.1 6.8 0.8 6.1 5.3 57.8 438.7 380.9 
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It is important to note that during the Soviet era economic activity of Central Asian 
republics was defined and subordinated to the instructions from the State Planning 
Commission (Gosplan) of the Soviet Union. The Gosplan administered the pricing system 
and defined goals of physical production for the entire economy of USSR (Pomfret, 
2006). 
A command economy of USSR was characterized by “a resource mobilization 
towards rapid industrialization”. The structure of the Soviet economy with its typical bias 
towards heavy and military industries, fuel and raw material orientation was reproduced 
in many Soviet republics including the Central Asian republics.  
Laruelle et al (2013, p.117) assert “under the Soviet regime, a number of industries 
operated at a loss, as they answered not to commercial logic but to considerations related 
to the managed economy that prioritized over light industry, or to development, which 
endowed each republic with an economic niche that contributed to the overall Soviet 
structure.” 
Thus, production capacities and infrastructures in Central Asia republics were 
created in accordance with the needs of the Soviet economy. Without the importation of 
many kinds of machines and equipment, chemical products, fuel and raw materials from 
other Soviet republics and primarily from Russia, the functioning of most of the Central 
Asian economies would have been practically impossible (Lounev, 1999).  
The USSR realized in Central Asia a specific variant of modernization, which was 
in many respects a derivation of the model that was typical for Russia itself. Vishnevsky 
(1998, cited in Kazantsev, 2010 p.3-4) asserts “the basic contradiction of Soviet 
modernization can be explained on the basis of the ideology of «conservative revolution»: 
creation of highly modernized and industrialized centers (for example, in the spheres of 
military or space hi-tech) based on traditional archaic institutions in other, more basic 
spheres (for example, revival of the institute of traditional forms of integration in the form 
of collective farms in the villages).” The paradox was that “in overpopulated and labor-
redundant Central Asia industry, transport and, in general, city life during the Soviet 
period were established and maintained mainly due to migration of highly skilled 
Russian-speaking specialists to the region” (Kazantsev, 2010, p.4). 
67 
 
During the years of perestroika42 (1985-1991), the Popular Front leaders43 
successfully exploited the idea that the economies of Soviet republics had a colonial 
character and were the raw material appendages of their metropolis - Russia. However, 
none of the former Soviet republics was a raw material appendage of Russia. Industrial 
sectors were developed in all of them. The structure of the Gross social product (GSP)44 
demonstrated that in 1989, the share of the industrial sector on average accounted for 60.5 
percent of GSP of the Soviet Union; in Kyrgyz SSR - 56.4 percent; in Tajik SSR - 54.8 
percent; in Uzbek SSR - 54.3 percent; in Turkmen SSR - 45.2 percent; in Kazakh SSR - 
45.2 percent. In the early 1920s, the ratio of maximum and minimum values of this index 
was 40:1, and by the end of the 1980s - 1.4:1 (Sitaryan, 1991, p.3). 
Furthermore, all Central Asian republics received subsidies from Russia. According 
to the calculations of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, the Soviet system of inter-republic economic relations included the transfer of 
6.6 percent of Russia’s national income to the other Soviet republics (Lounev, 1999). 
For example, in 1991 the direct centralized subsidies from Russia to the Central 
Asian republics amounted for 44 percent of the budget of Tajikistan, 42 percent  of 
Uzbekistan, 34 percent  of Kyrgyzstan, 23 percent  of Kazakhstan, 22 percent  of 
Turkmenistan (Marnie et al, 1993, p.34). Some researchers consider even these numbers 
underestimated owing to the existence of indirect subsidies connected with the supply of 
products from Russia to the Central Asian republics at reduced domestic prices in 
comparison with world prices.  
In connection to this, it is important to note that “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan paid nothing into the union budget; the contributions of Kyrgyzstan were 
                                                          
42 The literal meaning of perestroika is “restructuring”, referring to the restructuring of the Soviet political 
and economic system. Perestroika is often argued to be the cause of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War (Heuvel et al, 2009). 
43 The Popular Fronts were one of the forms of association of supporters of perestroika, which defended the 
new ideology of the USSR and supported the deepening of political and economic reforms.  
44 Gross social product was defined in the Soviet Union by adding up all goods and services provided for a 
certain period (usually for the year). At the same time, double counting took place. For example, if the 
components produced by one plant were sold to another plant, the cost of these were taken into account 
once again in the value of the finished product. Gross social product was used in the calculations in the 
Soviet Union until 1991. Since 1988, in parallel with this indicator the gross domestic product (GDP) used 
in most countries of the world has been defined. 
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insignificant. Only Kazakhstan was seriously financing the union government” 
(Khrustalev, 1994 cited in Kazantzev, 2010, p.9).  
At the same time, Kaufman et al (1993, p.10) says that “the CIA and other Western 
estimates were undertaken in the belief that many of the numbers furnished by the Soviet 
statistical agency were seriously flawed. Under Soviet rule official secrecy and the 
absence of market prices hid real growth rates, inflation and other indicators from view.” 
Kaufman et al (1993, p.6) analyze what was a “politically charged question in the 
Soviet Union: who gained and who lost the most from inter-republic merchandise trade, 
or “who’s feeding whom?” The authors find that “if one uses world market prices, Russia 
is by far the largest net creditor, largely because of its energy exports to the other 
republics. All other republics have modest to large negative balances.”  
According to statistical data, Russia in 1986-1990 effectively had a stable positive 
inter-republic exchange balance, while the Central Asian republics had a stable negative 
inter-republic exchange balance (except for Turkmenistan) (table 2.1; table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 Inter-republic and foreign trade balances of the Soviet republics in the 
world prices in 1988 (billion rubles)    
                                                                                                                                                          
Soviet  
Republics 
Inter-republic 
trade balances 
Foreign trade 
balances 
Total 
balance 
Russia  +23.88 +6.96 +30.84 
Azerbaijan –0.24 –0.21 –0.45 
Armenia –1.06 –0.31 –1.37 
Belorussia –1.59 –0.46 –2.05 
Estonia –1.06 –0.24 –1.30 
Georgia –1.61 –0.30 –1.91 
Kazakhstan –5.94 –0.64 –6.58 
Kyrgyzstan –0.54 –0.52 –1.06 
Latvia –0.99 –0.32 –1.31 
Lithuania –3.33 –0.36 –3.69 
Moldava –2.22 –0.41 –2.63 
Tajikistan –1.20 +0.08 –1.12 
Turkmenistan +0.1 –0.06 +0.04 
Ukraine –1.57 –1.32 –2.89 
Uzbekistan –2.63 +0.09 –2.54 
                       
                  Source: Granberg et al, 1997, p.17. 
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By converting inter-republic trade into world market prices, the inter-republic 
exchange balance of Russia was even more positive. In fact, Russia was the donor of most 
Soviet republics, and thanks to its subsidies provided the functioning of the common 
economic space of the Soviet Union.  
The USSR had a tightly integrated economy with great mutual dependencies 
between regions. The Soviet republics were closely related to each other due to rigid 
specialization and the monopolistic production of commodities. In 1990, in all Central 
Asian republics (except Kyrgyzstan), the share of inter-republic trade accounted for 
almost 90 percent or more both of total exports and imports (table 2.3). 
Nonetheless, the Soviet model of modernization of Central Asia was causing 
serious problems to Russia. Even in view of price disproportions in the Soviet economy 
(“the underpricing of energy and overpricing of manufactured goods”), the republics of 
Central Asia were getting from Russia more than they were giving to it, except for 
Turkmenistan that was the major suppliers of oil and natural gas on the common market 
of the USSR (Pomfret, 2006). Turkmenistan received almost nothing from Russia due to 
its oil and gas wealth and the Soviet system of pricing, which artificially subsidized the 
finished products and reduced prices for raw materials (Kazantzev, 2010).   
According to widespread agreement among specialists regarding the general trends, 
the Soviet Union was unable to reserve or arrest the long-term slowdown in growth that 
began in the 1960s and grew steadily worse.  
Kaufman et al (1993, p.1) notes that “Gorbachev’s policy of heavy investments, 
especially in high technology sectors, achieved some degree of success in 1986-88, 
posting high growth rates in industry, agriculture, and construction. By 1989, however, 
the industry, construction, and transportation sectors experienced a downturn, partly as a 
result of a shift in Gorbachev’s policies away from investment to consumption.” 
According to the authors, this policy increased nationalism between the Soviet republics 
that led to local protectionism and reduced economic activity between them.  
 
 
 
70 
 
2.2 Central Asia’s transition to a market economy and the features of 
transformational recession in the 1990s 
The post-Soviet period began unexpectedly for the population and the elites of the 
Central Asian countries with the signing of the Belavezha Accords in December 8, 1991, 
which led to the dissolution of the USSR. 
The destiny of Central Asia was decided at the state dacha in Belovezhskaya 
Pushcha by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, without any consultation with 
the leaders of other Soviet republics. According to Dietl (1997, p.113), “the Central Asian 
republics were practically «pushed out» from the Soviet Union” despite the fact that 93.7 
percent of the population of Uzbekistan, 94.1 percent of Kazakhstan, 94.6 percent of 
Kyrgyzstan, 96.2 percent of Tajikistan and 79.9 percent of Turkmenistan had voted for 
the preservation of the Soviet Union in the referendum of 1991. 
 The partly compelled proclamation of independence towards the end of 1991 
required the Central Asian ruling elites to conduct a number of measures to maintain the 
viability of the national economies and the social systems in order to determine their 
position in the world community and in the international division of labor. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union put before the independent Central Asian countries completely new 
challenges associated with the abolition of the Communist party and the replacement of 
the communist ideology with the national one.  
The new Central Asian independent states are faced three major economic shocks: 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, transition from central planning to a market economy, 
and hyperinflation. According to Pomfret (2006, p.5), “in 1992, prices increased very 
rapidly, by more than 50 percent per month in all five Central Asian countries”. 
The transition to a market economy in the Central Asian states started with the 
introduction of new institutions and governance practices fixed in the Washington 
Consensus. This type of macroeconomic policy was recommended by IMF and the World 
Bank and provided the implementation of reforms aimed at the expansion of market 
forces and the reduction of the public sector.  
However, the new institutions interacted badly with inherited traditions of public 
administration and the structural features of the post-Soviet centrally planned economy 
(Ratanova, 2003). The painful market transformation of the new independent states 
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was noted by a significant economic decline and increased poverty that equally affected 
all Central Asian states. 
The gap of interrelated ties between Soviet republics (table 2.3) and in first place 
with Russia after the disintegration of the USSR caused a chain reaction of a dramatic 
decline of production in many enterprises that led to the economic collapse in all the 
republics of the former Soviet Union (Illarionov, 1995).  
 
Table 2.3 Inter-republic trade of Central Asian republics in 1990 and 1995, 
percentage of total balances 
 
Soviet Republics 
/independent 
states 
Output (Export) Input (Import) 
1990 1995 
∆ % 
1995/90  
1990 1995 
∆ % 
1995/90 
Kazakhstan 89 55 -38.2 88 70 -20.5 
Uzbekistan 89 39 -56.2 89 41 -53.9 
Kyrgyzstan 97 66 -32.2 80 68 -15.0 
Tagikistan 82 34 -58.5 89 59 -33.7 
Turkmenistan 96 49 -49.0 89 55 -38.2 
Source: Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS States: Statistical Yearbook (Статистический 
ежегодник СНГ), 1998, p.68. 
 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates that in 1995 in comparison with 1990 the share of inter-republic 
trade in total trade balances of Central Asian republics declined significantly: from 32.2 
to 58.5 percent in inter-republic output (exportation) and from 15.0 to 53.9 percent in 
inter-republic input (importation).  
As a result of the rupture of technical and cooperation ties within former Soviet 
republics, the countries of the Central Asian regions had to move away from the 
monopolized, highly centralized, military-oriented Soviet development “towards a 
favoring of consumer needs”.  
Attempts to maintain economic links in the post-Soviet space by retaining the ruble 
as a common currency in 1992-93 exacerbated the problem of hyperinflation. The 
72 
 
collapse of the ruble zone in the end of 1993 and the introduction of national currencies 
in Central Asian independent states made interstate trade even more difficult (Ratanova, 
2003). In Tajikistan that was torn by civil war the national currency was not introduced 
until May 1995 (Pomfret, 2006).  
The replacing of artificial Soviet prices by world prices, led to the appearance of 
many unprofitable enterprises in a number of industries of Central Asian republics and to 
the cessation of activities in much of them. Nonetheless, some Central Asian post-Soviet 
states benefited from improved prices for cotton and minerals and lower prices for 
manufactured goods.  
According to Pomfret, (2006, p.4-5), “Uzbekistan benefited from the shift to world 
prices because world cotton prices boomed during the first half of the 1990s”. At the same 
time, “Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were unable to benefit from the transition to world 
prices immediately because the dominant exit route for their oil and gas exports was via 
the Russian pipeline network” (ibid). 
After 1993 the Russian subsidies to the republics of Central Asia dramatically 
dropped. Gradual termination of Russian economic assistance increased economic 
recession in Central Asia that also caused the crisis of the Socialist economic model, the 
growth of political instability, and the emergence of critical problems in food and energy 
supply, environment, and infrastructure.  
In the first half of the 1990s, a sharp drop in gross domestic product (GDP) was 
observed in all post-Soviet Central Asian republics (figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1 GDP of Central Asian states in constant 1990 prices in percentages, 
(1991=100). 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on UN and World Bank data. 
 
Figure 2.1 show that in the first half of the 1990s the decline of GDP in Uzbekistan 
amounted to 15-20 percent in comparison with 1991; GDP of Kazakhstan declined by 25-
35 percent; in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan the GDP fall was 30-45 percent. At the same 
time, in Tajikistan, there was a catastrophic decline of GDP by 50-65 percent compared 
with pre-crisis 1991 due to a consequence of the civil war of 1992-97.  
According to the statements of the Tajik President Rakhmon, “the economic 
damage caused by civil war was estimated at 7 billion of dollars (…) by the end of the 
war, the drop in industrial production amounted to 72 percent” (Kuzmin, 1998, cited in 
Boboxonov 2001, p.81). 
Most Central Asian countries managed to stop the decline of GDP only in the 
second half of the 1990s. Meanwhile, Tajikistan reached the GDP level of 1991 only at 
the end of 2012.  
Economic decline in the first half of the 1990s led to a significant drop in per capita 
incomes in all Central Asian republics (table 2.4; figure 2.2). In this regard, it is important 
to note that in pre-crisis 1991 Central Asian states as a whole passed ahead of such 
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countries as India, China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan for the levels of per capita incomes 
(Lounev, 1999, p.46).  
 
Table 2.4 GDP (PPP) per capita in Central Asian states from 1990 to 1996 in 
constant 1993 prices, in rubles  
 
Countries 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
∆ % 
1996/90 
Kazakhstan 3 845 3 196 2 827 2 465 2 290 2 330 -39.4 
Kyrgyzstan 3 402 2 639 2 235 1 789 1 677 1 748 -48.6 
Tajikistan 2 426 1 526 1 340 1 033 890 731    -69.9 
Turkmenistan 3 104 2 549 2 147 1 704 1 529 1 510 -51.4 
Uzbekistan 2 709 2 292 2 189 2 056 2 002 1 995 -26.4 
          Source: Вопросы экономики (Economic issues), 1997, n.10, p.151.  
   
 Figure 2.2 Per capita gross domestic product index (1990 =100) 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014, p.7. 
 
Table 2.4 and figure 2.2 demonstrate that from 1990 to 1996 there was a gradual 
reduction of per capita incomes in all Central Asian republics. In 1996, in comparison 
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with 1990, the reduction of per capita incomes varied from 26.4 percent to 69.9 percent 
by countries. The strongest decline of per capita incomes among Central Asian occurred 
in Tajikistan due to the bloody civil war of 1992-97.  
Furthermore, the transition from the Soviet model of economic development to a 
market economy, especially in its most active phase during 1991-1999, led to the dramatic 
changes in the sectoral structure of GDP in all Central Asian republics. It was expressed 
in the sharp reduction in the share of agriculture and the industrial sector (except 
Turkmenistan), and the increase of the share of the service sector due to the rapid 
development of the retail trade, the banking sector and market services in all of them 
(table 2.5). 
Table 2.5. The sector-focused structure of the Central Asian republics, (add-value, 
percentage of GDP).  
 
Sources: World Bank data; The State Statistics Committee of the USSR. The national economy in 1990), 
(Госкомстат СССР. Народное хозяйство в 1990), 1991, p. 639-643.  
 
As follows from table 2.5, at the end of the 1990s in Central Asia, the GDP structure 
observed an increase in the share of the services sector and a reduction in the share of the 
agriculture sector. The agriculture sector, which in the Soviet era was one of the largest 
sectors of the economy of the region at the end of the 1990s, had become less significant, 
although it provided a growing share of total employment in the region. The 
manufacturing industries varied across Central Asian countries but they played a 
secondary role in relation to the oil and gas industry and mining.  
The economic decline of the 1990s was closely connected with the removal of high-
tech production and industries with high value added from the production structure of the 
Central Asian 
republics 
Industry  Agriculture Services 
1990 1999 2014 1990 1999 2014 1990 1999 2014 
Kazakhstan 38 30 36 42 11 5 21 55 59 
Kyrgyzstan 44 24  27 43 38 17 13 37 56 
Tajikistan 42 30 22 37 27 27 22 34 51 
Turkmenistan 34  44 48    48 26 15  19 28 37  
Uzbekistan 38  23 34 44 34 19 18 42 48 
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Central Asian economies due to the breaking or weakening of mutual economic ties 
among the former Soviet republics.  
As a whole the changes that occurred in the 1990s under the influence of 
transformational and geopolitical shocks caused a deep deindustrialization of Central 
Asian economies, returned them to decades ago on the level of socio-economic 
development, and threw them onto the periphery of the world economy (Ratanova, 2003). 
A profound and a protracted economic and social crisis was also the result of  the 
instantaneous opening of the economies of Central Asian states to external competition, 
the reduction of military expenditure and the conversion of military enterprises and the 
admission of mistakes in conducting the reforms.  
In connection to this, it is important to note that the reduction of the Russian 
presence in the military and security spheres posed even more problems than the sharp 
decline in investments and assistance previously provided by Russia to Central Asia. For 
some new states of the former Soviet Union the problem of Soviet nuclear inheritance on 
their territory, which could no longer be controlled or dismantled by order from Moscow, 
became significant. It suffices to say that the nuclear arsenal that was at the time of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan exceeded the nuclear arsenals of the United 
Kingdom, France and China put together (Zhukov et al, 2001). 
According to Laumulin (2009, p.357), “in exchange for consent from Kazakhstan 
that it would remove ballistic missiles from its territory, the George Bush administration 
put pressure on Chevron and encouraged it to come with investments in the Caspian oil 
and gas fields despite the economic disadvantages. Only later, the gaining of access to 
Caspian hydrocarbons become the core of American geopolitics in Eurasia.”      
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2.3 The socio-economic evolution of Central Asian countries in the post-
transition45 period. Structural change and the new economic development models   
Following a deep economic decline and a painful systemic transformation during 
the 1990s, the five Central Asian republics have shown sustainable economic growth after 
2000 (tables 2.6, 2.7; figures 2.1, 2.2).   
Pomfret (2006, p.2) asserts that “in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the five Central Asian countries economic performance differed, to some extent 
reflecting policy choices, but since 2000 the comparative situation has been dominated 
by the global boom in oil prices.” 
 
        Table 2.6. The main macroeconomic indicators of Central Asian countries  
Nominal GDP (billion US$) 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan 80.6 203.5 231.9 212.3 203.1 216.6 
Uzbekistan 21.4 51.2 57.2 62.6 68.2 76.5 
Kyrgyzstan 3.2 6.6 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.9 
Tajikistan 3.2 7.6 8.5 9.2 8.5 9.2 
Turkmenistan 17.0 35.2 41.0 47.9 44.7 51.9 
 
Real GDP Growth (annual change; percent) 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan 8.4 5 6 4.3 2.0 3.1 
Uzbekistan 6.8 8.2 8.0 8.1 6.2 6.5 
Kyrgyzstan 4.3 -0.9 10.5 3.6 1.7 3.4 
Tajikistan 8.0 7.5 7.4 6.7 3.0 4.1 
Turkmenistan 13.9 11.1 10.2 10.3 9.0 9.2 
 
                                                          
45 This definition refers to the second phase of the transition period of Central Asian states from the Soviet 
command economy to a market economy given the fact that the world community has recognized 
Kazakhstan, having the largest economy in the region, and Kyrgyzstan, as the countries with market 
economies.  
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Consumer Price Inflation (year average; percent) 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan 9 5.1 5.8 6.7 5.2 5.5 
Uzbekistan 15.3 12.1 11.2 8.4 9.5 9.8 
Kyrgyzstan 9.2 2.8 6.6 7.5 10.7 8.6 
Tajikistan 15.3 5.8 5.0 6.1 12.8 6.3 
Turkmenistan 7.2 5.3 6.8 6.0 7.7 6.6 
         Source: The International Monetary Fund, 2015a.  
 
As shown in table 2.6 and figure 2.1, in the 2000s, GDP growth rates in Central 
Asia differ widely. According to IMF data, the highest rates of GDP growth were 
observed in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The lowest rate of GDP growth 
was in Kyrgyzstan owing to the consequence of two coups d’état in 2005 and 2010. 
 In the period under review, the inflation rate varied mainly due to fluctuations of 
world prices of commodities, and in some cases, due to pressure from consumer demand 
(Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014). In 2014, the weighted average inflation rate 
amounted to 6.9 percent throughout the region. 
According to World Bank data, from 2000 to 2008, the weighted average GDP 
growth rates in the Central Asian region amounted to about 8.3 percent per year. It was 
the highest value of such an indicator for any group of the countries of the former Soviet 
Union in the post-transition period. Thus, in the pre-crisis period, the economies of 
Central Asian states grew much faster than the global economy that allowed incomes to 
increase and poverty to be substantially reduced (table 2.7, figure 2.2).  
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Table 2.7. GDP (PPP) per capita in Central Asian countries (at current prices) in 
2000, 2008 and 2013.  
Countries 2000 2008 2013 
US$ Russia=100 US$ Russia=100 US$ Russia=100 
Kazakhstan 4 833 62.9 11 219 70.4 14 391 80.5 
Kyrgyzstan 1 399 17.5 2 185 13.8 2 611 14.6 
Tajikistan 884 11.5 1 761 11.1 2 354 13.2 
Turkmenistan 1 910 24.9 5 892 37.2 9 510 53.5 
Uzbekistan 1 419 18.5 2 590 16.4 3 762 21.0 
     Source: Dadabaeva et al, 2014, p. 18. 
  
As illustrated in table 2.7 and figure 2.2, from the beginning of the 2000s, 
Kazakhstan has demonstrated a widening gap in terms of its socio-economic development 
compared with the other states of the region, due to the rapidly developing oil and gas 
industries and a more favorable financial situation connected with attracting a significant 
volume of foreign investment.  
In 2013, per capita GDP in Kazakhstan increased almost three times in comparison 
with 2000, and amounted to US$ 14391. Kazakhstan has become one of the leaders of 
rapid economic growth not only in Central Asia (Kazakhstan’s GDP is more than the 
GDP of other Central Asian economies put together (table 2.6)), but also among the post-
Soviet states (World Bank data). 
The economies of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which also rely on oil and the gas 
extraction industry, have shown stable economic growth in the period under review. In 
2013, in comparison with 2000, per capita GDP increased in Turkmenistan five times and 
in Uzbekistan 2.7 times, and amounted to 9510 and 3762 dollars respectively.  
The important drive underpinning Central Asia’s economic growth in the pre-crisis 
period was a very significant increase in international prices for energy resources and 
metals that are available in Central Asian regions. High commodity prices attracted 
massive foreign direct investment (FDI) into oil and gas extraction industries and 
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transport infrastructure, which led to rapid export growth46 in hydrocarbon-rich countries 
(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Even the countries that lack substantial 
hydrocarbon deposits (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) benefited from this price increase 
through the remittances of their migrants from oil-rich neighboring countries (Russia and 
Kazakhstan. In other words, economic development in all countries of the CAR, in the 
pre-crisis period directly or indirectly was caused by the favorable conditions in the world 
markets (in some cases regional) of energy, capital and labor (Asian Development Bank 
Institute, 2014).  
The high rates of economic growth in the region were interrupted by the global 
financial and economic crisis that started in 2008, the impact of which on the economies 
of the region is currently ongoing. In 2014, the decline of exports and remittances as well 
as ruble depreciation put pressure on the Central Asian currencies that led to the rise of 
inflation and the drop of economic activity. According to IMF projections, this trend will 
continue in 2015 mainly as a consequence of lower commodity prices and spillovers from 
Russia’s slowdown, which has close linkages with the region through remittances, trade, 
and foreign direct investment (The International Monetary Fund, 2015a). 
Nonetheless, economic growth has not led to the recovery of the Soviet level of 
industrial diversification (figure 2.5). The sectoral structure of GDP in the 2000s has 
continued to change in accordance with the trends of the 1990s, but less rapidly (table 
2.5). In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the new production capacity became 
mainly concentrated in the traditional sectors of the economy and focused on extraction 
and exportation of natural resources. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the share of industry 
sectors in the structure of GDP continued to decline.  
 Despite the further reduction of the share of the agriculture sector in the GDP 
structure of Central Asian economies, it still remains an important source of livelihood 
for the rural population and provides work for close to half of the population of the region 
(more than one quarter even in Kazakhstan). Over the past two decades of intensive 
changes in the GDP structures of Central Asian economies, the service sector has become 
                                                          
46 According to projections of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the volume of oil 
exportation in 2015 will be increased almost in 6 times compared with the level of 1998 (from 17.3 million 
tonnes in 1998 to 102 million tonnes in 2015). 
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the largest sector in all five republics, the share of which in 2014 already accounted for 
about half or more than half of GDP (except Turkmenistan).  
Thus, the oil and gas industries, mining and non-tradable services have become the 
key drivers of economic growth and the largest sectors in all five Central Asian countries 
in the post-transitional period. 
At the same time, it is necessary to stress that the structure of GDP in the Central 
Asian states is largely dependent on absolute and relative prices supported in the national 
economies that makes its interpretation more problematic. For example, in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, where the market economic system dominates, the structure of 
production precisely reflects the economic specialization of their economies. In 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the definition of the structure of production is complicated 
due to an existing specific system of internal prices (Asian Development Bank Institute, 
2014). 
Overall, the economic development of Central Asian countries in the post-
transitional period was determined by individual combinations of factors connected with 
the degree of economic liberalization and the features of internal political processes. The 
informal regime of clan politics and high levels of corruption have become factors that 
determine the formation of the political and economic system in Central Asia (see chapter 
1 of this paper). By different estimates, in some Central Asian countries the revenues 
from drug trafficking amount to about 40 percent of GDP47.  
Moreover, economic development in Central Asian countries was significantly 
caused by the influence of third countries, China, Russia, EU, US, and to a lesser degree, 
Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan in the past two decades. The external actors seek to 
strengthen their geopolitical position in the post-Soviet space, gain access to alternative 
sources of energy, and to expand the markets of their products in Central Asia. 
                                                          
47 http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2012/05/17/982025.html До 40% ВВП ряда стран Средней Азии — это 
наркобизнес (Drug trafficking provides 40 percent of GDP in some countries of Central Asia). 
“Российская газета” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta), May 17, 2012. 
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 The uneven distribution of natural resources between the countries of the region 
also significantly influenced the differences of their economic development levels (table 
2.8). 
Table 2.8 Reserves of natural resources in Central Asian countries 
 
Central Asian 
states  
Oil 
(million 
tonnes) 
Gas 
(bcm) 
Gold 
(tonnes) 
Coal 
(billion 
tonnes) 
Uranium 
(million 
tonnes) 
Hydro-
power 
(billion kWh / 
year) 
Kazakhstan 4 093 6 800 18.9 35.8 1 690 40.2 
Kyrgyzstan 5 6 24 - 20 142.5 
Tajikistan 2 - - - 460 527 
Turkmenistan 400 23 000  - - - 2 
Uzbekistan 250  5 900  90 4 185.8 15 
Total in the CAR 4 557 35 706 132.9 39.8 2 335.8 709.7 
Position in the 
world 
11 2 9 8 2 6-8 
    Source: Calculations based on statistical indicators of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).   
 
As follows from table 2.8, the Central Asian countries differ significantly in 
resource endowment and production capabilities.  
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have significant reserves of 
hydrocarbons and metals, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have such volumes in 
strategic reserves, but they are rich in vital hydropower resources. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan occupy the headwaters of the two main rivers of Central Asia - Amu Darya 
and Syr Darya, and can regulate the river flow and irrigation of agricultural lands in the 
entire region.  
According to expert estimates, about 4 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves 
and more than 4 percent of the world’s proven gas reserves are concentrated in Central 
Asia and in the shelf of the Caspian Sea (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010; 
cited in Akkazieva 2011, p.276). 
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The combination of the factors considered above has led to a high diversity in the 
performance of the countries in terms of their economic development levels and models, 
despite their similar histories and cultures. In the post-transitional period in Central Asia, 
three different economic models of development can be identified.  
 
2.3.1 A “petrostate” model of economic development (Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan) 
This model of development is based on the extraction and exportation of 
hydrocarbons (table 2.9). The well-being of these states strongly depends on revenues 
from hydrocarbon exports, on foreign investment from third countries and multinational 
companies, and on a conjuncture in the world markets.  
 
Table 2.9. Crude oil and natural gas production and export (million barrels per 
day) Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
 
Countries 
Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 
Projections 
2015 2016 
Crude oil production/export 
Kazakhstan 1.26/1.08 1.65/1.42 1.70/1.47 1.68/1.44 1.68/1.44 1.68/1.44 
Turkmenistan 0.19/0.04 0.23/0.04 0.23/0.04 0.24/0.05 0.25/0.05 0.27/0.05 
Natural gas production/export 
Turkmenistan …/0.67 1.08/0.69 1.19/0.67 1.30/0.72 1.42/0.83 1.56/0.95 
  Source: The International Monetary Fund, 2015a.  Note: …= date not available. 
 
As illustrated in table 2.9, crude oil extraction in Kazakhstan increased 33 percent 
in 2014 in comparison with the average level for the 2000-11 period and amounted to 
1.68 million barrels per day, of which 1.44 million barrels per day, or more than 85 
percent of the total extraction per day, was exported.  
As for Turkmenistan, in 2014 the production of crude oil and natural gas amounted 
to 0.24 and 1.30 million barrels per day respectively, of which 0.05 million barrels of 
crude oil, or 21 percent of the total production per day and 0.72 million barrels of natural 
gas, or 55 percent of the total production per day, was exported.  
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The rapid growth of hydrocarbon exports and a substantial inflow of foreign 
exchange in the post-transitional period contributed to the formation of a relatively stable 
current account surplus in both states, except Turkmenistan over the last two years (tables 
2.17 and 2.18) and allowed them to enlarge international reserves and to create special 
national funds.  
According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan on September 1, 2015, the volume 
of International reserves amounted to US$ 29085 million and the volume of assets of the 
National Oil Fund amounted to US$ 68776 million. As of December 2000, the 
International reserves of Kazakhstan amounted to US$ 2096 million and the volume of 
assets of the National Oil Fund were equal to zero.48 
In December 2014, official international reserves of Turkmenistan amounted to 
US$ 27040 million49. Data on the volume of the special national fund of Turkmenistan 
are not available (The Central Intelligence Agency). 
However, both these economies are susceptible to the symptoms of “Dutch 
disease”, which can increase their vulnerability in cases of worsening terms of trade. The 
export flows of these states are predominantly directed towards extra-regional markets 
and to a far lesser degree dependent on intra-regional markets than the other countries of 
the CAR. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Kazakhstan began to hold serious macroeconomic 
reforms and made integration into the global economy the purpose of its economic 
development. Kazakhstan has the most liberal economic system in comparison with other 
countries of the CAR, and the international community recognized it as the state with a 
market economy.  
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is the only country in the post-Soviet space, which 
transferred to the management or ownership of foreign corporations of about 60 of its 
important industrial enterprises operating in the field of power engineering, extraction 
                                                          
48 http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=180&switch=english  Last access September 21, 2015. 
49 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html The World 
Factbook: Reserves of foreign exchange and gold. Last access September 21, 2015. 
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and refining oil and non-ferrous metals. “The level of oligarchization of the national 
economy is very high: 10 percent of the largest financial and industrial groups control 
more than 70 percent of industrial production” (Blatova, 2010, p.104).  
As for Turkmenistan, their economic development largely depends on revenues 
from exports of natural gas on the foreign markets (in its reserves, Turkmenistan ranked 
second in the world) (table 2.8).  
Turkmenistan has a totally state economy, close to the Soviet economy, where all 
kinds of resources and factors of production are in state ownership and at the disposal of 
the public authorities. After gaining independence, privatization was not implemented, 
and, except for the low influx of foreign investment (foreign investors are allowed in only 
for the complex and expensive extraction of oil and gas deposits) the private sector is 
represented only by individual labor (The Public Finance Monitoring Center, 2010).  
Turkmenistan is one of the few “closed” countries in the world, where it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the socio-economic situation and standard of living by 
means of well-known economic indicators accepted by international statistics. The 
absence or low prices for most public utilities provided to the population makes this 
assessment more difficult. Furthermore, there is a problem of access to the main 
macroeconomic indicators, because a lot of them are not available or are provided 
irregularly.  
 
2.3.2 Economy of remittances (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan)  
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are referred to as the group of countries with low natural 
resource development and they are hydrocarbon importers. A rapid population growth in 
these countries aggravated the problem of unemployment, and caused the immense 
migration of a working-age population in them. High dependence on remittance flows 
from migrants is the main feature of the economies of the second type.  
Both countries have a stable current account deficit (table 2.17 and table 2.18), 
which is regulated by means of external loans and export of labor forces. Export revenues 
in the countries are also supported by the favorable conjuncture on the markets of non-oil 
export commodities (gold, copper, uranium and aluminum), reserves of which these 
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countries possess. Moreover, until recently, the re-exportation of Chinese products was 
the main source of Kyrgyzstan’s incomes. 
In contrast to the first group of the countries where exports are primarily directed 
towards extra-regional markets, Tajik and Kyrgyz economies are also focused on intra-
regional markets. At the same time, foreign direct investment plays a more significant 
role in the economic development of Tajikistan, whereas intra-regional export revenues 
are more important for the Kyrgyz economy.  
For example, from the beginning of the 2000s, Kyrgyzstan’s apparel sector has 
grown from scratch to one of the most important sectors of the national economy in terms 
of intra-regional export revenues and employment. According to data of the National 
Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, garment exports increased more than 10 
times from US$ 15 million in 2003 to US$ 156 million in 2012. Approximately 80 percent 
of Kyrgyzstan garment production is exported to Russia and most of the rest to 
Kazakhstan. High import duties imposed by Russia and Kazakhstan on imports of China’s 
garments also provide Kyrgyz enterprises with a considerable price advantage (Asian 
Development Bank Institute, 2014).  
In both countries, economic development is determined by domestic customer 
demand, which largely depends on the remittances from migrants working in Russia50 
and Kazakhstan. Remittance flows from abroad exceed export revenues and are   
important item incomes of the budgets of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
According to World Bank migration and remittance data, in 2014, remittances from 
abroad amounted to US$ 3.3 billion in Tajikistan and US$ 2.1 billion in Kyrgyzstan. For 
share of remittances in GDP (39.0 percent in Tajikistan and 29.1 percent in Kyrgyzstan), 
these countries occupied, respectively, first and second place in the world (table 2.10).  
 
 
                                                          
50 According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2015, p.13), the Russian 
Federation is a primary host to millions of migrants from Central Asia, and took first place in the ranking 
of countries by remittance outflows that amounted to US$ 20.6 billion in 2014. It was followed by the 
United Kingdom (US$ 17.1 billion), Germany (US$ 14 billion), France (US$ 10.5 billion), Italy (US$ 10.4 
billion) and Spain (US$ 9.6 billion).  
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Table 2.10 Remittance flows into Central Asian states and labor migrant outflows  
Countries 
Cumulative 
remittances 
2002–2012 
(US$ 
million) 
Remittances 
from Russia 
(US$ 
million) in 
2014 
Share of 
Russian 
flows 
(%) 
Remittances  
Migrants (‘000) in 
Russia 
(%) of 
annual 
GDP 
Place 
in the 
world 
IFAD 
FMS of 
the Russia 
Kazakhstan 1 707 171 94.2 .. .. .. 553 
Kyrgyzstan 9 005 2 104 93.7 29.1 2 573 544 
Tajikistan 16 673 3 314  86.4 39.0 1 452 1061 
Turkmenistan .. 35* 100 .. .. .. 26 
Uzbekistan .. 5 588 100 9.8  7 1 111 2333 
  Sources: International Fund for Agricultural Development, June 2015, p.13, p.31, p.24; 
http://slon.ru/russia/skolko_gastarbayterov_v_rossii-870263.xhtml  Сколько гастарбайтеров в России 
(How many migrant workers in Russia?) Bessudnov A. 27.12.2012. 
 Notes: * The Central Bank of Russia data for 2013; ..= not available. 
 
As follows from table 2.10, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan received 86 and 94 percent 
respectively of their remittances from Russia. These ties among other things are pushing 
Kyrgyzstan (member from 12.08.2015) and Tajikistan towards joining the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) that offers freer movement of labor and better treatment of 
migrants within the Union.  
Labor migration has significant consequences on the socio-economic development 
of this group of states. On the one hand, in the short-term period, remittance flows have 
become a mechanism of survival for poor families in both countries and on a national 
level, they have allowed non energy-rich countries to maintain imports at a level 
exceeding their export earnings. On the other hand, preservation of the current 
“remittance model” of economic development can have a negative impact on the long-
term outlook of these countries and exceed the short-term benefits of labor migration.  
The negative effects of labor migration are connected with a nearly total 
dependence on the Russian labor market and with the losses of human capital by these 
states, as the majority of migrants do not work abroad in their own field. Moreover, the 
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male population, which is predominantly considered the main political force in relations 
between the citizens and the state in Central Asia, are subjected to economic migration. 
All these factors hinder the economic development of both states and may lead them to a 
deadlock in a long-term outlook51.   
According to Work Bank forecasts52, the weakening economic growth in Russia, 
the ruble depreciation, and the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries as a 
result of the conflict in Ukraine, could lead to the slowing down of the growth of 
remittances to Central Asia in 2015.  
According to the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT), net inflow of remittances from 
Russia to Tajikistan in the first quarter of 2015 was US$ 289 million, which is 42.4 
percent less than in the same period of 2014. This is the most significant remittance 
reduction to Tajikistan in the history of statistics53.   
The decline of domestic demand due to the reduction of remittances, and export 
revenues owing to the decline of prices for non-oil export commodities (gold, copper and 
aluminum) in the world markets can provoke a deep economic and political crisis in both 
Central Asian states in the near future. 
Tajikistan was considered in Soviet times the poorest republic, and it is still feeling 
the effects of the civil war of 1992-97. Since independence, the country has not been able 
to find resources to conduct fundamental economic reforms. Remittance flows in 
Tajikistan are mostly directed to consumption rather than private investment in small and 
medium enterprises that can contribute to the creation of new workplaces and 
diversification of the economy (Commonwealth of Independent States, 2014).  
As for Kyrgyzstan, which has consistently implemented the recommendations of 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank after two “revolutions” of 2005 and 
                                                          
51 http://rus.ozodi.org/content/article/25329533.html Таджикистан должен диверсифицировать 
экономику (Tajikistan has to diversify its economy). S.Olimova. Radio Ozodi. April 14, 2014. 
52 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/06/remittances-developing-countries-five-
percent-conflict-related-migration-all-time-high-wb-report  Remittances to Developing Countries to Grow 
by 5 Percent This Year, While Conflict-Related Forced Migration is at All-Time High, World Bank Report, 
October 6, 2014. 
53 http://www.interfax.ru/business/447944 Объем денежных переводов таджикских мигрантов из РФ 
упал на 42% (The remittances of Tajik migrants from Russia dropped by 42 percent), Interfax/Economy, 
June 17, 2015.  
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2010, it has not reached a stable economic growth. The annual GDP growth rates remain 
the lowest in the CAR (table 2.6).  
 
2.3.2 A mixed model of economic development (Uzbekistan)  
A “mixed” model of economic development has a borderline status in comparison 
with the two economic models examined above. This model combines the elements of 
the Soviet planned economy, the “petrostate” economy, and the economy of remittances.  
On the one hand, Uzbekistan has its own energy resources (table 2.8), the export of 
which allowed it to keep current account surplus in the post-transitional period (table 2.17 
and table 2.18). However, Uzbekistan can be considered a “petrostate” economy only 
partially. According to the definition of IMF, the country refers to the category of fuel 
exporters if the export of hydrocarbons amounts to more than 50 percent of the total 
national exports54. In 2014, the share of hydrocarbon exports accounted for 27 percent of 
total exports of Uzbekistan, which was below the predetermined IMF threshold value 
specified by IMF55.  
Uzbekistan has a relatively diversified industry oriented towards the large domestic 
market and to the markets of neighboring countries. In 2014, the share of exports of 
manufactured goods was the highest in the CAR and amounted to 32 percent of total 
Uzbekistan exports (UNCTADstat data, 2014).  
Furthermore, the economic growth of Uzbekistan is largely sustained by domestic 
demand, which depends on investment and remittances from labor migration.  In 2014, 
remittance inflows amounted to US$ 5.6 billion, or 9.8 percent of the annual GDP of the 
country. According to IFAD data (2015, p.31), Uzbekistan is totally dependent on Russia 
for remittances (table 2.10).  
The “mixed” model of economic development of Uzbekistan can also be referred 
to as a weakly modified Soviet model of planned economy dependent on government 
                                                          
54 http://datahelp.imf.org/knowledgebase/articles/528074-what-determines-a-country-to-be-included-in-
the-e The “Export Earnings:  Fuel” category (formerly named Oil Exporting Countries) includes countries 
that have mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials comprising over 50 percent of their exports, IMF/ 
Methodology. 
55 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/860/en860GeneralProfile.html General Profile: Uzbekistan. 
UNCTADstat data. Last access: September 20, 2015. 
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subsidies supporting industrial production and the social sector. In the literature, this 
model is often described as an “Uzbek model” of state capitalism (Ratanova, 1999, p.94). 
On the one hand, the state tightly controls all economic activity, which together 
with elements of central planning and strategy of import replacement, prevents economic 
liberalization, structural reforms, and significantly limits the development of private 
enterprises. On the other, the state pays particular attention to the development of new 
industries and the creation of joint ventures with the involvement of Western technologies 
and targets more than 50 percent of their production to exports.   
For example, in Uzbekistan the serial production of new types of passenger and 
transport aircrafts in cooperation with Russian enterprises was upgraded and launched. 
The production of “Mercedes” tractors in Khorezm, and the assemblage of “Avia” and 
“Tatra” trucks in Tashkent were started. Moreover, in the mid-1990s in Asaca, the 
automobile plant “UzDaewooAuto” was launched with the assistance of the foreign 
corporations “Daewoo” and “General Motors”.  
Despite the fact that the “mixed” model of economic development is more stable in 
comparison with the two models examined before, it has serious imbalances too. In 2014, 
the exports of commodities with raw material orientation (energy resources, metals and 
cotton) accounted for more than 50 percent of national exports and increased the 
dependency of the country’s solvency on changes in export prices (figure 2.4). 
Thus, all three economic Central Asian models are characterized by a high level (in 
greater or lesser extent) of involvement of the state in the economy, because of political 
authoritarianism inherent to countries of the region. 
Moreover, corruption, the inequitable distribution of national wealth for the benefit 
of individual clans and ruling elites, and a very low standard of living of most of the 
population, are the common features of Central Asian models of economic development. 
The percentages of the population living under the poverty line are very high in the four 
southern countries, varying from a quarter to a half, in particular in the two poorest of 
them, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
Three Central Asian models of economic development are unified also by one thing 
in common - they are all mono-economies, i.e. critically dependent on currency earnings 
from exports of one or two commodities and/or labor forces of external markets.  
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Laurelle et al (2013, p.117) assert “despite their difference, the Central Asian 
economies are stamped by their overreliance on exports in raw materials (…) They can 
therefore be put in the category of economies of rent”. 
Regional cooperation with neighboring countries of the CAR is very limited due to 
different economic policies conducted by the leaders of these states, and the uniformity 
of mono-raw material Central Asian economies. 
 
2.4 The role of external factors in the economic development of Central Asian 
countries in the post-Soviet period 
After the collapse of the USSR, the dependence of socio-economic development of 
the Central Asian states on external factors has become critically high.  
Disintegration of the common economic space of the Soviet Union led to the access 
of the Central Asian republics into world markets. “It can be asserted without 
exaggeration that the Central Asian economies operate in their present form only owing 
to the inclusion in an international division of labor. If cut off from international trade, 
they would immediately cease to exist” (Zhukov et al, 2001, p.112). 
The emphasis on exports of natural resources has helped to open these economies 
and many channels now link them to the global economy, including trade in goods and 
services, labor migration and migrants’ remittances, foreign direct investment and official 
development assistance. 
 
2.4.1 Analysis of economic openness to foreign trade of Central Asian countries  
In the post-Soviet period, the Central Asian post-Soviet economies turned into open 
economies, which are characterized by high share of exports and imports and/or their 
average value in the structure of the national GDP (export quota, import quota and foreign 
trade quota respectively)56. The indicator value exceeding 30 percent shows a high degree 
of openness of the national economy (table 2.11). 
                                                          
56 These key indicators of openness reflect broadly the relative importance of international trade to an 
economy. In terms of interpretation, small economies typically depend more on international trade than 
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Table 2.11. The dynamics of export-import quotas and foreign trade quotas of 
Central Asian economies in 1995, 2000 and 2014*.  
 
 
Central Asian 
republics 
1995 2000 
 
2014 
 
Kazakhstan 
a. Export, % of GDP 
b. Import, % of GDP 
c. (a+b) /2, % of GDP 
39.0 
43.6 
41.3 
50.1 
27.7 
38.9 
41.3 
26.3 
33.8 
Kyrgyzstan 
a. Export, % of GDP 
b. Import, % of GDP 
c. (a+b) /2, % of GDP 
29.5 
42.4 
35.9 
38.1 
41.5 
39.5 
35.0 
96.4 
65.7 
Tajikistan** 
a. Export, % of GDP 
b. Import, % of GDP 
c. (a+b) /2, % of GDP 
115.4 
124.8 
119.9 
77.6 
65.5 
71.5 
16.9 
56.8 
36.9 
Turkmenistan*** 
a. Export, % of GDP 
b. Import, % of GDP 
c. (a+b) /2, % of GDP 
48.2 (187.0) 
35.0 (135.8) 
41.6 (161.4) 
57.1 (143-171) 
 39.2  (98-117) 
48.1 (120-144) 
35.8 (161.1) 
   21.1 (94.9) 
28.4 (128.0) 
Uzbekistan*** 
1. Export, % of GDP 
2. Import, % of GDP 
3. (a+b) /2, % of GDP 
38.0 (41.0) 
38.4 (41.4) 
38.2 (41.2) 
24.1 (78.7) 
21.8 (71.0) 
22.9 (74.8) 
21.4 (30.4) 
22.5 (31.9) 
26.3 (31.2) 
 
 Note: * Data for different years are not strictly comparable with each other due to changes in the 
methodology of calculation; ** In Tajikistan, the foreign trade turnover in value may be more than the GDP 
due to the specifics of national statistics; *** Indicators in parentheses are given at the exchange rate of the 
“black market.”  
Sources: Zhukov et al, 2001, p.110 (data for 1995 e 2000); Authors’ calculations for 2014 based on 
UNCTADstat data and expert estimates about currency exchange rates on the “black markets” of 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (http://www.asiaterra.info/economy/uzbekskij-sum-vpered-k-novym-
rubezham Узбекский сум вперед к новым рубежам? (Uzbek sum: forward to new horizons?) A. 
Volosevich. Asiaterra. February 14, 2015; https://iwpr.net/ru/global-voices/chernyy-rynok-valyuty-
osnova-ekonomiki   Черный рынок валюты – основа экономики Туркменистана (The black market of 
currency is the backbone of the Turkmenistan economy). IWPR Central Asia. February 21, 2005). 
 
                                                          
large economies. These ratios may be biased in favor of low-income countries, due to the undervaluation 
of their currencies (UNSTAD; cited in International Chamber of Commerce, 2013, p.9).  
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As follows from table 2.11, in the period under review, the Central Asian countries  
have had a high degree of openness in their economies (indicators of openness in almost 
all of them amounted to over 30 percent of GDP).  
It should be noted that in the conditions of unfavorable conjuncture on the world 
markets that often lead to a reduction of revenues from commodity export, the Central 
Asian countries may purposely reduce the value of imports with respect to the value of 
exports in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. Revenues from exports of 
commodities are the only channel for generating freely convertible currency in the open 
mono-raw material economies and they are essential for the national government to 
stabilize the exchange rate and curb inflation. In connection with this, the export quota 
characterizing the openness of the national economy and the depth of participation in the 
international division of labor might be the most appropriate indicator for some Central 
Asian countries rather than the import quota.  
In 2014, Kazakhstan became the leader among the Central Asian states for the 
degree of openness of the national economy (export quota amounted to 41.3 percent of 
GDP). The high export quota of Kazakhstan is largely determined by the volume of export 
demand, which is formed under the influence of transnational corporations operating in 
this country. 
At the same time, Uzbekistan, which partly retained the elements of the Soviet 
economic system, tends to regulate net exports. In other words, through a specific system 
of internal prices Uzbekistan balances exports and imports so that their values correspond 
approximately to each other (Zhukov et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, in table 2.11 the economic indicators characterizing a degree of 
openness of the economy of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are calculated on undervalued 
official exchange rates. The indicator value in parentheses of the table above, which were 
obtained by using the exchange rate on the “black market,” demonstrates the higher 
degree of openness of both economies in comparison with indicators relying on the 
official exchange rate.  
Uzbekistan has simultaneously several parallel existing national currency exchange 
rates. This situation has been going on for more than twenty years, except for a short 
period in the mid-2000s, where there was almost no difference between the currency 
94 
 
exchange rates of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan and of the “black market”. The global 
economic crisis led to a reduction of the supply of foreign currency in Uzbekistan and the 
significant difference between official and “bazaar” exchange rates was formed again. 
For example, at the beginning of 2015, the difference between official and “bazaar” 
exchange rates exceeded 40.5 - 42.4 percent57.  
Apart from the official exchange rate of the Central Bank and the “bazaar” course 
of the “black market”, in Uzbekistan there is also an exchange rate for importers of goods 
and services (where the dollar is more expensive than on the “black market”). According 
to expert assessments, this provisional market exchange rate might be perhaps the closest 
that could be formed in the country based on supply and demand (Anderson et al, 2012). 
In Turkmenistan, the free conversion of currency has been forbidden since 1998. 
The increased popularity of black market currency among the population of the republic 
has become the consequence of this policy. According to available data, the dollar/manat 
rate on the “black market” of Turkmenistan was 4 to 5 times higher than the official rate, 
and fluctuated within the range of 22.000 - 25.000 manats to the dollar.58  
In contrast to the energy-exporting countries with a high degree of openness of their 
economies, in 2014 Tajikistan had the lowest export quota in the region (16.9 percent of 
GDP). According to World Bank data, from 2003 to 2013 the average annual decline of 
export volume in Tajikistan accounted for 3.9 percent from the base period of 2000. The 
low export quota in Tajikistan in the first place, connected with the decrease of exports 
of cotton (one of the major export commodities of the country) is due to the reduction of 
cotton prices in world markets in recent years59.  
Meanwhile, in 2014 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have had the highest import quota 
in the region (96.4 e 56.8 percent respectively). A very high value of this indicator shows 
the significant reduction of domestic production in both countries due to its low 
                                                          
57 http://www.asiaterra.info/economy/uzbekskij-sum-vpered-k-novym-rubezham Узбекский сум вперед к 
новым рубежам? (Uzbek sum: forward to new horizons?) A. Volosevich. Asiaterra. February 14, 2015. 
58 https://iwpr.net/ru/global-voices/chernyy-rynok-valyuty-osnova-ekonomiki   Черный рынок валюты – 
основа экономики Туркменистана (The black market of currency is the backbone of the Turkmenistan 
economy). IWPR Central Asia. February 21, 2005. 
59 http://nm.tj/economy/27592-tadzhikistan-v-2014-godu-prodolzhil-sokraschenie-eksporta-hlopka.html  
Таджикистан в 2014 году продолжил сокращение экспорта хлопка (Tajikistan in 2014 has continued 
to reduce the export of cotton). P. Chorshanbiyev. Media group “Asia-Plus”. January 20, 2015. 
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competitiveness, and the emergence of an unjustified dependence of certain industries 
and the economy as a whole on imports. 
 
2.4.2 Sectoral specialization and geographical orientation of exports of the 
Central Asian states 
Being critically dependent on foreign trade, all the Central Asian countries, without 
exception, are characterized by an extremely vulnerable sectoral (figures 2.3, 2.4) and 
geographical structure of exports (table 2.12).  
Based on a Herfindahl-Hirschman export concentration index,60 figure 2.3 clearly 
suggests that export revenues of the CAR are concentrated on exports of mineral fuels, 
and that this concentration has grown in the past two decades considerably.  
 
Figure 2.3. Concentration on exports of mineral fuels of Central Asian regions 
 
             Note: Based on the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, with values closer to 1 signifying higher 
concentration in the product category.          
           Source: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014, p.31. 
                                                          
60 The Herfindahl–Hirschman export concentration index examines how concentrated the exports of 
Central Asia are. It is calculated as: 
 
where: j denotes country; i product; and t time period, using UN Comtrade statistics data. 
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The data presented above show that exports of mineral fuels have become dominant 
among the exports of other categories of products in Central Asia. At the same time, 
exports of manufactured materials and crude materials that were essential at the beginning 
of the ‘90s currently decreased significantly. Moreover, exports of some categories of 
products practically disappeared. The reduction of the export concentration index of 
manufactured articles, manufactured materials, and machinery equipment in the period 
under review demonstrates the deindustrialization of Central Asian exports in the past 
two decades.  
Figure 2.4 shows the enlarged structure of exports in Central Asian states in 1995 
and in 2014.  
Figure 2.4. Export structure by product group of the Central Asian countries in 1995 
and in 2014 in percentages.  
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Figure 2.4 illustrates that the export structure of Central Asian states in 2014 
compared with 1995 has changed considerably. Currently, exports of crude oil, natural 
gas, oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cotton, and wheat provide most of the 
total exports of the region.  
As the figure 2.4 shows, in 2014, exports of fuel and metals accounted for 88 
percent of national exports of Kazakhstan. Export of metals (first of all, gold) and mineral 
products provided 61 percent of total exports of Kyrgyzstan. Only the export of 
hydrocarbons amounted to 89 percent of total exports of Turkmenistan. Metals (primarily, 
aluminum) and cotton accounted for 77 percent of the export basket of Tajikistan. Fuel, 
metals and cotton accounted for 55 percent of exports of Uzbekistan. Thus, the 
dependence of the Central Asian economies on exports of one or two commodities is very 
high, and in most countries tends to exceed 50 percent.  
Moreover, in 2014 compared with 1995 a trend increasing the critical dependence 
on exports of a limited number of raw commodities was observed in all Central Asian 
states, with a lesser degree in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which in 2014 had the most 
diversificated structure of exports among Central Asian states. The high share of exports 
of manufactured goods and exports of services in the total of exports in both states can be 
explained by the increase of exports of automobile and transport services from 
Uzbekistan, and apparel and tourism services from Kyrgyzstan (Asian Development 
Bank Institute, 2014). 
As the presented data demonstrates, in all Central Asian republics in 2014, in 
comparison with 1995, there was a significant reduction in the share of cotton in total 
exports. For example, the share of cotton in the total exports of Turkmenistan fell from 
77 percent in 1995 to 5 percent in 2014.  In Tajikistan, exports of “white gold” fell from 
59 percent to 18 percent. In Uzbekistan, from 77 percent in 1995 to 11 percent in 2014. 
According to data of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the export 
of cotton in volume decreased by 8 times in 2013 in comparison with 1990.  
The main reasons that led to the reduction of the export of cotton in Central Asian 
republics was the decrease of the cost of cotton on world markets, the problem of water 
supply in the region, and the removal of part of its agricultural land for forage and cereal 
crops. At the same time, in Turkmenistan, which has an internationally recognized status 
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of neutrality, the gradual release of agricultural land from cotton to expand wheat sowing 
was carried out in order to ensure food self-sufficiency of the country (Karadzhaev, 2014).  
Furthermore, in the period analyzed, in all countries there was a relative reduction 
of the share of export items such as machinery, equipment and vehicles, and chemical 
products in total exports. 
Thus, the changes that occurred in the export structure of Central Asian states 
during the last two decades reinforced the role of Central Asian regions mainly as 
suppliers of fuel, metals and agricultural raw materials (which have a strong tendency to 
decline) on the world markets.  
A high dependence on a limited number of foreign markets is imposed on the raw 
material orientation of export of the Central Asian states (table 2.12). 
Table 2.12. Geographical concentration of exports of the Central Asian states by 
major trading partners in percentages. 
 
Trade partners 1995 2000 2010 2014 
Kazakhstan 
 Leading trade 
partner 
45.1  
Russia 
17.4 
Russia 
18.5 
China 
20.5 
Italia 
Three leading 
trade partners  
60.5 38.1 
 (Berm. Isl. - 11.1; 
Br.Vir. Isl. – 9.6) 
33.7 
 (France -7.9; 
Italy -7.3) 
44.2 
(China - 12.5; 
Netherlands – 11.2)  
Five leading trade 
partners  
67.4 51.8 
 (China - 7.3; 
Germany- 6.5)  
45.4  
(Netherlands-6.2; 
Russia - 5.5) 
56.4  
(Russia – 6.6;  
France - 5.9)  
Kyrgyzstan 
Leading trade 
partner  
25.6  
Russia 
34.6 
Germany 
22.57 
Switzerland 
24.3 
Kazakhstan 
Three leading 
trade partners  
59.5 60.5 
(Russia - 16.9; 
China-8.9) 
59.5  
(Russia-19.3; 
UAE-17.6) 
55.3 
(Uzbekistan -23.8; 
Russia- 7.2) 
Five leading trade 
partners 
82.5 73.5 
 (Switzerland -8.0; 
Kazakhstan - 4.9) 
81.4 
(France -14.5; 
Kazakhstan - 7.5) 
66 
(UAE-6.2; 
Afganistan-4.5) 
Tajikistan 
Leading trade 
partner  
34.1 
N.-lands 
57.5 
Russia 
26.4 
Turkey 
25.9 
Turkey  
Three leading 
trade partners  
64.4 64.52  
(Turkey- 3.9; 
Italy - 3.1) 
55.5 
(Russia -19.7; 
Korea - 9.4) 
44.2 
(Kasahkstan-9.5; 
Afghanistan- 8.8) 
Five leading trade 
partners  
73.8 69.5 
 (China-2.5; 
 Korea- 2.4) 
66.0 
(Norway- 5.4; 
China-5.1) 
60.7 
 (Iran- 8.3;  
China – 8.2) 
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Turkmenistan 
Leading trade 
partner  
24.5 
Ukraine 
53.3 
Ukraine 
38.8 
China  
53.9 
 China 
Three leading 
trade partners  
50.8 79.5 
(Italia -19.7; 
Turkey-6.4) 
61.4  
(Turkey-15.1; 
Italia-7.6) 
73.8 
 (Ukraine -15.4;  
Turkey - 4.5) 
Five leading trade 
partners  
64.7 85.89  
(Russia-3.96; 
Kazakstan-2.5) 
71.7 
(Russia-6.1; 
Afghanistan -4.2) 
80.6 
(Italy - 3.9; 
UAE - 2.9) 
Uzbekistan 
Leading trade 
partner  
12.8 
Russia 
32.5 
Russia 
20.9 
China  
41.7 
China  
Three leading 
trade partners  
30.6 49.9 
(Italia- 9.4; 
Ukraine -8.1) 
59.4 
(Russia -24.5; 
Turkey- 13.9) 
83 
(Kazakhstan -20.9; 
Turkey -20.4) 
Five leading trade 
partners  
40.0 59.1 
(Korea - 5.0; 
Turkey- 4.2) 
80.3 
(Afghanistan -13.6; 
Kazakhstan- 7.3) 
88.3 
 (France -
3.4; Ukraine - 1.9)  
   
  Sources: The Observatory of Economic Complexity 2010 (http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/); Zhukov et al, 
2001, p.115; UNCTADstat data 2014 (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/home/Indexen.html).   
 
As shown in table 2.12, exports of Central Asian states over the past 20 years were 
concentrated geographically on a small number of markets.   
During the period under review, a quarter and more than a quarter of Central Asia’s 
exports accounted for one trading partner.  In 2014, the dependence on one export market 
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the highest in the CAR and amounted to 53.9 and 
41.7 percent of total exports respectively.   
At the same time, in 2014, the three leading export partners absorbed 44.2 percent 
of total exports of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, 55.3 percent of total exports of Kyrgyzstan, 
73.8 and 83 percent of total exports of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively. The 
five leading export markets accounted for 56.4 percent to 88.3 percent of total exports, of 
which Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were more diversified geographically as a whole in 
comparison with other Central Asian states. 
In the first decade after gaining independence, the exports of Central Asian states 
were focused primarily on the markets of Russia, the European Union, and the Ukraine. 
In the second decade, all five countries started gradually redirecting their export 
destinations from the markets of European countries towards China, Turkey, Iran, 
Afghanistan, the Republic of Korea, and to other Asian partners (Dadabaeva, 2014, p.22). 
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In particular, China has become one of the largest export partners of almost all Central 
Asian states in recent years due to the large-scale presence of Chinese capital in the 
projects for oil and gas extraction and mining.  
Nonetheless, despite the high dependence in each of the Central Asian economies 
on the limited number of export markets, as a whole, the geographical structure of exports 
of the CAR is too fragmented. By deepening their specialization on exports of natural 
resources, Central Asian economies have increased their dependence on a limited number 
of foreign markets and has inhibited the development of manufacturing and other sectors 
potentially competitive on the world markets. The predominance of the raw materials 
sector in Central Asian economies, coupled with an underdeveloped manufacturing 
industry hinders the formation in Central Asian regions of a unified economic 
block strengthened by common interests.   
Furthermore, the high sectoral and geographical concentration of exports increases 
export risks in the region and signifies that external shocks easily extend to local Central 
Asian economies. The unfavorable dynamics in only two or three raw commodity 
markets, as well as the possible economic disruption in the very limited number of 
countries, may have an immediate effect on the economic trends in the states of the region.  
The relatively high dependence of Central Asian economies on the limited number 
of export markets can be explain by the fact that main export flows in these states are 
driven by the demand from major industrial economies for hydrocarbons and other 
commodities existing in the region.   
 
2.4.3. Dynamics, structure and economic impact of foreign direct investment 
into Central Asian countries 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in the formation of 
the geographical structure of exports of Central Asian states, the volume of which has 
begun to increase rapidly from the mid-1990s (table 2.13). 
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                              Table 2.13. Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI)61 to Central Asian states from 1990 to 2013 
Country 
Ʃ1990-
2004 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
US$ million (current)   
Kazakhstan 21 149 2 546 7 611 11 973 16 819 14 276 7 456 14 287 15 117 9 739 120 973 
Kyrgyzstan 657 43 182 208 377 189 438 694 372 758 4 129 
Tajikistan 485 54 339 360 376 16 -16 67 198 -54 2 086 
Turkmenistan 1 975 418 731 856 1 277 4 553 3 631 3 399 3 159 3 061 23 060 
Uzbekistan 1 106 192 174 705 711 842 1 628 1 467 1 094 1 077 8 996 
% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
Country 
annual 
average 
(1990-
2004) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
annual 
average 
(2005-
2013) 
Kazakhstan 6.6 4.5 9.4 11.4 12.6 12.4 5.0 7.7 7.5 4.0 8.1 
Kyrgyzstan 0.2 1.7 6.4 5.5 7.3 4.0 9.1 11.2 5.7 10.0 6.1 
Tajikistan 2.2 2.4 12.0 9.7 7.3 0.3 -0.3 1.0 2.8 -1.0 3.6 
Turkmenistan 3.8 5.2 7.1 6.8 6.6 22.5 16.1 12.1 9.4 7.0 9.7 
Uzbekistan 0.6 1.3 1.0 3.2 2.5 2.6 4.2 3.2 2.1 2.0 2.3 
                              Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD)
                                                          
61 FDI net inflows are the value of inward direct investment made by non-resident investors in the reporting economy. 
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As follows from table 2.13, in the period under review, FDI net inflows into the 
countries of the Central Asian region have varied significantly. Some countries of Central 
Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) have managed to attract significant amounts of FDI. In 
2012, Kazakhstan entered the ranks of the top 20 economies of the world receiving FDI 
(United Nations Conference on trade and development, 2013, p. xv). Other countries 
(Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) were less successful in attracting FDI. 
In absolute terms, Kazakhstan has been the largest FDI recipient in Central Asia. 
According to calculations based on data of World Development Indicators, Kazakhstan’s 
economy has attracted $US 121 billion of FDI from 1990 to 2013. At the same time, UN 
data of the net inflows of FDI in Kazakhstan should be considered conservative, since 
they are understated compared to the national statistical agencies data available. 
Kazakhstan’s authorized official persons assert that since gaining independence the 
national economy has attracted $US 200 billion or more than 80 percent of all FDI 
directed to Central Asia.62    
Differences in estimates of the value of FDI net inflows in the economy of 
Kazakhstan can be explained by the fact that “about 20-25 percent of FDI, which were 
previously removed from the country by Kazakh businessmen, later returned to 
Kazakhstan under the jurisdiction of the Netherlands and some other states and territories 
with tax haven status” (Minchenko et al, 2013 p.3).  
At the same time, in the period under review, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan received 
the lowest amounts of FDI in the CAR. In 2010 and 2013, net inflow of FDI to Tajikistan 
was even negative, as the outflow of FDI from the country exceeded inflow in the country. 
Low investment activity in both countries was caused by the high level of economic risks 
and political instability in them. Moreover, most investments were not directed towards 
                                                          
62 http://www.inozpress.kg/news/view/id/44489 Казахстан аккумулировал свыше 80% прямых 
иностранных инвестиций, привлеченных в Центральную Азию (Kazakhstan has accumulated more 
than 80% of direct foreign investments to Central Asia). D. Alenova. InoZpress. March 11, 2015. 
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the development of certain sectors of economy, but to the formation of the so-called 
democratic institutions, which do not create added value.63  
In relation to GDP, the largest FDI recipient in 1990-2013 years was Turkmenistan 
(figure 2.5).  
 
Figure 2.5. FDI inflows to Central Asia, 1990–2013 as percentages of GDP  
 
Source: Graph based on data of table 2.14. 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates that average annual FDI net inflows to Turkmenistan were 9.7 
percent of GDP, thus ranking Turkmenistan 26th in the world and 6th in Asia (Asian 
Development Bank Institute, 2014). During this period, Kazakhstan’s FDI inflows 
exceeded 8.1 percent of GDP per annum. Uzbekistan had the lowest ratio of average 
annual FDI among Central Asian states, which amounted to 2.3 percent of GDP. 
In all five countries of the region, FDI net inflows were quite volatile. During 2005–
2013, FDI inflows varied from 5.2 percent to 22.5 percent of GDP in Turkmenistan, from 
1.0 percent to 12.0 percent in Tajikistan, from 4.0 percent to 12.6 percent in Kazakhstan, 
from 1.7 percent to 11.2 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and from 1.0 percent to 4.2 percent in 
                                                          
63 http://www.regnum.ru/news/economy/1423225.html  Oб экономических итогах 
«послереволюционной» Киргизии (The economic trend of the “post-revolutionary” Kyrgyzstan).  
A.Mihranyan. July 08, 2011. 
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Uzbekistan. In the period under consideration, FDI inflows in CAR do not seem to follow 
strictly the different phases of the global economic cycle and “it seems that their dynamics 
depend more on the implementation schedules of large investment projects related to 
energy and mining” (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014). 
At the same time, all Central Asian republics have shown similar trends of FDI 
inflows by sector and by country of origin (table 2.14). 
 
Table 2.14. Structure of FDI inflows into Central Asia by sector and by country of 
origin  
 
Kazakhstan 2014 
 
 
 
 
Source: Graphs based on data of the National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
Kyrgyzstan 2014 
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Source: Graphs based on data of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Tajikistan  2013 
 
 
Mining, geological explorations, communications, 
financial services, construction, electricity 
production and distribution, public health services, 
the development of air transport.* 
 
 
Source: Graphs based on data of the statistical agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan.  
Note:* A more detailed structure of FDI by sector is not available.  
Turkmenistan  2012 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014 
Uzbekistan  2014 
Key investor countries: China, Russia, Germany, 
South Korea, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Japan, 
ASEAN, other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investments and Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
Note: A more detailed structure of FDI by country of origin is not available. 
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Table 2.14 demonstrates that in the period under review China, Russia, some 
countries of the European Union and the United States have become the key investor 
countries in the Central Asian region. However, their presence has been varied.  
China’s investments in all economies of the region have grown very quickly. For 
example, in 2005, the shares of China’s investment in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
amounted to 3 percent and 2 percent respectively in total FDI inflows in these countries; 
by 2014, these shares had already increased to 8 percent and 31 percent respectively. In 
Tajikistan, China’s share in total FDI increased from 4 percent in 2009 to 49 percent in 
2013. In Turkmenistan, China’s share in total FDI of Turkmenistan amounted to 39 
percent in 2012 (Xiaofeng et al, 2013). Much of these investments are concentrated in 
natural resource extraction companies, but they are gradually expanding into other 
sectors.  
Infrastructure and trade are the foundations of China’s push into Central Asia. 
Beijing financed and constructed an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan in 2006 as well as a 
large gas pipeline (known as the Central Asia - China gas pipeline) from Turkmenistan 
across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China’s western provinces of Xinjiang in 2009. By 
2016, it has also planned to extend an additional gas pipeline, which will cross the 
territory of Kyrgyzstan.64 This gas pipeline broke the Russian stranglehold over Turkish 
gas export that existed since the Soviet Union collapse (China now imports more Turkish 
gas than Russia does).  
Moreover, China is pressing for the construction of new railroads into Central Asia. 
Beijing is also a major funder of CAREC through the Asian Development Bank. 
CAREC’s long-term strategy for regional development (formalized in 2012) provides the 
construction of six major corridors running from ports on China’s east coasts across 
Central Asia to points further west (Mankoff, 2013). These new infrastructures underpin 
growing economic and political ties between China and all five Central Asian republics. 
                                                          
64 http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/112066. 3-я нитка Трансазиатского МГП Туркменистан - Китай может 
быть проложена по территории Киргизии (The third line of Turkmenistan - China gas pipeline could be 
laid on the territory of Kyrgyzstan). Journal «Neftegaz.RU». August 5, 2013. 
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It is necessary to note that if China’s investments were put together with those from 
Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the Republic of Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Japan and 
ASEAN member states, it would be evident that Asian partners have provided with a 
more and more significant role than in the past. 
In 2014, the countries of the European Union (mostly the Netherlands (US$ 7 
billion), the United Kingdom (US$ 0.7 billion), France and Belgium (US$ 0.8 billion 
from each country) have become the largest investors in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, in the 
other four Central Asian countries its role was much smaller, with only the United 
Kingdom being a key investor. 
According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, in 2014 total FDI inflow to 
Kazakhstan amounted to US$ 23.9 billion, from which the Europe Union share accounted 
for US$ 10.7 billion or 45 percent of total FDI inflows to the country. Very significant 
investments were directed towards the energy sector65. 
The European Commission’s multi-annual cooperation with Kazakhstan and other 
countries of Central Asia has provided an investment of EUR 719 million for regional 
programmes and country-based projects between 2007 and 201366. The biggest share of 
these funds was allocated to social and economic development and supported for state 
and administrative reform, while regional programmes prioritized cooperation in the field 
of energy and transport, environment, education, security and stability. 
Russia is also one of the largest investors in Central Asian countries. Since the early 
2000s, Russia has begun to invest actively in the extraction and transportation of energy 
resources in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Moreover, Russia significantly 
invests in the space industry of Kazakhstan.  
In relation to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russia’s foreign policy is determined more 
by geopolitical interests, rather than economic feasibility. Investments in the hydropower 
                                                          
65 http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=469&switch=english National Bank of Kazakhstan, Official 
internet-resource.  Direct Investments Statistic according to the directional principle. 
66 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/central_asia_eu/index_en.htm Delegation of the 
European Union to Kazakhstan. 
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sector of both energy-poor countries are considered by Russia as a guarantee of loyalty 
to the local political regimes.  
Russia’s presence in the Central Asian energy sector is largely explained by the fact 
that the extraction of hydrocarbons in the region is technologically easier and 
economically more profitable than the extraction of hydrocarbons in the north of Russia, 
where the vast majority of oil and gas fields of the country are concentrated. Russia also 
has a range of opportunities to import gas on commercially attractive terms from Central 
Asia and the Caspian Sea through established Soviet era pipeline networks. Russia seeks 
to involve as much of Central Asian hydrocarbons in its energy balance in order to 
maintain domestic consumption, without reducing the volume of hydrocarbon exports to 
foreign markets, primarily to Western Europe. As a result of such a policy, exports of 
energy resources from Central Asian regions to Russia have steadily increased in recent 
years.  
Nonetheless, Russia’s investment in hydrocarbon sectors in Central Asia is modest 
in comparison with investments by other dominant international actors, and much of them 
are directed towards the economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, 
Russia’s presence remains rather limited, as Ashgabat only permits foreign companies to 
invest in offshore deposits, which are the most costly and challenging on a technical level. 
Because the status of the Caspian Sea remains unresolved, such deposits are also the most 
complex geopolitically since they are often close to the Iranian border. 
According to Western analysts, Russia is reinforcing Central Asia in its role as an 
exporter of primary resources by neglecting to develop its hydrocarbon refining capacity, 
especially the manufacture of products with high added value. In connection with this, it 
should be noted that during the Soviet era oil refining determined the considerable volume 
of mutual deliveries of “black gold” in Russo-Central Asian energy exchanges 
(approximately four times more than today) (Paramonov et al, 2008). 
 Laruelle (2009, p.7) asserts “Central Asian economies are destined to serve above 
all as transit zones for Russo-Chinese trade, hence the emphasis on infrastructure and all 
the freight-related services.” 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that Russia and China have refused ideological 
mediation in economic and political relations with Central Asian countries.  Russian and 
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Chinese political and economic strategies in Central Asia differ advantageously from the 
strategies of the US and EU. The latter are based on providing investments and loans to 
the countries of Central Asian in exchange for the implementation of democratic reforms 
that have proven to be ineffective in this region already by 1993 (see chapter 1 of this 
paper).  
Canada, Switzerland, and the Persian Gulf countries represent other large investors 
in the region. 
As follows from table 2.14, in the period under review, foreign investment inflows 
were directed towards the raw materials sector of Central Asian economies: extraction, 
processing, and transportation of hydrocarbons and metals. The production of enterprises 
supported by these investments is mostly exported abroad.  
The important factors of attracting FDI in this sector have been opening oil and gas 
fields for foreign investors and the permanent growth of prices for hydrocarbon and other 
raw materials. According to estimates of the International Monetary Fund, from 2003 to 
2013 hydrocarbon and metal prices increased more than threefold. 
FDI come to Central Asia in search of new markets in the non-tradable sectors. 
Table 2.14 illustrates that  the market-seeking motive is well represented in CAR, as 
witnessed by the high share of sectors serving domestic markets, including construction, 
real estate development, finance, trade, and communications in the structure of FDI. The 
share of non-tradable sectors is especially high in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which do 
not have large hydrocarbon deposits. Investments in non-tradable sectors are indirectly 
dependent on FDI in the natural resource sectors thanks to their contribution to economic 
growth and the expansion of domestic markets of recipient countries.  
Trade protectionism, which may be one of the reasons for market-seeking 
investments and which is practiced by some governments of the Central Asian region, 
does not attract much investment into sectors protected from the inflow of imports. The 
Daewoo and General Motors automobile plant in Uzbekistan, which was launched in the 
mid-1990s, is only one large protection-driven investment project in the CAR. No other 
manufacturing project of comparable scale unrelated to the region’s natural resources has 
been realized since then (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014).  
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Agriculture sectors receive relatively small shares of FDI or virtually no 
investments at all.  
  Labor force has also not attracted much investment into the CAR. The strong 
appreciation of regional currencies against the US dollar in 2000-2012 and the widespread 
migration of workers from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan into Russia and some 
other countries kept wages in the region relatively high and has not led to economically 
feasible investments in labor-intensive industries.  
As for efficiency-seeking FDI in Central Asia, the returns on FDI vary significantly 
by country and highly depend on the sectors receiving FDI. In Kazakhstan, where the 
energy sector is a key recipient of FDI, the rate of return on invested capital is the highest 
in the region and amounts to 25 percent. In Tajikistan, where the less profitable electricity 
generation is the main recipient of FDI, the rate of return amounts to 2.1 percent (Asian 
Development Bank Institute, 2014).  
In 2014 and for 9 months in 2015, the risks for foreign investors in Central Asia 
increased significantly owing to political unrest and an unfavorable situation on world 
markets. Currently, the region is indirectly touched by war sanctions between Russia and 
the West, and the dangerous expansion of IS terrorist groups.67 
Over the past two decades, the increased role of global value chains has transformed 
the world economy. The declining cost of communication and international shipping has 
caused production processes to be broken down into smaller parts and has spread across 
geographical areas. International commerce is now dominated by trade in intermediate 
products, rather than final goods and services. In this connection, it should be pointed out 
that in Central Asia there is no investment project that forms part of such global supply 
chains, principally due to lack of regional cooperation and an efficient transport 
infrastructure (European Bank for reconstruction and development, 2014). 
At the same time, in Central Asia the share of enterprises with full foreign 
participation and joint enterprises receiving FDI has constantly increased. For example, 
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the largest number of enterprises with participation of 
                                                          
67 http://www.ictsd.org/ Эксперты отмечают рост рисков для привлечения инвестиций в страны 
Центральной Азии (Experts note the increase of investment risks in Central Asian countries). International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. March 3, 2015. 
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foreign capital (8000 and 4833 respectively) have been registered in the region. 
Moreover, in Kazakhstan the share of enterprises with full foreign participation amounts 
to 53.8 percent of total enterprises receiving FDI (Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan; State 
Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan).  
Such a situation has led to no development of any competitive domestic industries 
after almost 25 years since gaining independence in the Central Asian regions. The 
national economies are almost entirely dependent on foreign investors - in receiving funds 
and new technologies, in geological explorations and mining of natural resources, in 
laying pipelines. This means that the technical and industrial structure of the Central 
Asian states is largely formed by external factors of the global economic order. For 
foreign investors, the Central Asian regions are a raw materials reservoir for the world 
economy and there is no contribution to the diversification of the local economies. 
As the high sectoral and geographical concentration of exports could increase 
export risks for the states of the region, foreign investment is also able to transmit a strong 
economic shock in the national economy. The significant inflows of foreign capital over 
a number of years, as well as a sharp decline in investment inflows could have a 
destabilizing impact on the dynamics of the economic development in the recipient 
country. 
Excessive investment in the natural resources sector caused by favorable 
commodity prices in the world markets may attract labor forces from the non-commodity 
sectors. This situation could lead to an increase in wages in the raw materials sector and 
the growth of the real exchange rate. Expensive national currency suppresses economic 
activity in the non-commodity sectors, due to the high production costs for domestic 
industries thereby causing deindustrialization of the national economy, and stimulates the 
switching of consumer demand for cheap imports. This situation in the economic 
literature is qualified as “Dutch disease” (Egert, 2013, p.3). 
The Kazakh economy, which has seen a boom of foreign investment in the raw 
materials sectors over the last two decades and has increased revenues from hydrocarbon 
exports, is predisposed to such a disease. The situation is saved thanks to the fact that, on 
the one hand, the significant parts of the national export revenues are purely nominal; in 
fact, they are the profits of foreign companies extracting hydrocarbon in Kazakhstan. On 
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the other, inflows of foreign currency are neutralized by massive capital flight from the 
country. 
Serious problems in the economy might arise also in the case of reduction of FDI 
inflows and export revenues. In this situation, a deep devaluation of national currency 
would provoke a new surge of inflation. Simultaneously, the purchasing power of the 
population and economic agents would reduce sharply thus leading to a decrease in final 
demand.  
All Central Asian economies are characterized by interest in attracting FDI, 
regardless of the country of their origin or their foreign policy orientation - Chinese, 
Russian, Western, and others. At the same time, over the last few years, China has 
increased its influence in Central Asia in comparison with other global actors. The main 
instrument of Chinese policy in Central Asia has become investments to the countries of 
the region, most of which were provided in the form of loans. Loans are issued 
proportionally to the recipient country’s commodity turnover with China, and are not 
necessarily on beneficial terms for the national economies (Semenova, 2012). For some 
of Central Asian countries, it makes the problem of the repayment of external debts 
relevant, and increases their dependence on foreign creditors (for the most part from the 
Chinese side), as it requires new loans mainly to pay off the old ones. According to 
analytical estimates, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the future may face the 
impossibility of servicing these loans.68  
 
2.4.5 External shocks and restrictive trade policies of the national governments  
After gaining independence, the total external debt increased significantly in almost 
all Central Asian economies (table 2.15). In connection with this, it is important to note 
here that the Central Asian post-Soviet states started their debt story from scratch, since 
Russia assumed all the external liabilities of the former Soviet Union (Zhukov et al, 2001, 
p.120).  
 
                                                          
68 http://ia-centr.ru/publications/19079/ Китайские кредиты странам Центральной Азии: риски 
очевидны (Chinese loans to the Central Asia countries: the risks are evident). A. Chekryzhov. “Berlek-
Unity.”  September 17, 2014.  
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       Table 2.15 Total external debt stocks* of Central Asian countries (current billion 
US$) 
 
Countries 1993 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Kazakhstan 1.7 12.9 43.9 119.1 124.3 135.5 148.5 
Kyrgyzstan 0.3 1.9 2.3 4.1 5.9 6.0 6.8 
Tajikistan 0.4  1.1 1.1 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.5 
Turkmenistan 0.3  2.6 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Uzbekistan 1.0 4.9 4.7 7.8 8.4 8.8 10.6 
           Source: The World Bank. 
         Note: *Total external debt is debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, goods, or services. 
Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, 
use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one 
year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
 
As follows from table 2.15, Turkmenistan has used fewer foreign loans than all the 
Central Asian states. The foreign debt of Turkmenistan remained unchanged from 2010 
to 2013 and amounted to US$ 0.5 billion. Kazakhstan has the highest external debt in the 
region, which amounted to US$ 148.5 billion in 2013.   
In order to estimate the amount of external debt it is necessary to consider also the 
ratio of external debt to GDP, since the value of this indicator measures the effectiveness 
of using foreign loans and credits (table 2.16).  
 
        Table 2.16 Total gross external debt of Central Asian countries (percent of GDP)  
 
 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan 78.9 67.2 64.6 67.5 72.9 72.1 
Kyrgyzstan 94.9 79.3 71.9 76.3 86.9 88.3 
Tajikistan 68.5 46.3 43.2 40.8 46.0 47.1 
Turkmenistan 11.9 18.1 21.1 16.8 18.6 16.4 
Uzbekistan 26.4 12.9 12.7 13.0 13.2 13.1 
          
          Source: The International Monetary Fund, 2015a. 
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Table 2.16 shows that during the period under review Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan had the highest ratio of their external debt to GDP among the Central Asian 
countries due to the attraction of significant foreign loans and credits. 
In 2014, in Kyrgyzstan the ratio of external debt to GDP amounted to 76.3 percent, 
it was the highest value of this indicator in the region. The significant increase of the 
external debt (from US$ 0.3 billion in 1993 to US$ 6.8 billion 2013) of Kyrgyzstan might 
indicate that slow economic growth in this republic (table 2.6) has been achieved only 
thanks to attracting foreign loans and credits. Foreign investment and loans have not 
allowed Kyrgyzstan to solve any of its economic problems caused by the significant state 
budget deficit, the stagnation of the economy and high unemployment, on the contrary, 
they have practically driven the republic into a “debtor’s prison”.  
At the same time, in the state balance of Kyrgyzstan, there are gold deposits with 
proven reserves of 430 tons, but corruption reduces the budget revenues from these gold 
deposits despite the fact that the country practically “stands on gold”. The most important 
political request of the Kyrgyz opposition has become the nationalization of the main gold 
field “Kumtor” owned by the international company “Centerra Gold Inc.”, and the 
contribution of which in the Kyrgyz economy in 2014 amounted to 11 percent of GDP, 
over 50 percent of industrial production and more than 50 percent of national exports69.  
Kyrgyzstan does not possess the necessary technical and financial resources to mine 
other gold fields. Therefore, the development of the mining industry in the country is only 
possible by attracting new foreign investment and loans. From 2014 the Chinese 
company, “Jin Zi” has begun to develop a gold deposit, “Taldy-Bulak Levoberezhny”, 
with proven reserves of 80 tons.  According to IMF forecasts, under these circumstances 
external debt for the following two years can only continue to increase. 
In terms of external debt, Turkmen and Uzbek economies are more balanced in 
comparison with the three above-mentioned economies. In 2014, the ratio of foreign debt 
to GDP amounted to 16.8 percent in Turkmenistan and 13.0 percent in Uzbekistan. At the 
same time, the ratio of foreign debt to GDP in both countries would be higher in 
                                                          
69 http://ria.ru/world/20121003/765322014.html В Киргизии снова митингуют, на сей раз – за 
национализацию рудника (Meetings for the nationalization of the gold mine are held again in 
Kyrgyzstan). RIA News. October 03, 2012).  
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comparison with the indicators that are shown in table 2.16, if we used the exchange rate 
on the “black markets” of these two states for calculations of GDP (see p.92 of this paper). 
In December 2014, Russia wrote off Uzbekistan’s US$ 850 million debt, or about 
8 percent of the total external debt of the country. According to analysts, the main factors 
that stand behind the Russian debt write-off are the prospects of Uzbekistan joining the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the strengthening of cooperation in security 
matters in the CAR70.  
Thus, as the analysis given above has shown, the impact of external factors on 
Central Asian economies leads to short periods of sharp economic growth, which are 
quickly replaced by no less rapid periods of recessions. Such a serrated pattern in the 
dynamics of economic development has imposed a number of restrictions on the Central 
Asian economies and has required that the national government must conduct an 
appropriate economic policy to minimize vulnerability to external shocks. The major task 
of national governments has become the attainment of an equilibrium in international 
trade and the establishment of mechanisms capable of dampening the demand 
fluctuations on the world markets thereby providing smoother dynamics of economic 
development in their countries.  
The Central Asian countries themselves cannot influence the level of their export 
earnings due to their dependence on a few trading partners and the predominance of 
exports of raw materials and low-processed manufacturing products. In this connection, 
the standard leverages to reduce current account deficit usually involves increasing 
exports or decreasing imports. The promoting of exports is accomplished directly through 
subsidies, custom duty exemptions, etc. Moreover, national currency devaluation, which 
influences the exchange rate and makes exports cheaper for foreign buyers, could also 
indirectly increase the balance of payments. The reduction of imports is realized through 
import restrictions, quotas, or duties. Furthermore, the reduction of wages or adjusting 
government spending to favor domestic suppliers indirectly could also lead to a 
                                                          
70 http://www.inozpress.kg/news/view/id/43290 Что стоит за списанием Россией долга Узбекистана 
(What stands behind Russia writing off the debt of Uzbekistan?).V. Volkov. «Deutsche Wele».  December 
11, 2014. 
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compression of imports. Less obvious methods to reduce a current account deficit include 
measures that increase domestic savings or reduce domestic borrowing. 
Energy-exporting Central Asian economies receiving high export revenues have 
had a relatively balanced current account in the post-transitional period, with the 
exception of Turkmenistan over the last two years (tables 2.17, 2.18). 
  
          Table 2.17 Current account balance of Central Asian countries (billion US dollars)  
 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan 0.1 1.0 1.1 3.4 -8.3 -6.7 
Kyrgyzstan -0.2 -0.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.3 -1.2 
Tajikistan -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 
Turkmenistan 0.7 0.0 -3.0 -2.9 -4.9 -3.5 
Uzbekistan 1.2 0.6 -1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
                 Source: The International Monetary Fund, 2015a. 
 
 
         Table 2.18 Current account balance of Central Asian countries (percent of GDP) 
 
 
Countries Average 
2000-11 
2012 2013 2014 Projections 
2015 2016 
Kazakhstan -1.0 0.5 0.5 1.6 -4.1 -3.1 
Kyrgyzstan -3.6 -15.6 -15.0 -13.7 -17.0 -15.2 
Tajikistan -3.9 -2.5 -2.9 -9.1 -7.1 -5.8 
Turkmenistan 4.1 0.0 -7.3 -5.9 -11.1 -6.7 
Uzbekistan 5.2 1.2 -1.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
                 Source: The International Monetary Fund, 2015a. 
 
 
As tables 2.17 and table 2.18 show, the Kazakh, Turkish and Uzbek economies have 
had current account surplus for most of the period under review.  
In Uzbekistan, trade surplus is regulated by a conscious restriction of imports. 
Kazakhstan has also used the reduction of imports in periods of unfavorable conjuncture 
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on the markets of raw commodities. However, in contrast to Uzbekistan, which is 
restricting import flows with administrative measures, Kazakhstan uses tools of the state 
economic policy such as the devaluation of the national currency.  
Kazakhstan’s economy has had a current account surplus in recent years but the 
negative impact of external shocks of 2014 and over nine months of 2015 have led to the 
macroeconomic instability of the country (currently, this trend is characteristic on the 
whole for all the countries of the Central Asian region). According to IMF forecasts, the 
deficit of the current account balance of Kazakhstan could amount to US$ 8.3 billion and 
US$ 6.7 billion in the next two years, or -4.1 and -3.1 percent to GDP respectively. 
On the one hand, the devaluation of the yuan and the depreciation of the ruble 
against the US dollar almost by half over the last year have made exporting into Russia 
and China ineffective for Kazakh exporters. On the other, an unfavorable raw economy 
reduction of hydrocarbon and metal prices on the world markets, which could decrease 
further in value due to the lifting of sanctions against Iran, has worsened the prospects for 
sustained economic growth in Kazakhstan.  
All these factors have forced Kazakhstan in the current year to conduct a 
protectionist policy to ensure export competitiveness of domestic industries in the 
countries that are major trading partners of Kazakhstan or produce similar products by 
means of joining the so-called currency wars (competitive devaluations). In August of 
2015, the Central Bank of Kazakhstan adopted the free-floating exchange rate of the tenge 
(the currency of Kazakhstan) in order to achieve a relatively low exchange rate for its 
currency, and eventually to increase export revenues.71 
During the last two years, Turkmenistan has had a current account deficit due to the 
decline of revenues from exports of hydrocarbon resources and owing to restrictions on 
the growth of investment spending adopted by the government of the country (The 
International Monetary Fund, 2015b). The available major international reserves provide 
a guarantee that the country could withstand the external shocks predicted by IMF in the 
following two years.   
                                                          
71 http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/61424 Обвал тенге. Казахстан вступает в валютную войну (The 
collapse of the tenge. Kazakhstan enters into currency wars). VGTRK. Economy news. August 20, 2015. 
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As for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, these states are far from achieving a current 
account surplus. In 2014, the deficit of the trade balance constituted -9.1 percent to GDP 
in Tajikistan and -13.7 percent in Kyrgyzstan. Such current account imbalances in the 
national economies hinder the predicted behavior of the exchange rates in both countries 
and exclude the conducting of any effective investment and industrial policy in them.  
The current account deficit indicates the lack of competitiveness of export 
industries in both republics, which in turn leads to the devaluation (depreciation) of the 
currencies of these countries. Given that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are unable to increase 
export earnings, the compression of imports is the only real way to achieve a balanced 
current account (through a further devaluation of the national currencies). However, if 
devaluation can ensure the competitiveness of domestic industries in such countries as 
Kazakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that are highly dependent on imported goods, 
devaluation instead can seriously reinforce the negative trends in the national economies 
(such as a new wave of inflation and recession in economic activity) and provoke social 
tensions. Further external borrowing for the financing of imports and the problem of 
repayment of external debts makes the stabilization of both economies in the long-term 
prospects impossible.  
 
2.5 Geoeconomic competition and the prospects of sustainable economic 
development in the Central Asian region 
According to Mackinder’s geopolitical theory, Central Asia is the Heartland of 
world politics. This theory asserts that the power, which controls the Heartland, could 
control world affairs (Mackinder, 1996; cited Zabortseva, 2012, p.169). 
In the nineteenth century, the region was the chessboard in the so-called “Great 
Game” for imperial rivalry existing between the British and Russian empires caused by 
their expansionist policies.  After a hundred years, the resurgence of the “Great Game” 
took place with diversified objectives, strategies, and players (Qamar, 2014; Davis et al, 
2004).  
Today the major world powers, such as China, Russia, United States, as well as 
some European countries, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan are interested in access to the natural 
resources of Central Asia. They seek to participate in the extraction and transportation of 
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Central Asian hydrocarbons, which, among other things, provide them with an 
opportunity to influence the political situation in the region directly. 
Access to an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves located in the 
Central Asian region and the Caspian Sea Basins, as well as to precious and rare-earth 
minerals “represents objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate corporate interests, 
rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations, and fuel international rivalries” 
(Brzezinski, 1997, p.125).  
Geoeconomic contradictions between external players for the resources of the 
region even in the short term create uncertainty connected with the direction of export 
flows and hinder economic development of the Central Asian states.  
Being a hostage of geostrategic players the CAR has not been able to become the 
independent and self-sufficient center of power and influence, thereby repeating in a 
certain sense the fate of the Middle East. Currently, Central Asia is being formed as a 
relatively isolated region from the global processes because multidirectional external 
forces do not allow the opening of a Central Asian space to equal economic cooperation 
with other regions of the world (Kazantsev, 2008). 
The fragility of the post-Soviet Central Asian economies, caused to a large extent 
by the globalizing processes which are impeding the crystallization of new nation-states, 
has led to foreign economic ties in the CAR shaped by transnational corporations, banks, 
financial and investment institutions. Commodity-oriented exports of Central Asian states 
and its geographical destination have derived from global network activities of 
transnational corporations and groups, which consistently expand and strengthen their 
control over the natural resources of the region, monopolize the national markets and 
undermine the sovereignty of the Central Asian states.  
Central Asian states are almost entirely dependent on foreign investors in obtaining 
financial resources and new technologies. FDI inflows into Central Asia, provided mostly 
in the form of long-term loans, firmly consolidate the raw materials niche of the region 
in the global division of labor and create the favorable conditions for the establishment in 
the CAR of an “external administration”, most probably from China.   
Over the past few years, thanks to low-interest loans, capital investment in 
infrastructure and projects for the extraction of natural resources, China has become a 
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major economic partner for all five Central Asian countries. Every year, China’s 
economic influence in Central Asia grows exponentially. On the one hand, China’s 
economy has huge needs for hydrocarbon resources and different types of mineral 
commodities from Central Asia because it aims to reduce dependence and the risks of 
maritime supplies from the Middle East and Africa. On the other, Beijing seeks to obtain 
economic opportunities to control Central Asia, turning it into a kind of buffer that helps 
to contain religious extremism and separatist forces in one of its largest and poorest 
bordering Central Asia Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Semenova, 2012). 
According to Mankoff (2013, p.22) “these roads, railway, and pipelines all underpin 
China’s growing economic and cultural presence in the region, and they are likely to have 
a more enduring impact on Central Asia’s long-term development than either the war in 
Afghanistan or Russian’s push for regional integration”.  
At the same time, Central Asian governments worry about the possibility of a 
popular backlash against Chinese development projects that seem to benefit Chinese 
companies and imported Chinese workers more than the local economies. Moreover, 
political elites in much of Central Asian republics fear that the changing trade and 
investment patterns threaten to replace Russian’s historical dominance of the region with 
China’s (Peyrouse, 2009).  
The reduction in Russia’s economic influence in the region, and the withdrawal of 
US forces from Afghanistan in 2014 (due to the rebalancing of the Obama administration 
toward the Pacific and significant cuts to the military budgets) changed both the nature 
and the extent of US interests in Central Asia. China today has become the most 
influential actor in Central Asia. 
However, according to some analysts, eventually, Russia and China and perhaps 
Iran are likely to be rivals for power and influence in Central Asia.  
According to Laruelle et all (2013), nevertheless “the Central Asian states are by 
no means merely passive objects of international confrontation, but are themselves fully 
fledged actors”. The presence of a certain degree of freedom in the formation of their own 
game rules by the Central Asian ruling elites, which they use to their advantage, cannot 
be ignored.  
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For example, Uzbekistan since 2005 has chosen to limit exploitation of new 
deposits and discouraged foreign activities in order to preserve its hydrocarbons for the 
future. Turkmenistan has been and still is very cautious about attracting foreign 
investments using restrictions on the growth of investment spending adopted by the 
government of the country (Laumulin, 2009; The International Monetary Fund, 2015b). 
Paramonov (2008, p.107) asserts that “the extraction of hydrocarbons in 
Turkmenistan on the land is controlled by the state. Only the development of offshore 
fields (in the Turkmen section of the Caspian Sea) on the terms of Production Sharing 
Agreements is available to foreign investors”. 
The comparison of the level of socio-economic development of countries rich in 
hydrocarbon resources (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) has shown that the 
results of using revenues from the export of energy resources vary by country. Only 
Kazakhstan has ensured sustained economic development. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
inadequately exploited revenues from the export of energy resources and did not provide 
desirable economic growth. 
Despite being involved in a difficult process of geopolitical balancing, all post-
Soviet Central Asian states have managed to distance themselves from binding to any one 
global or regional center. The ruling elites of Central Asian states want to extract 
maximum economic benefits from their geopolitical position by allowing the rent of 
transit routes and the location of military bases as steps to support their fragile economies. 
According to Bogaturov (2010, p.119), “the convergence of the course towards 
cooperation with Russia and China in Central Asian foreign policy on the one hand, and 
the desire to develop cooperation with the United States and the European Union, and 
involvement in military cooperation at the minimally required level on the other, is 
characteristic of the type of foreign policy which can be described as potential or delayed 
neutrality. In actual fact, this principle has become a system-making element in 
international relations in Central Asia.” 
The multi-vector policy that has been chosen by all the Central Asian states as the 
main foreign policy strategy has largely determined the search for international 
partnerships to assist them with exploiting their resources, as well as in ensuring national 
and regional security.  
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According to Malisheva (2010, p.16), “a very peculiar phenomenon has arisen in 
Central Asia - no diversification of purposes, but diversification of political partners, and 
substitution of national foreign policy priorities by simplified maneuvering.”      
Zahidov (2009, p. 27) asserts “currently in Central Asia a sort of peculiar foreign 
policy market has formed, where «buyer countries» with their interests are interacting 
with «seller countries» with their needs.”  
Despite the fact that balancing external actors gives Central Asian states a greater 
degree of strategic independence than they enjoyed in the first post-Soviet years and 
reduces the pressure on national governments to reform, such a policy is ultimately 
inefficient, and even dangerous from the point of view of Central Asian long-term 
political and economic interests.   
The multi-vector strategy based on foreign policy maneuvering, avoiding 
commitments, and achieving foreign loans and subsidies at the expense of their own 
sovereignty does not contribute to the transformation of the region into the independent 
subject of world politics. Various international partners for promoting their own, quite 
concrete geopolitical interests successfully use such uncertainty in foreign policy of 
Central Asian states.  
Geopolitical uncertainty in the region is also typical in the economy sphere.  As a 
whole, the unstable Central Asian economic models could provoke a political crisis and 
a new phase of redistribution of property, especially in the long-term outlook.  Reliance 
on favorable world commodity prices and concentration only on a few export products 
might create difficulties in the future, given that natural resources will eventually be 
exhausted and that global commodity prices remain volatile. Moreover, FDI into Central 
Asia has largely been limited to the extractive sectors, and they could be unreliable as a 
source of capital inflow in the long term.  
Population growth, which will continue in the region in the first half of the XXI 
century and the presence of serious restrictions in the development of the agriculture 
sector, could create pressure on the labor market. Export of labor can also provide only a 
short-term effect, but in the long-term outlook, it can increase social tensions. 
To achieve sustainable economic development, Central Asian states need to 
diversify their economies by reducing dependence on commodity exports and 
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remittances, and by broadening their appeal for foreign investment and technologies 
beyond the extractive sectors.  
On the one hand, greater product diversification would help Central Asian states to 
increase trade ties with major economic centers and to expand their market destinations. 
On the other, Central Asian states also “need to increase production and exports in the 
area of their comparative advantage, taking into account fixed costs and increasing returns 
in key sectors, such as oil, gas, and mineral extraction, as well as manufacturing sectors 
that require high capital intensity and entry barriers” (Asian Development Bank Institute, 
p.40-41). Thus, oil and gas services could become one of the most important sectors for 
transition from a raw material orientation economy to a high-tech economy in Central 
Asia.  
Furthermore, in order to improve the productivity of the export basket, exports 
should be diversified by new high productive goods. Among the most promising 
directions of industrialization in Central Asia, the development of light industry (textile 
and apparel), food processing and chemical (petrochemicals and fertilizers) industries 
should be noted.  
Sustainable economic development in Central Asia will also depend on regional 
trade and financial integration, investments in infrastructure and transport, and 
developing human and institutional capacity in management, financing, efficiency and 
maintenance. 
At the same time, the differences between oil exporters and non-oil exporters, and 
their dependence on different export commodities imply that a single universal approach 
may not be suitable for all the Central Asian economies.  
Today Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have the greatest opportunity to 
lead a successful industrialization. These countries have significant human resources, as 
well as the possibility of redistributing incomes from the export of oil and gas resources 
into other industries and in construction. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the possibilities 
for industrial growth are severely limited; however, with a successful economic 
integration with Uzbekistan, these countries could also have good chances of success. 
In connection with this, it should be pointed out that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
predetermined the disintegration of the Central Asian region and the breaking up of a 
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single economic space, although some authors argue that in the Soviet period the 
integration was with Russia, but not between the republics (Dadabaeva et al, 2014). 
Currently, the Central Asian states do not act collectively in the world economic and 
political space, but rather autonomously and very often in a bilateral format (especially 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).  
Five Central Asian countries have completely different geopolitical aspirations that 
have very little in common. In their foreign policies, they all are aimed at the achievement 
of their own national interests (primarily, for the legitimation of their authoritarian 
regimes) rather than on the development of mutual relations within the region. According 
to Laruelle (2013), the Central Asian regimes “want to open up to the world but shut out 
their neighbors”.  
The Central Asian states have completely mismatched economic strategies: 
Kyrgyzstan is pursuing a policy to reduce the regulatory role of the state. Kazakhstan 
forms a model of joint participation of the state structures and businesses in the economy. 
Uzbekistan acts in the opposite direction - it tends to retain its functions for the State. In 
Turkmenistan, the governmental structure and economic policies took unthinkable market 
economy forms, by adopting the elements of oriental archaic despotic regimes.  
Moreover, the gaps in the levels of economic development determine the low 
interest of the neighbors of Central Asian countries to trade with each other. Mutual and 
cross-border trade has a fragmented and unsystematic character. Dadabaeva et al (2014) 
say that only about 5 percent of total exports or imports of these countries accounts for 
the other Central Asian countries. The largest regional trade partner of all countries of the 
CAR is Kazakhstan (see table 2.12 of this paper). 
In the early years of the 21th century, cross-border trade was hampered by the many 
protectionist measures that the Uzbek authorities imposed. From 2009, border crossing 
became even more difficult, causing a decline in trade between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, aggravated by serious political unrest in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (Laruelle, 
2013). 
At the same time, the analogous nomenclature of exports, the informal regime of 
clan politics, the different models of economic development, and transport isolation of 
the poorest countries of the region undermine the interaction between the republics of 
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Central Asia and excludes the formation of a regional trade and economic block in the 
region. 
Moreover, the political disagreements between the leaders of some countries, in 
particular the personal rivalry between the Uzbek and Kazakh presidents, who have been 
in place since the years of perestroika, and who want to be granted the status of “first 
among equals”, has been a major challenge for regional cooperation in Central Asia.  
Due to unresolved border issues, customs barriers and complex inter-state relations, 
a considerable part of the turnover belongs to the “shadow” economy, which generates 
corruption and contributes to the appearance of organized criminal activities.  
Laruelle et al (2013, p.117) asserts that “while it may seem logical in the light of 
the region’s economic specializations that priority be given to major external actors, the 
absence of a regional market has drastically impeded the economic capabilities of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and weighs on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in 
the critical areas of food security, energy security, and water management”. 
The Central Asian states have never displayed a great eagerness for collaboration. 
All previous attempts within these states to form a regional intergovernmental 
coordination structure were unsuccessful. The contradiction between the countries of 
Central Asia always appeared stronger than the desire to cooperate.  
External actors within integration projects such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), some 
Western investment projects and others, determine the main regional cooperation 
mechanisms. China and Russia are the countries most involved in regional integration in 
Central Asia.  
Today Russia offers the countries of Central Asia the economic integration model 
of the Eurasian Economic Union, which operates through supranational and 
intergovernmental institutions, and is based on the model of the European Union. For 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (members of this organization since 2015), it has become the 
first supranational agreement since the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are recognized as potential candidates of the EEU and 
membership negotiations are ongoing.  
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The EEU is an alternative to Chinese (The Silk Road Economic Belt72), American 
(The Great Central Asia, the New Silk Road Project73), European (CAREC and 
TRACECA) and Turkish (mainly through the ideas of pan-Turkism) integration projects. 
On the one hand, the EEU opens to its country-members a wide single market for 
the free movement of goods, capital, services and people, and provides common transport, 
agriculture and energy policies, with provisions for a single currency and greater 
integration in the future. On the other, the EEC puts Central Asian states in front of a hard 
strategic choice that limits the multi-vectoral model of their foreign policy behavior. 
 This integration union raises increasing concerns for the other strategic players in 
the Central Asian region, especially with regard to the prospects of the implementation 
of the Chinese model of a free trade zone within the framework of the SCO (Dadabaeva 
et al, 2014).  
Overall, in the near future the different integration projects in the region could have 
a significant impact on regionalization and further political and economic development 
of the Central Asia states. Success by any of these political and economic initiatives will 
largely depend on the extent to which concepts put forward by external actors coincide 
with the present reality in Central Asia and the interests of the leaders of the region’s 
countries. 
                                                          
72 http://www.caspiania.org/2014/05/11/osobennosti-novoj-strategii-kitaya-v-otnoshenii-centralnoj-azii/    
Особенности новой стратегии Китая в отношении Центральной Азии Caspian (Features of the new 
Chinese strategy for Central Asia). Caspian Bridge – Information analytical Center. May 12, 2014.  
73 http://journal-neo.org/2015/04/27/rus-amerikanskaya-strategiya-dlya-tsentral-noj-azii-knut-i-pryanik 
US Strategy of Carrot and Stick in Central Asia. Electronic analytical journal New Eastern Outlook 2010-
2015. V. Panfilova. April 27, 2015. 
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Conclusions 
 
For Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union the transitional post-
Soviet period came to an end, but they are still in the process of transforming their systems 
towards a democracy and market-oriented economy. After almost twenty-five years of 
independent existence, they have become differentiated in their political and economic 
development levels and models. Nonetheless, the CAR and its countries today are 
characterized by growing complexity and uncertainty determined by a number of factors. 
1. The borders and national identities artificially formed in Central Asia in the  
Soviet era and which were preserved by the new successor independent states in the post-
Soviet period have led to ethnic controversies related to water and land distribution and 
have caused reciprocal complaints between the states across the region. The unresolved 
border issues are a background for the unpredictable and often uncontrollable movement 
of people, smuggling goods (weapons and drug trafficking) and diffusion of conflicts. 
The instability in the states of the region is exacerbated by the policy of ethno-national 
self-determination and the repression and persecution of Islamic activists conducted by 
incumbent presidents to legitimize their authoritarian regimes. 
2.  Despite establishing a complete set of democratic institutions, none of the post-
communist Central Asian countries has ensured the functioning of them or has solved the 
problem of political stability. The stabilizing capacities of the clan-based super-
presidential authoritarian regimes (many of the incumbent presidents are the former 
members of the republican Communist parties), which was achieved in the early stages 
of independence, no longer correspond to the current challenges and threats of the Central 
Asian states, nor to the development prospects of the entire region. The absence of an 
institutional mechanism for leadership succession only increases systemic contradictions, 
and leads to political crisis and a new phase of struggling among elites for the 
redistribution of power and property.  
3.  The break of mutual economic ties between the former Soviet republics and the 
impact of transformational shocks have led to deindustrialization caused by the removal 
of high-tech production and industries with high value added from the production 
structure of the Central Asian economies. The adoption of the new raw material and labor 
129 
 
export-oriented models of economic development in the post-Soviet period has not 
provided prosperity for society in Central Asia. The involvement of the state in the 
economy has led to the inequitable distribution of national wealth for the benefit of 
individual clans and ruling elites, a large non-observed economy, and corruption. A very 
low standard of living for a considerable part of the population has become a 
characteristic feature of most of the Central Asian republics: some of them are the poorest 
countries in the post-Soviet space. Rapid population growth aggravates the problem of 
unemployment and increases social tension. The immense migration of the working-age 
population causes high dependence on remittance flows. 
4. The deepening specialization of exports of raw materials driven by the demand 
from the major industrial economies has increased the dependence of Central Asian 
economies on a limited number of foreign markets that significantly heighten export risks 
from external shocks for the region. Geo-economic contradictions between external 
actors for the resources of the region create uncertainty connected with the direction of 
export flows and hinder economic development of the Central Asian states. Foreign direct 
investment provided mostly in the form of loans firmly consolidates the raw materials 
niche of the region in the global division of labor, it makes the problems of repayment of 
external debts in the long-term outlook highly relevant, and it creates favorable conditions 
for the establishment in the CAR of “external administration”, most probably from China.  
5. Currently, the CAR is not a politically and economically consolidated region. 
Intra-regional interaction among Central Asian countries is impeded by a range of factors, 
including the multi-vector foreign policy, disagreement between the leaders of some 
countries and analogous nomenclature of exports. Further fragmentation of the region 
could lead to a situation in which it ceases to exist as a subject of world politics, and most 
of its states would be attracted to other political and economic centers. The issue of the 
disappearance of the CAR within its present borders constantly arises when competing 
with other integration projects supported by external actors.  
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